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Preface
In the formative period of this republic, one of the most promi-
nent persons in American politics was Henry Clay ofKentucky.
From 1807, when the young senator came to Washington, until
1852, when he died in a hotel room there, he participated in
many important events. Known as a skillful pacificator, he
fashioned three great compromises of fundamental sectional
differences. During his tenure in the House of Representatives
(1811-1825), he advanced the role of speaker to that ofan influ-
ential policymaker. At first a Jeffersonian Republican, then a
highly visible leader of the Whig party, a senator, and a presi-
dential aspirant during the thirties and forties, Clay advocated
an economic nationalism called the American System. I have
focused on that aspect ofhis career.
This is a biographical perspective upon economic history.
It explores the character and impact of Clay's program for
growth of the United States in a political setting, as distin-
guished from existing studies of economic theory or econo-
metric analysis. On numerous issues, whether concerning
•tariff, banking, public land, or transportation, the positions
taken in congressional debate as well as during elections usu-
ally involved the meaning and applications of the Constitu-
tion, in a broad sense. So I have paid attention to this aspect
but have sought to integrate it with other relevant factors.
Hopefully, the result will be an improved understanding not
only of the life of Clay as a colorful pathmarker but also of the
dynamics of general history.
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1Jeffersonian
Nationalist
A t the beginning of the nineteenth century the new westernstate of Kentucky offered splendid opportunities to an am-
bitious young lawyer in the fast-growing town of Lexington.
Near the house of Henry Clay at Mill and Second Streets were
signs of a go-ahead community: shops of weavers, tailors,
blacksmiths, and saddlers, as well as establishments of distill-
ers and hemp manufacturers. A flourishing trade with the
East, the South, and foreign countries passed through the
great Ohio-Mississippi River system. The basic industry of
agriculture, especially in this fertile bluegrass region, was
thriving too. Here, as in other frontier areas, interest in land
was intense. Optimism stimulated speculation and settlement;
indeed it had done so as early as Revolutionary days when Vir-
ginians had blocked out large, if hazily bounded, grants in
their transmontane county. 1
, In 1800 Clay was only twenty-three. But he had defi-
nitely begun his ascent to prosperity and a favorable repu-
tation. Within months after emigration from his native
Virginia, he had secured admission to the bar and had begun a
profitable practice. And he had married the eighteen-year-old
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daughter of Thomas Hart, a leading merchant-capitalist in-
volved in a variety of enterprises. The Clays lived next door to
the Harts and wouJd become a family of social standing in
their own right.
This connection merely enhanced his prospects, which
depended chiefly on his unusual personal qualities. He was
tall, thin, and sandy-haired, with an expressive face. His per-
sonality, at times emotional and always engaging, would be a
never-failing asset. Intellectually, he was quick and resource-
ful. In an era of golden oratory he would be in the front rank
because of his ability not only to arouse but to instruct an au-
dience on almost any subject.
Given his circumstances, it was natural for him to move
into politics without delay. His background was Jeffersonian
Republican of the Virginia school. As a youth he had been a
student and assistant of Thomas Jefferson's mentor, Chancel-
lor George Wythe, in Richmond. He admired James Madison's
leadership in party conflicts with the ascendant Federalists
over domestic and diplomatic issues. Soon after settling in
Lexington, he took part in a lively debate over changing the
state's constitution, which, he thought, ought to be more demo-
cratic. Arrayed against the administration of John Adams, he
spoke out ardently against the Sedition Act of 1798 as vio-
lating state and individual rights. Now, during Jefferson's
presidency, he would be a steady supporter of Republican prin-
ciples and policies.
Like Jefferson himself, Clay tempered his subscription to
states'rights and limited government with a firm belief in posi-
tive efforts to forward economic development. For the republi-
can "experiment" to survive, the economy must support it.
Though identified as agrarians, Jeffersonians such as Clay
sought national strength and true independence by also
encouraging commerce and manufacturing. Perhaps there was
some ideological inconsistency. Nevertheless, constitutional
amendment and recourse to state and private action would be
available.
Clay's own rapid advance on the Lexington scene illus-
trates the relationship of political and economic elements of
early American society. His involvement in numerous under-
takings in addition to a law practice helps to explain the for-
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mation of his political ideas. His lifelong commitment to agri-
culture began with acquisition of hundreds of acres of land,
much of it near town, where his crops of hemp and grain, his
stock of horses and other animals, and his increasing number
of slave laborers justly classified him as a border-state
planter. The Clay family, including several children, occupied
a handsome new mansion on the property known as Ashland.
And he owned many parcels of land elsewhere, some as dis-
tant as Illinois and Missouri. But he had several other inter-
ests. He was a stockholder and proprietor of the hemp and
cotton spinning mill on Silver Creek in Madison County. He
was a director, as well as attorney, for the two banks then or-
ganized in the state. His property included many lots, houses,
and even a tavern in town. As a trustee, he had a strong com-
mitment to the administration of Transylvania University in
Lexington. In light of the breadth of· his personal concerns,
well beyond those of a mere lawyer or farmer, there is little
wonder that he expounded the merits of a growing, diversified
economy, fostered by government.2
So he did not wait very long before entering current po-
litical contests. At age twenty-six he won the first of seven
annual elections to the Kentucky House of Representatives.
Nor did the young legislator pause before taking a position of
leadership. He quickly became the chief spokesman for a Re-
publican majority against the dwindling Federalist ranks in
the debates, which were sometimes less than decorous. His
counterpart was Humphrey Marshall, a cousin of Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall and a bitter opponent in the House or on
the dueling field.
An early legislative conflict, however, involved a fellow
Republican, Felix Grundy, against whom Clay would be re-
peatedly arrayed in future years at the national capital. This
battle concerned the state's policy on banking. In 1802 the
legislature had incorporated the Kentucky Insurance Com-
pany in response to the hazards of a lively traffic on the west-
ern rivers. But in addition to regulations in the charter on
that subject, there was a provision authorizing the corpora-
tion to operate as a bank-to make loans and issue notes. For
a while it was the only bank in Kentucky and was yielding
large dividends to its stockholders.
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Representative Grundy took a staunch agrarian position
in attacking the company as a privileged instrument of mer-
chants to the disadvantage of honest farmers. Such banks
were inconsistent, he declared, with the principles of a simple
republican economy. Not so, Clay retorted. For desirable devel-
opment, the state must have adequate capital and.credit. Over
three sessions Grundy sought to repeal or severely amend the
company charter. Besides his economic defense, Clay con-
tended that revocation would amount to a breach of contract
violating vested rights. He managed to turn back a repeal but
had to maneuver cleverly to do so. As a bluff, he introduced a
bill to enforce state collection of old payments from occupants
of lands in the Green River area, for whom Grundy was speak-
ing. At length, both he and Grundy agreed to withdraw their
bills. Clay's victory was not complete, because Grundy had
previously succeeded in getting an amendment to the charter
requiring a larger reserve for note issues.3
Shortly afterward the legislature set up a second corpo-
ration, the Bank of Kentucky, in which the state would hold
half the stock and appoint not only half the directors but the
president as well. A mixed corporation, of which there were to
be many in the period, it had a rough road ahead and would
not last out its chartered lifetime. But Clay was quite satis-
fied with its organization; in fact, he became a director and
often an active one. In his view, such financial institutions
were indispensable to the commonwealth's prosperity.4
An equally important facility was a good transportation
system or, as then expressed, internal improvements. During
the first decade of the nineteenth century, Kentucky and the
rest of the western country suffered from slow, expensive
movement of the products they bought and sold. For some pur-
poses, it was nearly prohibitive to ship goods to and from the
Atlantic coast. Though westerners used the long route down
the river system to New Orleans and thence by sea, more so
after the Louisiana Purchase (1803) had assured access to that
port, the downriver barges were slow and upriver keel boats
were hardly practical. In 1810 Kentucky was the most popu-
lous trans-Appalachian state, and the annual value of its own
downstream shipments amounted to $1,182,000 out of a west-
ern total of $2,600,000. The next year the steamboat came to
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the Mississippi Valley and promised to increase that trade de-
cidedly-if river channels ·were clear and if falls and rapids
were neutralized. At Louisville the latter problem was most
acute. During much of the year river boats at the falls there
had to unload and reload cargoes, with all the cost and delay
that involved. For a long while, the slow and expensive project
of a canal and locks dragged on.5
In his second legislative session (December 1804), Clay
had reported a committee recommendation to charter a com-
pany for this work. A year later it was obvious that adequate
capital would have to come in substantial amounts from
stock subscriptions not merely by Kentucky but by neighbor-
ing states and the national government. Always, it seemed,
the cost would be underestimated. But Clay shared the pre-
vailing opinion in the West that a canal would be a key to
progress.6
The growth of manufacturing in Kentucky drew political
attention too. Clay's hemp crops contributed to the state's de-
velopment of an active industry turning out several products.
In addition to rope and sailcloth, a fabric for bagging southern
cotton became an important output. Throughout his legis-
lative career, Clay never neglected to pursue whatever was
necessary to benefit this industry. He deserved his occasional
title, the prince of hemp. In the legislature he guided a char-
ter for the Madison Hemp and Flax Spinning Company to
passage in 1808. Holding stock in the corporation and briefly
acting as a proprietor, he also assisted it as an officeholder.7
In the years after 1807 during a critical phase of the
Napoleonic wars, Britain and France invoked severe restric-
tions on neutral maritime trade. The United States reacted
with an embargo on trade and other countermeasures, and
eventually declaration of war in 1812. The West, as well as
the maritime East, suffered economically. States such as Ken-
tucky lost much of their agricultural exportation to Europe
and the West Indies (one reason for advocating military re-
sponse to Britain). But as in the Northeast, reduced imports
brought an impetus to western manufacturing. Clay was alive
to this ·dimension of national events and introduced resolu-
tions not only approving Jefferson's embargo but also urging
Kentuckians to use only goods made in America. Specifically,
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he proposed that legislators on a certain day wear clothing of
domestic rather than foreign manufacture.
During a name-calling exchange his 10ng-term·Federalist
adversary Humphrey Marshall attacked the resolutions so
heatedly that, with equal heat, Clay challenged Marshall to a
duel. Fortunately the encounter ended with no loss of life, the
challenger suffering only a minor wound. Notwithstanding
this personal unpleasantness, Clay was convinced he spoke
for a large majority on the necessity to attain economic self-
sufficiency as a nation.8
He interrupted his state legislative service briefly in
early 1807 when he went to Washington to fill out the term of
a senator who had resigned. The attraction of doing so was
largely his own financial interest. He had been involved in
land speculation himself and in extensive litigation as a
lawyer about unclear land grants, defective titles, and delin-
quent taxes. So he traveled to the capital and argued such
cases before the Supreme Court while attending the Senate.9
Again in sessions of 1810 and 1811 he replaced another sena-
tor. It was a time of difficult diplomacy, soon leading to Ameri-
can entrance into war, of decisions that the young war hawk
would influence. He also moved energetically into congres-
sional discussions about important domestic issues, allowing
him to draw upon his state experience.
Clay found an even stronger movement in Washington
than in Frankfort, Kentucky, for internal improvements. The
idea that action by the national government should develop
vital lines of transportation was gaining ground. But did Con-
gress have the power to enter upon an extensive program for
better roads and waterways? Here was a difficult question the
Republican administration confronted.
President Jefferson did not have the slightest doubt that
such projects were highly desirable for eastern commerce and
western expansion, for manufacturing and agriculture in the
country as a whole. Yet he could find no specific constitutional
authority, whether in commerce, defense, or postal clauses of
the document, for direct federal involvement. He had relaxed
his strict constructionism somewhat in approving Secretary of
Treasury Albert Gallatin's plan for the National Road in con-
nection with the congressional law of 1802 on statehood for
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Ohio. Since that measure preceded actual admission of Ohio
and therefore concerned a territory, over which there was a
larger scope of national power than over a state, and since the
Ohio legislature had entered a kind of compact, Jefferson felt
comfortable about this legislation. The procedure would devote
5 percent of federal land sales in Ohio to build the National
Road to and through that state. Later, the policy would be ex-
tended to Indiana and Illinois. Still, this undertaking seemed
to be a special case, not a precedent for other improvements.
They would require an amendment to the Constitution, and
Jefferson had recommended such a course.10
This was the status' of national internal improvements
when Clay arrived in the Senate in early 1807. He soon had
an opportunity to show his enthusiastic approval of a measure
for the federal district; a bridge across the Potomac to Alexan-
dria. His speech was a full-scale, animated argument, favor-
ably impressing some colleagues if not convincing those who
thought the existing Georgetown ferry was sufficient. At the
moment, opponents prevailed by one vote, but the bridge's
sponsors would win passage at the next session.11
Concurrently, Clay was at work chairing a committee on
aiding construction of a canal at the Ohio River falls. He
brought to the task his experience in getting a canal charter
from the Kentucky legislature. It was a matter of money,
which, he found, must be provided by several states in the
region as well as by Congress. He now made a good case for the
large benefits to the national economy from facilitating west-
ern commerce. Nevertheless, he had to go slowly, to ask only
for a commission to study the practicability of a canal. The
Senate approved by a good margin, but the House did not.12
In pressing for help on the Ohio canal, Clay allied with
senators advocating other plans, one of them a Chesapeake-
Delaware canal.. James Bayard sought to subsidize a twenty-
mile connection of rivers flowing into those bays, particularly a
goal ofPhiladelphia shippers as access to the Chesapeake. The
formula, similar to many in the future, would use federal land
grants to subscribe stock in a private company: Public land
would furnish capital for a mixed governmental-private under-
taking. Another memb~r of the Senate, John Quincy Adams,
voted against these proposals because, with some reason, he
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suspected logrolling by a coalition of local interests to raid the
treasury. Adams urged a more systematic, general approach to
improvements, but his motion to that effect failed. 13 Mter the
Senate postponed acting on the Chesapeake-Delaware ·re-
quest, another member's motion for requesting a comprehen-
sive report by the secretary of treasury did pass.14
Gallatin complied with this request enthusiastically. His
report ofApril 1808, a year later, was a detailed survey of ex-
isting land and water routes and became a classic blueprint
for future development. With information elicited from public
officers and persons active in all fields of transportation, such
as Benjamin Latrobe and Robert Fulton, Gallatin laid out a
nationwide program. He recommended a continuous north-
south inland waterway paralleling the Atlantic coast, linking
bays and sounds from Maine to Georgia with canals. To de-
velop east-west communication, he would improve river sys-
tems on either side of the mountains and build turnpikes,
joining the nation's sections into one network. He would urge,
adoption of some currently contemplated projects, including
Clay's canal at the Louisville rapids and another from the
upper Hudson River to Lake Erie.
The secretary's geography and his economic diagnosis
were very good, much better than his thoughts on how to exe-
cute the grand design. He estimated it would cost $16,600,000.
And since some states would not benefit as much as others, he
would distribute an additional $3,400,000 to them for local
purposes. Raising the total to $20 million seemed manageable:
appropriate $2 million annually for ten years, to be obtained
from proceeds of public-land sales. Quite practical, he thought,
since the treasury's yearly surplus then amounted to $5 mil-
lion. Ofcourse, his figures on construction were unrealistic-in
the report itself he remarked on costs of road building in Con-
necticut, amounting to a million dollars for each hundred
miles. Furthermore, the surplus of funds represented revenue
from customs, which had been unusually large because foreign
commerce had expanded during the war in Europe. This rev-
enue would soon shrink with adoption of an American em-
bargo, ,and fiscal problems would continue on through the War
of 1812.15
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There was also the constitutional problem. Jefferson's
messages had warned Congress that an amendment empower-
ing national action was required. Gallatin recognized the
difficulty and mentioned the options ofstate consent or govern-
mental subscription to stock of private companies. Whether
any of these solutions was politically possible was unclear. In
any event, Jefferson and Gallatin had made a convincing case
for the value of internal improvements-to stimulate economic
growth, to hold the Union together, even to help public finance
by boosting the value of the public domain.16
These were valid arguments for the long run, but now
few positive steps could be taken. Often discussed, a constitu-
tional amendment made no progress. Legislation decidedly
lagged, owing to diplomatic and subsequent military priori-
ties. In 1810 Clay's colleague.in the Senate, John Pope, sought
to pass a bill with many features of Gallatin's report, financed
by governmental land grants and subscription of company
stock. Peter Porter of New York, whose political views were
identical to those of his friend Clay, delivered an extensive
speech forcefully putting the case in the House, but all was in
vain. That was true not only of his efforts but those by DeWitt
Clinton and others from New York who were lobbying for aid
to dig the Erie Canal. Internal improvement advocates could
get only modest appropriations ·to build a section of the Na-
tional Road from Cumberland, Maryland, toward Ohio.17
The Republican administrations of Jefferson and Madi-
son were also reacting to the transformation of manufacturing
then under way. They favored policies supporting industry
mainly to achieve national economic independence at a time
of disrupted foreign commerce and of possible involvement in
war. Near the close of his presidency early in 1809, Jefferson
emphasized the desirability of an "equilibrium" of manufac-
turing, agriculture, and commerce. He warned against the
danger posed by an aggressive Federalist commercial interest,
understandable in view of his irritation with its vexing
opposition to the recent embargo legislation.18 His successor,
Madison, in annual messages to Congress recommended
protecting manufactures that had developed during the Na-
poleonic wars when imports from Europe had declined. He es-
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pecially had in mind more assistance to cotton textiles from
the tariff. 19
Accordingly, the House Committee on Manufactures re-
ported its approval of the president's view and of pleas from a
number of petitioners.2o For more information the House also
asked Secretary Gallatin to report on the general status of
manufactures, indicating the extent to which they had been
established and providing a plan to protect those requiring
protection. After a year-long process of collecting data, the sec-
retary forwarded his admittedly incomplete findings in April
1810. He described the trend toward mechanized production
in factories and the roles of labor and capital. Then he sug-
gested that some products were in sufficient quantity to meet
the domestic demand, but that many others still needed pro-
tection by higher customs rates or governmental bounties or
loans. He particularly pointed to textiles, which had received
a stimulus from the reduction of European imports. He also
included in this category not only iron manufactures but iron
itself, a surprising situation in a country with such rich re-
sources. In fact, that was true of other raw materials.
Throughout the document the theme of fostering diversifica-
tion was evident, to the degree of endorsing the goal of a bal-
anced economy and a home market in the manufacturing
sector for the country's output of food, fiber, and ores. Despite
a strong effort, Gallatin concluded that he had been unable to
supply all the desired information. He advised use of the
coming census of 1810 to fill the gaps.21
Census takers did compile a large body of detail, though
results were still incomplete and defective. To make the report
more intelligible, the House directed preparation of a digest,
which fell to Tench Coxe, former assistant to Alexander Hamil-
ton in the Treasury and dedicated promoter of manufacturing.
His report of 1813 surveyed a wide range of industries and
tabulated the annual value of production by each, with textiles
the largest. He took the liberty of amending, substantially up-
ward, the total annual value of all manufactures from $120
million to $173 million.22
After Clay returned to the Senate in early 1810, he was
quite aware of this rising interest in economic development.
During debate on the military appropriations bill, he vigor-
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ously supported an amendment instructing the secretary of
the Navy in purchasing supplies to give preference to domes-
tic over foreign hemp products (rope and sailcloth). He spoke
as he would throughout his career for this important interest
back home. Kentucky's dew-rotted hemp, however, was handi-
capped in competition with the superior water-rotted variety
from abroad. As long as the European war continued, the do-
mestic market did make gains, but in the future Clay and
other hemp planters would have to improve their methods.
Clay's specific argument about hemp rested on a broader
exposition of economic self-sufficiency. He rejected the famil-
iar warning that America must avoid commitment to industri-
alization or suffer the social ills so apparent in British
manufacturing centers. All the nation needed to do, he said,
was to produce only.what it needed at home and not strive for
a world market. Then the United States would be as happy as
a self-reliant family household, unhurt by outside exploita-
tion. Besides, the American setting and character differed so
much from Britain's that he perceived no risk. His criticism of
what he called economic colonialism must have caused his
fellow senators to smile: "For many years after the [Revolu-
tionary] war, such was the partiality for her [British] produc-
tions, that a gentleman's head could not withstand the
influence of solar heat unless covered with a London hat-his
feet could not bear the pebbles or frost of this country unless
protected by London shoes-and the comfort or adornment of
his person was only consulted when his coat was cut out by
the shears of a tailor 'just from London.'" His most memorable
words were "Others may prefer the cloths of Leeds and of
London, but give me those of Humphreysville TConnecticutJ."23
Tariff policy became unavoidably entangled with diplo-
matic and financial aspects over the next several years. As the
United States invoked commercial restrictions on belligerent
nations in Europe, another possible action was to raise tariffs
to an extreme height. A 50 percent proposal came to the
Senate at the time of Macon's Bill Number Two in 1810. Clay
favored the idea, but it failed passage.24 Then when war
against Britain was declared in 1812, all rates were doubled
for the duration to obtain badly needed revenue. This policy
aided American business somewhat, but its principal signifi-
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cance was probably to whet the appetite of protectionists af-
terward.25
Another issue upon which many Jeffersonian Republi-
cans moved away from their original strict-constructionist po-
sition concerned banking. In 1811 the twenty-year charter of
the Bank of the United States (BUS) would expire. Its useful-
ness to the government as a public depository and as a
provider of currency in its circulation of notes, as well as its
relationship to the economy in credit and exchange opera-
tions, recommended it to persons of both political parties.
This was true of Gallatin, who endorsed recharter with Presi-
dent Madison's acquiescence. A year in advance of the date of
expiration, the Senate discussed a renewal bill. Though Clay
did not speak on the measure, he showed some dissatisfaction
with the institution by proposing restrictions on it. He was
not completely negative, however, and voted against termi-
nating the bank. The Senate deferred action.26
An all-out debate followed at the next session. William
Crawford, chairman of the Senate committee, reported for
recharter with generous praise of a constructive role of the
BUS. He reflected sentiment of a sizable number of fellow Re-
publicans. Still, the final vote was going to be close, not on
strict party lines. Some members of Crawford's party adhered
to pure Jeffersonianism to oppose renewal, and others appar-
ently opposed because they disliked Gallatin or because they
were influenced by competing state-bank opinion.
Clay was among those Republicans who argued against
the national bank bill. One of his reasons was practical and
concerned the situation in Kentucky. His professional and po-
litical connections with the Kentucky Insurance Company
and the Bank of Kentucky, both of which had complaints
against the BUS, probably had an effect. Then the legislature
had instructed the state's senators to oppose recharter. The
other reason was ideological. In his set speech during the
senate debate in February, he advanced a constitutional argu-
ment similar to the well-known Jeffersonian opinion on the
original. chartering in 1791.
He contended that establishing this corporation could not
be justified as an implied power, necessary and proper to
carry out congressional powers enumerated in Article I, sec-
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tion 8, of the Constitution, such as authority to tax, to pay
debts, or to regulate commerce. Just as Jefferson had written
twenty years earlier, the power to set up a corporation had
been denied in the federal convention of 1787. As for the pres-
ent, Clay could not agree that the bank was performing any of
these necessary functions. Here he recounted a humorous
anecdote: "Like the Virginia justice you tell the man, whose
turkey had been stolen, that your book of precedents fur-
nishes no form for his case, but then you will grant him pre-
cept to search for a cow, and when looking for that he may
possibly find his turkey! You say to this corporation, we
cannot authorise you to discount-to emit paper-to regulate
commerce, &c. No! Our book has no precedents of that kind.
But then we can authorise you to collect the revenue, and,
whilst occupied with that, you may do whatever else you
please!"27
The senator joined colleagues in depicting the specter
of a privileged corporation-it was truly an exploitative mo-
nopoly, he declared. Worse still, foreigners, mainly British citi-
zens, owned 70 percent of its stock. And now that the United
States faced arrogant British policies paralyzing maritime
commerce and perhaps instigating a war, the danger was
even greater.
The senate vote was seventeen to seventeen, whereupon
Vice President George Clinton broke the tie. It was said· that
Clay wrote or at least contributed to Clinton's statement ex-
plaining the decisive blow. To cap the bank's defeat, its re-
quest for an extension of time to wind up its operations was
not granted. Clay was chairman of the committee recom-
mending rejection.28
At this juncture, early in 1811, attention to domestic
issues was declining as diplomatic and military concerns
became dominant. Elected to the House, Clay began his long
service as Speaker later that year and played a leading role in
pressing for war against Britain, declared in June 1812. Two
and a half years of conflict, marked by political discord and
military stalemate, ended with negotiations at Ghent, to
which Clay went as one of the peace commissioners.
In addition to discussions about postwar boundaries, re-
sulting in no changes of antebellum lines, two economic sub-
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jects were considered by the treaty makers: (1) British access
to and use of the Mississippi River from Canada, and (2)
American "liberty" of fishing in waters off Newfoundland.
Both privileges dated back to the treaty of the Revolution
(1783), but the present war may have terminated them. The
first seems to have been a symbolic question, since the Cana-
dian boundary did not extend as far south as the source of the
Mississippi, thus making access rather impractical. Clay
staunchly opposed any concession, however, for he knew how
sensitive his fellow westerners were about this great commer-
cial artery. The second subject, the Atlantic fisheries, was an
important interest of New England, also viewed as at risk and
perhaps with better reason. Clay's colleague John Quincy
Adams of Massachusetts, with concurrence of two others of
the five American commissioners, insisted that both rights,
access to the Mississippi and the fisheries, be renewed by ex-
press provision. Clay vehemently opposed what he saw as an
unacceptable bargain to benefit New England at western ex-
pense. Then followed moves and countermoves, culminating
in deletion of any mention of either matter in the Treaty of
Ghent (1815). Adams would get his fishing rights in a subse-
quent agreement (1818), but the whole episode left him and
Clay with hard feelings toward one another.29
A follow-up move was to negotiate a British-American
commercial convention. It was desirable to obtain one because
earlier provisions had lapsed. Both sides wished to stimulate
trade with one another, for it was complementary in many
ways. So Clay went to London in spring 1815 for this purpose,
joined by Bayard, Gallatin, and Adams, the new minister to
Britain.
Throughout the talks, Clay tried to get British acknowl-
edgement of neutral maritime rights against impressment of
sailors and spoliations of ships and cargoes, rights claimed by
the United States before and during the late conflict. To the
extent of persuading his English counterparts to discuss these
matters, he succeeded; but that did not produce any explicit
commitment, just as nothing had been gained in the Treaty of
Ghent.
Clay and his colleagues did sign a commercial convention,
assuring freedom of each nation from discrimination in ton-
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nage duties on its ships and in import rates on goods carried
by those ships. This was a modest retreat from long-standing
navigation laws of the two signatories. Britain managed to
retain some of its system by way of imperial preference, since
the United States benefited only in trade with Britain proper
and with its possessions in India, but not with its West Indies
islands and other colonies. The breakthrough toward equal
shipping rights did, however, provide a model for future
treaties.30
At its next session, in 1816, Congress debated a bill put-
ting the trade agreements into effect. Because of a continuing
ban of American ships from the West Indies, there were un-
derstandable objections to allowing nondiscriminatory entry
of British ships arriving in the United States on indirect
routes from their home country, including stops at those
Caribbean colonies. Clay said very little during this discus-
sion in the House, but he entered briefly a debate on the rela-
tionship of commercial treaties and congressional statutes
under the Constitution. Some opponents of the agreement
contended that a treaty had no effect unless supplemented by
a statute. Others thought Congress could enact a law nullify-
ing a treaty. Clay reasoned that a statute was permissible,
though unllecessary, to execute the treaty; but he thought in
this case the House ought to enact one, repeating the terms of
the convention. Anglo-American trade would, however, create
many problems in the future. 31
2The American
System
The decade after the Tre~ty of Ghent, from 1815 to themiddle twenties, was a time of emerging economic trends.
The end of the European war, in which the United States had
long been entangled, diplomatically and then militarily, meant
that the nation could now direct more attention to domestic af-
fairs. Westward migration into the Ohio and Mississippi Val-
leys populated several new states from the Great Lakes to the
Gulf of Mexico. The South strengthened its plantation system
and its institution of slavery to produce an ever larger output
of cotton. And the Northeast was industrializing and urbaniz-
ing at a startling pace.
Politically, a current of nationalism moved men and
events. Though the peace commissioners had failed to assure
neutral maritime rights or to acquire territory, at least the re-
public had passed through the ordeal without loss and with
pride in standing ground against powerful Britain. This psy-
chological impact, although difficult to measure, contributed
to a surge of nationalism. One beneficiary was the Republican
party, now dominant over the Federalists, who were associ-
ated with an unpatriotic, narrow-minded opposition to the
war. Nationalism competed with the old agrarian tradition,
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and the triumphant Jeffersonians became advocates of such
nationalist policies as a national bank, a protective tariff, and
even federal internal improvements.
Through most of these postwar years, Clay was Speaker
of the House. Exceptions were the congressional session (1814-
15) when he was abroad on the peace commission and a three-
year period (1821-23) when he did not seek reelection to the
House. Otherwise, he presided over the lower chamber until
he became John Quincy Adams's secretary of state in 1825. So
he was at the center of political debate and decision making
when these nationalist tendencies arose. Since the two presi-
dents, Madison (1815-17) and James Monroe (1817-25), did
not exercise strong leadership on Capitol Hill, and since the
earlier two-party system had disintegrated, Clay's role was all
the more influential.
To be sure, he never disclaimed his Jeffersonian roots-
he often declared that Madison's report to the Virginia legis-
lature in 1799 on broad states' rights exactly expressed his
own political creed. Nevertheless, on specific issues he, as well
as many others of the day, seemed to be confirming a Hamil-
tonian creed of expansive nationalism. He was attuned to pre-
yailing sentiment, but he also drew upon his own experience.
Where he seemed inconsistent with an earlier position, for ex-
ample on a national bank, he insisted that conditions, not his
basic ideas, had changed.
In the session of 1816, Clay and like-minded congress-
men sought governmental encouragement to industrialization
then under way. Several industries-iron, flour, glass, leather,
textiles-had benefited from reduced imports during the war.
Further impetus came from a large pool of investment capital,
a plentiful supply of fiber, food, minerals, and lumber, a good
source of labor for the new factories, and advances in tech-
nology for mechanized, efficient production. 1 The industry un-
dergoing the most spectacular change was that of cotton
textiles. Francis Cabot Lowell and other merchants of New
England established mills with new machines to spin yam
and weave cloth. They employed large numbers of women and
children in paternalistic environments. By avoiding urban lo-
cations, they hoped to sidestep the social ills that afflicted
British mill areas, notably Manchester.2
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With such progress in industrialization came a feeling
that public policy ought to be more positive. And the most ob-
vious positive assistance to enterprise in its infancy was be-
lieved to be a protective tariff. The largest share of foreign
goods now came, as usual, from Britain. In 1815, the first year
of resuming commerce, British imports amounted to $85 mil-
lion. The next year they soared to $151 million, bringing on
the charge that Britain was "dumping" goods at unfairly low
prices to smother American producers.3 A widely reported
remark of Lord Henry Brougham in Parliament added cre-
dence to that complaint: "It is well worthwhile to incur a loss
upon the first exportation, in order by the glut, to stifle in the
cradle, those rising manufactures, in the United States, which
the war had forced into existence, contrary to the natural
course of things."4
Enactment of a tariff would not be a novelty, for Congress
had legislated on the subject almost every year since the
adoption of the Constitution. The first measure, in 1789,
shaped and sponsored by Representative Madison, announced
in its preamble an objective of encouraging and protecting
American manufactures. Of course another, more pressing
reason for the enactment was a desperate need for revenue, so
sadly lacking during Confederation days. The average rate of
8 percent represented a compromise for the moment between
the two principles of revenue and protection, but it was only
the beginning of a continuing interaction. A significant point,
however, is that at this time there was little if any constitu-
tional objection to the protective option.5
Among early advocates of a tariff to foster American
manufactures, Tench Coxe of Pennsylvania stands out. As a
young, aggressive publicist, Coxe tried to persuade the consti-
tutional convention of 1787 to frame a document that would
promote economic growth and national self-sufficiency. He put
forward a rationale that would have a long political life. In-
dustrialization, he said, would result in a balanced economy,
with mutual benefits to agriculture, commerce, and manufac-
turing. This was the essence of the home-market argument.
Then when Representative Madison was guiding the tariff bill
to passage in 1789, Coxe supplied him with large amounts of
information and with anti-British, protectionist reasons for a
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schedule of formidable rates. Coxe became assistant secretary
of treasury under Hamilton and contributed significantly to
the secretary's well-known Report on Manufactures.
Coxe's later publications in 1794 and in 1814 (the digest
of the census of 1810) were undoubtedly known to politicians
like Clay.6 It was probably through materials such as those of
Coxe and of later popular writers that Clay equipped himself
with some everyday concepts of political economy.
At the beginning of this postwar session, in early 1816,
the House centered its attention on fiscal policy. A public debt
of $120 million represented heavy borrowing during the con-
flict, even though Congress had laid excise and direct land
taxes and doubled tariff rates. Now the question was how
much the government should rely upon taxes and how much
upon import duties. Through January, Clay repeatedly
stepped down from the Speaker's chair to urge reduction of
taxes. He was pleased that the direct levy on land would be
phased out the following year and that reliance on other taxes
would diminish in comparison with proceeds from public-land
sales and especially from the tariff. His aim was to strengthen
the argument for a high tariff to protect manufactures by de-
pendence upon it also as the major source of revenue. 7
In an earlier message President Madison had recom-
mended that Congress consider "means to preserve and pro-
mote the manufactures which have sprung into existence, and
attained an unparalleled maturity throughout the United
States, during the period of the European wars."8 On February
13, 1816, the House Committee on Commerce and Manufac-
tures responded to a stream of petitions by textile manufactur-
ers with a report describing the status of that industry and the
desirability of governmental assistance. Statistics in the docu-
ment revealed enormous growth. Mills had used only five hun-
dred bales of cotton in 1800 but ninety thousand in 1815. Total
capital in the industry amounted to $40 million; and the labor
force rose to one hundred thousand persons, nine-tenths of
them women and children. To encourage further development
in face ofa menacing British competition, the committee called
for higher import rates.9
The same day, Secretary of Treasury Alexander Dallas
reported on revising the tariff. He envisioned three levels of
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imposts: (1) high rates on goods that this country made in suf-
ficient quantity to satisfy domestic demand; (2) lower but pro-
tective rates on goods that, if encouraged, could be produced
in sufficient quantity; and (3) still lower rates, for revenue
only, on goods that American manufacturers could not supply.
For textiles in category 2, the secretary recommended ad val-
orem duties of 33 t percent, much higher than the prewar
level but lower than that of wartime.10
In late March, with adjournment approaching, the House
began debate on a bill presented by William Lowndes, chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee. Some rates in this
version were lower than than those recommended by Dallas-
that on cotton textiles would be 25 percent. Clay entered into
discussions on numerous features of the bill; but like others,
he showed the greatest interest in the section on textiles. He
tried several times to restore the 33 t percent in the Dallas
report or at least 30 percent for three years before a reduction
to Lowndes's 25 percent. Here he encountered resistance from
Daniel Webster, who was concerned about an adverse effect of
protectionism on New England shipping. At last Webster got
the better of him, and the final vote was for 25 percent for
three years, then 20 percent on cottons. Woolens received the
same treatment, and Clay was no more successful on the
hemp rate. 11
Despite his aversion to full-scale protection, Webster did
respond to needs of New England's manufacturers. On hand
was Francis Lowell, who lobbied effectively for his textile com-
panies in Massachusetts. Webster later recalled, "I was much
with him, & found him full of exact practical knowledge, on
many subjects."12 The subject about which Lowell was most
knowledgeable was inexpensive cotton sheeting, in which his
mills specialized, though in competition with low-priced im-
ports from British India. So Lowell got Webster's help for
adding a provision to the bill placing a minimum value of
twenty-five cents per square yard on such goods for purposes
of assessing ad valorem. As time passed, this minimum
system would virtually prohibit imports of cheap cottons (with
actual value far below twenty-five cents) and would be the fa-
vorite target of antiprotectionist complaint.13
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In light of future events, the position of John Calhoun is
noteworthy. Then in his nationalistic phase, Calhoun spoke
warmly in support of these textile rates. The true policy, he
said, must be a regard for all elements of the economy: manu-
facturing, commerce, and agriculture. What benefited one
benefited the others. Cotton manufacturing required an ever
larger quantity of southern fiber. Mill workers were con-
sumers of other agricultural products. Foreign and domestic
commerce carried and profited from the output of industry.
Factories operated successfully when there was a good mar-
ket for their goods. ·Besides, a self-sufficient nation would not
be at risk of foreign exploitation or wars. And the values of the
republic, the liberty of its citizenry, and the perpetu~lunion of
its states would be enhanced. Liberty and union, he declared,
were inseparable. In his postnationalist years he would hear
his adversary Webster utter the same sentiment.14
Now Clay and Calhoun were kindred spirits. The home-
market idea, national economic independence, the favorable
impact of industrialization, and governmental promotion of
these conditions all had become basic concepts of the Speaker's
ideology. When the tariff bill passed, he could be heartened at
least by the commitment it made to economic growth and
could hope for further progress in fulfilling that commitment.
The statute ofApril 1816, however, turned out to be only
moderately protective-rates on many imports, including cot-
tons, were actually lower than they had been during the war.
The levy on hammered iron would be even less than the
prewar level. Raw wool, sugar, hemp, and a number of other
items did not get the kind of protection Clay had sought. And
generally, the ad valorem system allowed circumvention by
the much reviled auctions to undercut American competitors
at port cities. To say all this is simply to recognize a persistent
characteristic of all tariff history, its open-ended, always con-
troversial presence in the nation's politics.15
Dissatisfaction with the new rates and with weaknesses
in collecting customs soon induced movements for more
protection. In a number ofcities, societies for promoting manu-
factures were forming, holding conventions, and petitioning
Congress. Their memorials complained about imports flooding
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the market, consequent problems ofAmerican producers, and
an inadequate law just adopted. Lobbyists and propagandists
visited Washington during the session of 1817-18.16 Modest
help came from President Monroe's annual message, briefly
calling attention to the value of manufactures. "Their preser-
vation," he said, "depends on due encouragement" by Con-
gress. 17
A bill passed for postponing reduction of the duty to 25
percent on cottons and woolens until 1826. Other measures
raised the schedule on selected products, such as glass, iron,
and other metals. A drive for still more decisive action seemed
to be gaining ground.18
An added factor was the downturn of economic conditions
in 1819. Banks had overextended and were unable to resume
specie payment for their notes. The new Bank of the United
States had failed to provide the dependable base expected of it,
had also overextended, and then had suddenly attempted to
retrench. Merchants, farmers, and land speculators had been
caught up in this cycle of expansion and contraction. As a
result price levels declined sharply and would remain lower
for a long time. Unemployment of labor and bankruptcy of
businesses spread discouragement across the land. Protection-
ists reacted by blaming the continued unfavorable balance of
foreign trade, which, they concluded, only a higher tariff could
correct. Their logic might have been questionable, but tariffre-
vision seemed necessary anyhow because the Treasury needed
v more revenue, as Secretary William Crawford had explained.19
So in April 1820 the House began consideration of a bill
for these purposes. As Speaker, Clay had attended to the nec-
essary groundwork of committee appointments and of plan-
ning the strategy. It was now near the end of the session, and
the legislators' thoughts had focused month after month on
the Missouri Compromise. Henry Baldwin, a western Penn-
sylvania protectionist, presented a report for upward revision,
nearly doubling many ad valorem rates, increasing those on
textiles from 25 to 33 percent, and raising specific duties on
forged iron, hemp, and other goods. Baldwin also brought in
two more bills that would tax sales of imports at auctions and
would replace the existing credit system at customs houses
with a cash basis.20
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During a week-long debate, both sides of the issue spun
out the familiar arguments and a few new ones on protection.
Baldwin and Louis McLane probably made the strongest case
for encouraging manufacturing while reconciling it with com-
merce and· agriculture on home-market grounds.. In opposition,
John Tyler and Philip Barbour-both Virginians-spiritedly
defended the agrarian position. High rates, they contended,
unjustly subsidized industry and raised consumer prices,
amounting to an exploitative tax. And they drew upon political
economists, such as Adam Smith, to argue for maximum free-
dom of international trade. Tyler and Barbour urged Congress
not to force an undesirable structure upon this country, whose
interests had been agricultural and commercial and ought to
continue to be.21
Clay entered the discussion in support of Baldwin's
report. He pressed for nurturing manufacturing at a time
when American agricultural exports and foreign commerce
generally had fallen off. No longer would Europe provide the
kind of market prevailing in the prewar period, he warned.
But to soften opposition, he sought to reconcile all elements of
the economy, thereby achieving national self-sufficiency. To
make his point, Clay drew a parallel comparing what he
wished for the country and what an individual household
could do. Consider the situation of Isaac Shelby, an early Ken-
tucky settler and governor, he remarked. Shelby's family pro-
duced most of their own clothing and other articles instead of
loitering at a crossroad tavern or otherwise wasting their
money: a happy scene. One could have asked Clay, however,
why the Shelbys did not patronize local merchants and manu-
facturers to promote a balanced economy. As for his opponents'
dependence upon Smith's doctrine of noninterference by gov-
ernment, Clay convincingly showed that foreign nations did
not practice what they preached. Britain, for instance, was
heavy-handed in laying high, if not prohibitive, rates on im-
ports, particularly by their corn laws as a barrier to American
grain.22
The outcome in this session of 1820 was postponement of
Baldwin's bill in the Senate by a margin of two votes after
passage by the House. A sectional breakdown of the vote
demonstrates the alignment of the country's interests and
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opInIons: the mid-Atlantic states and the Northwest were
solidly for protection, New England was divided between ad-
herence to commerce and to manufacturing, and the South
was decidedly opposed to Clay's prescription for prosperity.23
Although the Kentuckian did not occupy the Speaker's
chair for the next three sessions (1821-23), the effort for tariff
reform persisted. Clay himself reiterated his home-market ar-
gument at a dinner at Lexington upon leaving Congress. "The
old system of applying so large a portion of our labor to pro-
duction [of agricultural goods] for foreign markets, which
have ceased to exist," would not do, he warned.24
One of the most active protectionist publicists was
Mathew Carey. This Irish-American bookseller and pam-
phleteer of Philadelphia widely disseminated the principal ar-
guments of the cause and later passed the torch to his son
Henry, an influential economist for decades.25 Equally active
in spreading the word was the Baltimore editor Hezekiah
Niles, whose Weekly Register (1811-36) carried commentaries
on the issues and an endless stream of documents. It was
highly useful not only to contemporary politicians but to fu-
ture historians as well.26 In the early twenties both Carey and
Niles were emphasizing revision of the tariff even more than
usual. Clay acknowledged their help and benefited from their
popularization of a theory of national self-sufficiency.27
Now in the twenties a depression still beset the country
and provided reasons for congressional relief to industry. Actu-
ally, there were both negative and positive symptoms. Prices
remained low in comparison to the level of 1816, the financial
disorder of the panic of 1819 resisted recovery, and businesses
continued to close their doors. Yet if the census of 1820 and
other surveys are even rough indicators, there was substantial
growth. At Lexington, Clay could see expansion wherever he
looked: textile mills, cotton-bagging factories, ropewalks, dis-
tilleries, iron and lead works, and many ·other enterprises.
The annual value of Kentucky's production was at least $2
million. The figure for the leading state in the Union, Pennsyl-
vania, was about $4.8 million. Representatives of new compa-
nies, as well as old ones that had experienced trouble, were
sending lobbyists to Washington.28 The large Lowell-Appleton
cotton-textile combination, however, was comparatively disin-
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terested in further protection because the tariff of 1816
seemed to be an effective barrier to cheap Indian imports,
hitherto in competition with its specialty of coarse cottons.
What help could this movement expect from the Monroe
administration? Secretary of Treasury William Crawford saw
no constitutional or economic difficulty in raising rates either
for added. revenue or for added protection. He had not yet
joined southern opposition to that policy.29 And the president,
like Madison before him, reminded Congress to consider the
interest of manufacturing as an offset to foreign supply of
American necessities. At last, in his communication of Decem-
ber 1823, Monroe referred to the fact that other nations had
not opened their ports freely, and the United States must re-
spond proportionately, but with the "greatest caution."30
Mter the tariff bill of 1820 failed to pass, further at-
tempts stalled. The chairman of the Committee on Manufac-
tures for part of this time was Philip Barbour, a states'-rights
Virginian hostile to high tariffs. And of course any protective
measure had poorer prospects when it lacked Clay's supervi-
sion and eloquent support. The outlook brightened when he
returned to Washington in December 1823 and resumed the
post of Speaker. Another favorable development was the reap-
portionment of congressional representation, with protection-
ist states, such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, gaining
twenty-three seats.
Memorials, executive documents, and lobbyist activity
again provided raw material for the House Committee on
Manufactures in drawing up a tariff report. On January 9,
1824, Chairman John Tod of Pennsylvania presented it for
consideration, though debate did not begin for another month.
Then Tod described the recommendations in his bill. There
were two categories of rates, he explained: (1) on imports not
competing with domestic goods and therefore subject to im-
posts for revenue, and (2) on imports to be protected against
foreign competition. Some rates would be ad valorem, more
would be specific. Generally, he continued, the bill did not
move in a new direction but merely extended present policy,
adopted in 1816. The purpose of raising the level of protection
would be to help American farmers and laborers and also to
strengthen national economic independence. Levies on wool-
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ens, wool, iron, cotton bagging, glass, and spirits were some
that fell· into the second category. To calm his colleagues' wor-
ries, Todcited protective precedents going back to Hamilton
and Jefferson. In any case, he 'said, such a measure would
raise essential revenue.31
Over the next two months the House gave much atten-
tion to the bill. Speeches were long-winded, probably soporific.
Nevertheless, they reflected basic economic concerns and con-
tours of political thinking in those days. In the absence of an
. operative two-party system, the divisions of opinion had
become more sectional (South, Middle Atlantic, New England,
West) and economic (commerce, agriculture, and manufactur-
ing). Clay and like-minded spokesmen for the manufacturing
interest now seemed to have the advantage.
For several weeks discussion of Tod's report consisted
mainly of reactions to particular rates, with voting on adjust-
ments up or down. Then Barbour spoke strenuously against
the general principles of protectionism, spurring Clay to de-
fend them.32 His speech, extending over two days, would be
perhaps his best-known exposition ofeconomic nationalism.33
He began, as he often did, by describing the poor condi-
tion of the country, which urgently required remedy. The de-
pression persisted in every part of the economy, he declared:
decline of the carrying trade in foreign commerce, disordered
agricultural markets, bankruptcies in large numbers, unem-
ployed labor. "What is the cause of this widespreading dis-
tress, of this deep depression, which we behold stamped on
the public countenance? We are the same people. We have the
same country. . . . The sun still casts its genial and vivifying
influence on the land." The cause, he felt, was the sharp con-
traction of postwar demand for American goods abroad, a situ-
ation that would not change. European restrictions of
American imports, especially the British corn laws, appeared
unyielding. Admittedly, the quantity of cotton exports had
risen rapidly, yet lower prices provided less income to
planters.34
Predictably, Clay's cure for the malady was development
of a home market for domestic products. "Let us counteract
the policy of foreigners, and withdraw the support we now
give to their industry, and stimulate that of our own country."
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Legislation, as in the present bill, was therefore essential. It
would establish "a genuine American System."35 This term
would become a staple in the political vocabulary of the ante-
bellum era. Clay did not invent it, for Hamilton had used it
more than a quarter century earlier. Later Jefferson did also.
And in a different context, Clay himself had employed the ex-
pression in a congressional speech in 1820, urging recognition
of Latin American independence and a common commercial
interest with that part of the hemisphere.36 But now it became
synonymous with a protective tariff and later would extend to
other policies. The American System rested on the idea of har-
monizing all segments of the economy for their mutual benefit
and of doing so by active support from an intervening national
government.
In several respects, Clay thought, the United States could
adopt the British model of industrialization, helped substan-
tially by restrictions upon foreign trade except for an indis-
pensable flow of American cotton to its thriving textile mills.
The South, he believed, should not fear British retaliation on
cotton if the proposed tariff bill passed, for that country would
never overlook its own interest. Here he countered arguments
widely advanced against the pending bill. The Kentuckian in-
sisted he did not wholly admire British behavior, though he
would borrow some ofits.developmental strategy.
Again the Speaker encountered antiprotectionist reliance
upon Adam Smith's political economy. These opponents con-
tended that this new science had demonstrated the unde-
sirability of forcing enterprise into a pattern. It was much
better to allow capital and labor to take an unhindered direc-
tion to a natural and ideal order. Clay responded that British
regulations abounded. So this nation, Clay said, must not uni-
laterally implement Smith's dictum of governmental noninter-
vention.
Still another objection to protection, assuming impor-
tance for the first time, was constitutional. In the early nine-
teenth century customs receipts supplied most of the revenue
needed by the treasury, and some antiprotectionists reasoned
that tariffs could not constitutionally have any other purpose.
Not so, Clay declared. Congress had the delegated powers to
lay imposts on imports and to regulate interstate and foreign
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commerce. Absent any specific limitation of these powers, he
said, they were plenary, thus including authority to nourish
American industry. There were precedents going back to the
first tariff law of 1789 with its preamble about protection of
manufactures. And there had been an embargo and additional
commercial regulations in the cause of neutral maritime
rights before the late war, which the courts had upheld as con-
stitutional.37 Nevertheless, the time was approaching when
the constitutionality of a protective tariff, as well as other con-
troversial subjects of politics, would become the focus of in-
flamed disagreement.
Clay's argument drew upon practical illustration and
generalization more than upon the abstract wisdom of politi-
cal economy. So he dipped into history for proof. He referred to
the record of several nations to show that some, Britain and
France notably, prospered as a result of promoting industry
while others, Spain for instance, did not. In addition to illus-
trating again the effectiveness of British policies, he went so
far as to quote Napoleon's recollections of his. French policy of
economic development. This example must not have strength-
ened his case. On the other hand, his negative classification of
Spanish torpidity seemed apt in view of the recent upheaval
dismembering its empire in Latin America.38 .
Clay's speech of March 30-31 had followed several weeks
of debate on the bill. Most of the general principles he had pro-
pounded were familiar themes: the home-market idea, the
mutual advantages to all economic interests and geographical
sections, the superior evidence of experience compared to
theory. Others did emphasize more heavily the beneficial
impact of industrialization both upon factory labor and upon
agricultural labor, each complementing the other. Andrew
Stewart and Silas Wood, as well as others from the Atlantic
states, took this line ofreasoning.39
On the other side, the recently elected congressman from
Massachusetts, Daniel Webster, immediately launched a
lengthy refutation of the Speaker's points, one after another.
He saw no need for most of the proposed rates, because the
country was not afflicted with all the economic ills Clay
gloomily perceived. Though prices had declined and business
had slowed, the New Englander saw widespread prosperity
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and happiness. All that was necessary was to allow free enter-
prise to work. Avoid putting the burden of a higher tariff on
shipping, depend upon the freedom of an active foreign com-
merce, and do not interfere with productive individualism, the
basis of a true American System. Unlike Clay, he believed
Britain was indeed moving toward free trade, necessarily at a
deliberate pace. Nevertheless, Webster was not doctrinaire, for
he did favor moderate protection of woolen and cotton manu-
factures, while attacking increases on iron and hemp, a po-
sition balancing commercial and manufacturing interests in
Massachusetts. It would not be long before he would tip the
balance toward higher tariffs.
Webster reiterated what he had drafted in a vigorous
memorial of Bostonians to Congress against the bill of 1820, so
narrowly rejected. In fact, that document now attracted some
attention, impossible four years earlier because it had arrived
in Washington after congressional adjournment. It had been
an even stronger statement than the present speech, for it not
only protested on economic grounds but had doubted the con-
stitutionality of such governmental intervention. How Webster
would later prefer to forget that foray!40
A good many other opponents expressed views on general
principles similar to those of Webster. The chief difference
within their ranks was sectional. Whereas he was a spokesman
for commercial New England, southerners foresaw harmful ef-
fects upon agriculture. Britain would retaliate by cutting its
demand for their exports, they predicted, and the domestic
market would not compensate for the loss. Far better to supply
raw materials to Europe and to purchase imported manufac-
tures, a natural process. This was, of course, another endorse-
ment of Smith's economics. Among those speaking for the
planter interest were George McDuffie and James Hamilton,
both of South Carolina, in addition to Barbour.41 Though believ-
ing a protective tariff violated the Constitution, Clay's adver-
saries had not fully developed that argument. Near the close cof
House debate, the volatile John Randolph of Virginia launched
a scorching attack on the tariff's threat to the South. His dia-
tribe mixed hyperboles and Latin phrases with hints of strong
remedies for an injustice. As it developed, this forensic battle
was a preface to the alarming story of political sectionalism.42
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Protracted debate moved back and forth between general
principles and particular rate changes. On each provision,
local interests strongly influenced positions the representa-
tives took-Pennsylvanians on iron, Louisianans on sugar,
Kentuckians on hemp, and so forth. This has been true, of
course, throughout history. But principles and interests did in-
teract at least in the rhetoric enveloping the House. Steadily,
protectionists of the Atlantic and western states (Clay's forces)
gained in their duel with their southern and New England ad-
versaries.
One would have expected the subject of textiles, espe-
cially cottons, to be prominent, yet that was not the case. Rel-
atively few words were spent as this schedule emerged nearly
unchanged. Most cottons would remain at 25 percent, and
minimum valuation would still screen out cheap material
from ·India. Woolens would rise to 33 t percent two years later;
but a lower rate, 25 percent, was allowed on cheaper goods, a
palliative to southerners supplying clothes to their slaves.
Even so, the bill would do something for wool growers, who
got 30 percent for their product, substantially weakening
woolen protection because of costs to the mills. More would
soon be heard about this matter.43
Somewhat more attention went to iron, increasingly cen-
tral to industrialization. The chairman of the reporting Com-
mittee on Manufactures, John Tod of Pennsylvania, did not
miss the opportunity to strengthen iron manufacturing in that
state and received special help from his colleague James Bu-
chanan, who brokered mutual assistance of iron and hemp
contingents in Congress. Hammered bar, a basic American out-
put, rose to ninety cents a hundredweight (112 pounds), twice
the level adopted in 1816. Members from New England's mar-
itime districts, such as Webster, strenuously complained about
increased costs of this metal, which was essential to shipping.44
Early in debate on the bill, a lively discussion about rais-
ing the rate on spirits to 15 percent had begun. An East-West
split on the issue appeared, with Clay and other westerners fa-
voring it to benefit grain growers and whiskey distillers in op-
position to easterners who feared that commerce in liquor
imports from the West Indies would .suffer. Opponents said
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that even the exising specific rate was twice the value of spir-
its. Despite this argument, Clay got the increase. He may have
been helped a little by scattered feeling that a stiff duty might
encourage temperance.45 During discussion of the impost on
molasses he urged further assistance to grain distillers. Em-
phasizing the sharp increase in sales of rum distilled from
West Indies molasses, he carried an upward revision over mer-
cantile protests. 46
The most extended argument on a particular rate con-
cerned cotton bagging, the hemp product of special impor-
tance to Clay. This fabric was in greater and greater demand
as the output of cotton doubled every ten years up to the Civil
War. As a hemp planter himself, the Kentuckian could speak
confidently about the state of the industry; and his powerful
leadership made a higher tariff on cotton bagging likely. At
several junctures he took the floor to describe the difficulties
requiring correction. Foreign competition from Scottish pro-
ducers had hurt domestic marketing badly, in part because
the American process of dew rotting had not yet been replaced
by the superior method of water rotting. He thought the shift
was quite practical-he had made progress at Ashland. He
could not deny, however, that ever since he had been involved
in congressional consideration of the problem fifteen years
earlier, the American disadvantage had persisted. Actually, he
took better ground when he pointed to continued hard times
as a reason for relief. And of course he did not overlook the
staple goals of national independence and security, derived
from economic self-sufficiency.47
Speeches on cotton bagging came mainly from opponents
of more protection, ·naturally from southerners who fought an
added cost of shipping their vital cotton crop. James Hamilton
and George McDuffie of South Carolina took the lead in at-
tacking what they felt to be an unfair sectional imposition in
behalf of the Kentucky hemp industry. In fact, declared
Charles Mercer of Virginia, the expense amounted to a tax on
cotton that they exported and therefore violated the constitu-
tional clause (Article I, section 9) prohibiting export taxes.48
Although an innovative theory, it was soon to be replaced by
others more persuasive.
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Mter the House focused on this issue for two weeks, it
approved an increased rate by the margin of a few votes.
Final congressional action later set the level at 3 t cents per
square yard, about double what it had been.49
The committee had also recommended increasing the
impost on the raw material itself, hemp, a prime interest of
the Speaker. Strong protest came from members watching out
for the merchant marine because of resulting higher prices of
cordage. In his set speech, Webster emphasized what he felt
was a huge injustice in boosting the hemp duty 50 percent to
two cents a pound. Again Clay prevailed, though the law, as
enacted, cut the increase slightly to 1 t cents.50
The House discussed and lightly amended the report
from the Committee of the Whole over ten days until approval
on April 16 in a close ballot, 107-102. A month later, after a
few senate and conference-committee adjustments, the bill
passed.51 In the end, Clay could be very pleased with the out-
come, a definite endorsement of the protective principle and of
his proclaimed American System. He portrayed the measure
as moderate, as a reconciliation of interests. Perhaps there
was truth in that view, yet those who had lost out in this
debate on economic policy did not concur.
Two sections of the nation showed substantial opposition.
New England, divided between commercial and manufactur-
ing opinion, voted against the bill, twenty-three to fifteen, de-
spite a trend toward industrialization. The South was still
less reconciled. The vote of southern representatives was sev-
enty to six against the Kentuckian's bill.52 Secretary of War
Calhoun did not comment on the tariff publicly, probably be-
cause he was the prospective vice president and was seeking
an alliance with one of the presidential hopefuls. Neverthe-
less, he had already perceived how unattractive Clay's eco-
nomic nationalism was to the South, whose plantation-slave
system seemed to gain little from it. So he privately supported
and advised opponents of the American System, such as
fellow Carolinians McDuffie and Hamilton, during congres-
sional debate.53
Just how Clay's program would affect the current presi-
dential election was unclear. Senator Andrew Jackson, who
was making spectacular gains in the ongoing contest, had
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voted for the bill on grounds of national economic indepen-
dence and defense, not to mention expected voter approval in
states like Pennsylvania. In a letter to a person there, pub-
lished in April 1824, he applauded a "home market," created
by employment of factory labor as consumers of agricultural
goods. "It is therefore my opiilion," he ventured, that a "judi-
cious tariff is much wanted."54 Another candidate, Secretary of
State John Quincy Adams, was a well-known nationalist, un-
doubtedly favoring protectionism but cautious about express-
ing his views. Secretary of Treasury William Crawford, also
an aspirant, had favored a higher tariff in his departmental
capacity; yet he was seen to be the foremost heir of the Vir-
ginia school of states-rights politics. Clay summed up the elec-
toral implications of the battle over the tariff when he wrote
that though all candidates approved more protection, "the dif-
ference between them & me is, that I have ever been placed in
situations in which I could not conceal my sentiments."55 His
characteristic optimism led him to select a positive position as
the most promising route to popular approval.
Postwar
Issues
Other developmental policies besides the tariff attractedpolitical attention during these postwar years. Congress
passed measures on banking, internal improvements, and
other subjects, reflecting an expansive, optimistic national-
ism. Counterforces of states-rights sectionalism opposed them
and indeed overtook the nationalist trend by 1825.
An important reason for the narrower outlook must have
been the impact of a depression, first felt as a financial panic
in 1819 and persisting for several years. The basic industry of
the country, agriculture, had expanded rapidly after the war in
both the North and the South; but European markets could
not or would not absorb a desirable amount ofAmerican prod-
ucts. The problem of oversupply extended also to the domestic
market for manufactures, largely due to a flood of European
imports, now that tariff barriers were lower than during
wartime. Businesses failed, disappointed in getting much
relief from debt moratoria and bankruptcy laws. Western
farmers who had too confidently bought large acreages at gov-
ernment land offices on lenient terms lost mortgaged property.
Labor was hard pressed-many workers unemployed. An eco-
nomic malaise lingered well into the twenties.!
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Sober analysis of the causes of these difficulties laid a
good deal of blame upon the financial system, especially the
banks. Since 1811, after congressional failure to recharter the
first Bank of the United States, both private and public sectors
had to rely upon state-chartered corporations. Undeniably,
these institutions had not performed well in a lightly regu-
lated, disordered setting. The number of banks had soared in
the five years before 1816 from 88 to 260, while their note cir-
culation increased dramatically from about $23 million to $99
million. Conditions deteriorated so seriously after the British
raid upon Washington in 1814 that bank offices across the
country, except in conservative New England, stopped redemp-
tion of their paper in specie. Meanwhile at the capital, the
Treasury had endless trouble in raising funds through loans
and taxes to maintain the war effort. The patchwork of un-
stable, diverse state institutions hindered more than helped.2
Well before the peace treaty, the Madison administration
sought establishment of a .new national bank. The problem
was that it wanted one that would be a virtual arm ofth,e trea-
sury in marketing large amounts of government securities and
in operating on a specie basis only as long as it suited the presi-
dent. Such a plan encountered strong congressional opposition,
and another bill for more independence from the government
fell to Madison's veto in January 1815.3
So in December, after Clay returned from diplomatic ne-
gotiations in Europe and again became Speaker, the House re-
sumed the effort for a bank. He asked Calhoun, as chairman
of a special committee, to make another attempt. This time
the administration accepted Calhoun's view that the institu-
tion ought to be more conservative and less subject to execu-
tive dominance. Accordingly, Secretary of Treasury Alexander
Dallas proposed a bank with less capitalization ($35 million)
and with five presidential appointees on the board of twenty-
five directors, the same ratio ofpublic and private elements as
in subscriptions to shares of stock. And unlike the earlier
plan, which made it easy to suspend specie redemption of
bank notes, the present one emphasized a stricter basis of
currency.
Calhoun guided this kind of bill to passage by mid-March
1816. In his speeches, he focused on counteracting the vast in-
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crease of state banks and their overissued, unredeemable
notes. He said very little about the proposed structure of the
institution and peremptorily dismissed all constitutional ques-
tions as now settled by long practice since 1791.4
Strange to say, the staunchest opponent was the Federal-
ist Webster, whose party had been the original advocate of a
national bank. Some historians have not understood his rea-
soning. Webster himself claimed Hamiltonian orthodoxy by
insisting he did not oppose a national bank per se, certainly
not constitutionally. But he did object to the government's
mingling with and manipulating this private corporation by
holding some of its stock and appointing some of its directors.5
These objections did not impress Clay. Stepping down
from his chair, he painstakingly explained why he entirely fa-
vored the pending measure despite having opposed recharter
of the first Bank of the United States in 1811 as a senator.
Five years ago, he said, the Kentucky legislature had in-
structed him so to vote, whereas now, as a representative, his
immediate constituents favored a new charter. Furthermore,
he had felt the old bank had abused its power by collaboration
with the Federalist party, but he was confident the new one
would not mix in politics. How wrong he would prove to be!
To those colleagues uncertain constitutionally, he set
forth a view more frank and convincing. Though he conceded
that, as a young senator, he believed the bank recharter was
unconstitutional (a pristine Jeffersonian position), experience
had changed his mind. The question had been and presently
was: is a bank necessary now to carry out the powers of Con-
gress? He saw an urgent need, both for assisting the gov-
ernment's fiscal operations and for supplying the people a
uniform national currency instead of the bloated, variable
paper now circulating. Citing the necessary and proper clause
of the Constitution, Article I, section 8, he concluded that
what may not have been necessary in 1811 had become so in
1816. Then there was the provision requiring tax payments to
be "uniform," which depended upon a uniform currency.6 The
House passed the bill, eighty to seventy-one, the Senate con-
curred with unimportant amendments, and Madison signed it
in early April 1816.7 Through the twenty years of its charter,
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the bank would often be at the center of political contention,
and Clay would be its leading advocate.
Mter enactment of the law for the Bank of the United
States (BUS), Calhoun sought resumption of specie payment
both for the mass of state bank notes already in circulation
and for future issues of the new institution. With Secretary
Dallas's recommendation, he reported a bill restricting pay-
ments to the national government to specie or specie-paying
notes by the end of the year. This could induce a general circu-
lation in these media. Though Calhoun lost his bill by one
vote, he collaborated with Webster to adopt a resolution to the
same end, imposing redemption in specie by February 20,
1817.8 Compliance by national and state banks was slow but
somewhat effective.9
Organized for business by January 1817, the BUS had an
unsatisfactory record for quite a while. Unfortunately, its first
president was the unqualified William Jones, former member
of Monroe's cabinet, who committed numerous mistakes and
allowed numerous abuses. Stockholders got loans from the
bank, secured by their shares of the bank's stock, and could
use the loans to pay for that stock. Inexplicably, Clay saw no
harm in that. The discount policy was far too loose, fueling still
more widespread speculation. Western branch offices issued
notes, to be redeemed at any other branch, drawing specie
from the East. And the BUS neither adequately assisted nor
controlled the state banks, which lacked sound capital and
often failed to resume specie payment. These mistakes proba-
bly contributed to the onset of a nationwide depression in
1819.10
Clay seemed far too tolerant. His correspondence with
Jones remained friendly and supportive, as one can see in a
series of letters about his becoming a BUS director. Plainly in-
terested in being selected, the Kentuckian saw opportunities
to advance the interests of his region and party. While com-
menting on a possible appointment, he also freely offered
aqvice on BUS policy. Perhaps because he said he could
attend board meetings only occasionally whenever he hap-
pened to be in Philadelphia, he was not chosen. Later he did
receive an invitation to serve but declined. Only then he did
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feel uneasy about the appearance of bias on legislative mat-
ters concerning the corporation if he were a director. 11
His relations with the institution were very close anyway.
As soon as Congress issued the charter, he pressed for estab-
lishment of branch offices in Kentucky. With his encour-
agement, a group of his friends in Lexington traveled east to
persuade Jones their town ought to have a branch. They were
successful, and a few months later Clay's intervention helped
Louisville get one, too. 12 He frequently exerted influence upon
appointment of directors at these places. Though usually sat..
isfied with such selections, he once complained that most of
his recommended list had been passed over, resulting in a
board dominated by Federalists. Republicans should make up
the majority, he thought, with a few Federalists added. The
bank should not be "a party institution," as its predecessor
had been, he warned. 13 It is difficult to understand how appor-
tioning party distribution on the board to reflect the political
character of the state, as he urged, would have kept the BUS
out of politics.
As time passed, Clay's relation to the bank became even
closer, due largely to the depression and its impact upon the fi..
nancial system. In any case, William Jones was reaching the
end of his mismanagement after some months of futilely
trying to tighten loose policies. In March 1819 Langdon
Cheves, the South Carolina congressman who had had a
friendly association with the institution since it was estab-
lished, took over. He intensified the curtailment of credit,
which had already begun-and did so with determination.
Branch offices, such as those at Lexington and Louisville, were
prohibited from redeeming notes issued at other branches.
Their discounting and exchange operations were severely con-
tracted. Transactions with state banks were stiffened, espe-
cially with respect to their paper circulation. Secretary of
Treasury Crawford encouraged Cheves to press ahead. 14
Clay observed the effects with mixed feelings. Though
always in favor of sound, conservative banking, he saw essen-
tialcapital drying up, which, he feared, would have the oppo-
site effect ofwhat Cheves intended. There would be a tendency
for local banks to issue still more paper worth much less than
face value. And already he saw movements under way for
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relief legislation to help hard-pressed debtors by postponing
judicial executions against property that secured loans. While
applauding the main office's effort to root out excesses, he
urged Cheves to instruct the branches to provide sufficient
currency and credit to meet the emergency, to forestall what
he believed to be an injurious attitude toward the West. A trou-
bling indicator, he argued, was the steady flow of specie east-
ward. 15
A significant expansion of credit did not occur until 1823,
when the BUS presidency again changed hands. Nicholas
Biddle, a scholarly aristocrat, began. his long tenure in that
position with modest financial experience, only as a director
on the main board; but he displayed an amazing ability to op-
erate what amounted to the nation's central bank. At once, he
readjusted Cheves's approach to intricate credit and currency
problems by a liberalized policy on note issue and exchange,
producing badly needed capital for industry at this stage ofre-
covery. Yet he was a cautious, sound-money person fundamen-
tally. Clay and Biddle saw eye to eye on this and other things.
The politician and the banker would maintain a satisfying col-
laboration for many years.16
Clay had another BUS connection, representing it as a
lawyer. He had a particular reason for taking on this work: to
payoff a heavy debt of about forty thousand dollars, much of
it owed to the bank.17 Retiring from Congress for a term and
returning to an extensive legal practice, he became chief coun-
sel for the corporation's litigation in Kentucky and Ohio
during the early twenties. He had his hands full, for there
were hundreds of cases, mostly debt collections in these de-
pression days. Besides appearing in court himself in a large
portion of them, he oversaw other "solicitors." His income
from this business apparently amounted to what he needed:
three thousand dollars a year from the bank as. chief counsel;
more for appearing in specific cases; and a sizable amount of
real estate in Ohio and Kentucky in addition to the cash.
Enough, at least, so that when he resigned to become secre-
tary of state in 1825, he was pleased not only with a high rate
of favorable judgments but with his compensation.18
The kind of business he conducted, however, was usually
not pleasant. Typically, it consisted of getting a court's order
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against a debtor, forfeiting the property that had secured a de-
faulted debt. What an emotional wrench when a farmer lost
everything, house and land. Often payment by the unlucky
borrower was utterly impossible. Predictably, public opinion
in both states tended to be negative toward lawyers and
banks, despite Clay's intention to soften the effects whenever
he could. No wonder the bank seemed a pitiless creditor.19
In Kentucky, hostility toward the institution led to legisla-
tion in January 1819 taxing each of the two branches sixty
thousand dollars annually. Other states adopted the same
tactic. In the best-known instance, a Maryland tax had come to
the Supreme Court (McCulloch v. Maryland), where a decision
was expected within weeks. Clay strongly disapproved of his
own state's action for being rash and unconstitutional. As he
had argued in the congressional debate on chartering the
bank, he believed Congress had an undoubtable power to es-
tablish it; and now a state could not "break" it by such a de-
structive tax. He directed the bank's efforts to oppose the
measure in both state and lower federal courts; and in one case
he successfully argued that the United States Circuit Court
could enjoin Kentucky not to collect the levy.20 In the end, the
state Court ofAppeals, though unpersuaded by the McCulloch
decision in Washington upholding the charter, chose not to
insist upon collection.21
The two BUS offices had reluctantly carried out orders
from Philadelphia to get redemption of state-bank notes; and
as they did, specie moved to the East. Because of a shortage of
capital and the advent of the depression, a demand for relief
shook the legislature at Frankfort. The response was a flurry
of state banking laws, beginning in 1818 and continuing to the
midtwenties. The Kentucky Insurance Company, which had
been the earliest financial institution in the state, closed its
doors in 1818 after an embezzling executive officer had ruined
it.22 And the Bank of Kentucky, still in business after many
years as a mixed public-private operation, seemed unable to
supply the needs of the economy.23 So the legislators responded
to the cry for a freer system by incorporating forty-six private
banks, alloting one to each local district. The life of these
paper mills, known as the "forty thieves," was short. In 1820
the legislature replaced them with the Bank of the Common-
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wealth, entirely state owned and administered by state ap-
pointees. It had many branches and issued a great deal of non-
specie-paying paper, just what advocates of relief wanted.24
Other legislation supplemented banking restructuring to
help desperate debtors. A so-called replevin statute of 1820 al-
lowed them a year's extension before they had to forfeit prop-
erty as a security on defaulted debts. If a creditor did not
agree to accept Bank of Kentucky non-specie-paying notes at
the new date, another year's extension was granted. This cen-
terpiece of economic policy precipitated a political upheaval.
For several years relief and antirelief parties battled one an-
other over issues related to it. Though winning elections for
governor and legislators up to 1824, the relief party did not
retain ascendancy very long. In fact, by that time the replevin
laws had been repealed. Perhaps a more serious setback came
from the courts. A county circuit judge, James Clark, declared
the statutes invalid, a retroactive deprivation of property in
conflict with the contract clauses of national and state consti-
tutions. Not only did the legislature fail to remove the bother-
some judge, but the state Court of Appeals upheld his
decision, whereupon the lawmakers passed a measure abol-
ishing this court and establishing one pledged to relief. For a
while Kentucky politics revolved around "Old Court" and
"New Court" parties. The relief party lost the election of 1824,
and the Old Court refused to leave office. Eventually the New
Court gave Up.25
What ought Clay, the state's foremost politico, to do in
this treacherous situation? His personal reaction was to de-
plore radical overhaul of state banking and of debtor-creditor
relations. Long associated with the Bank of Kentucky, he
wrote and spoke to its officials and stockholders in behalf of a
sound-money policy, yet somewhat liberalized to provide suffi-
cient capital, so scarce during the depression.26 As a~awyer he
argued cases on the antirelief side. Still, he avoided embar-
rassing involvement in the conflict as much as possible, be-
cause it might both undermine his home base and damage his
position in national affairs.27
Probably the most sensitive aspect for him proved to be
the strain upon his relations with Amos Kendall and Francis
Blair. Years before, upon arrival in the West as a young man,
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Kendall had been helped by the Clay family-for a period he
had tutored the children. As editor of the newspaper Argus of
Western America he had until recently supported Clay; but
during the relief war, he favored the policies of easy money
and of replevin for debtors. For the time being he was on the
fence, a New Court leader but a friend of Clay. Soon he would
be very disappointed when Clay, as the new secretary of state
in 1825, did not find an appointment for him. He then would
go over to the Jacksonian movement; and in the future, as a
principal adviser of President Jackson, he would be a thorn in
his former mentor's side.28 Likewise, Frank Blair, another
ardent follower of Clay, became a prominent relief man-the
clerk of the New Court among other things.29 He, too, joined
the Jacksonian, anti-Clay ranks a little later. His subsequent
editorship of the Washington Globe, the main Democratic
organ, would be a political irritant, to say the least. Generally,
New Court adherents in Kentucky moved toward the rising
Jacksonian Democratic party. Ironically, Jackson himself dis-
liked relief measures such as those in this state.30
In Ohio as BUS counsel, Clay continued to handle a
great deal of business, most of it involving delinquent debts.
Economic distress persisted well into the twenties and, as in
Kentucky, fueled antagonism toward the bank, depicted as a
relentless creditor responsible for much that had gone wrong.
Clay did favor all possible leniency toward debtors, principally
postponement of final hearings.31 Nevertheless, he seldom lost
cases altogether. In late 1822 he told BUS President Cheves
at the main office that he had obtained 211 favorable judg-
ments on debts at Cincinnati, while losing only three or four
on account of procedural mistakes. In other correspondence
up to 1825, he reported similar success. 32
The legislature responded to vigorous complaints with an
act to expel the two branches at Cincinnati and Chillicothe
from the state. In February 1819, just before the Supreme
Court invalidated a Maryland tax, Ohio imposed an annual
levy offifty thousand dollars on each branch. At the same time,
Clay also faced the nearly identical Kentucky tax. Though un-
convinced by the McCulloch decision, the state Court of Ap-
peals there decided not to resist the ruling for the bank. Ohio
proved to be more determined. A protracted constitutional
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crisis brought angry expositions of state sovereignty, strange
instances of officials being put in jail, and complex legal pro-
ceedings in the federal courts.
To carry out the state law, Auditor Ralph Osborn ordered
forcible collection of the tax, if necessary. So in September
1819 his officers seized one hundred thousand dollars from
the BUS branch in Chillicothe and headed for Columbus with
it in a wagon.33 Then upon the bank's petition, the federal Cir-
cuit Court issued an injunction against this procedure. The
state refused to comply and retained the money. Osborn's two
agents who had hauled off the funds spent three months in
jail before being released by a local judge. At this point, March
1820, President Cheves asked Clay to take the question of the
tax's validity into the federal courts. Thenceforward, he gave
close attention to this litigation, stretching over four years. He
filed civil and criminal suits in Ohio and defended the bank
on Osborn's appeal to the Supreme Court at Washington.34
Meanwhile he negotiated with the state's counsel, Charles
Hammond, about compromises, all of whose proposals he fi-
nally rejected because the state wished to shape the settle-
ment so as to get the bank's recognition of a tax power in
exchange for return of the money that had been seized.35
Osborn's appeal to the Supreme Court required two hear-
ings during the 1824 term. Clay felt confident that Chief Jus-
tice Marshall and his Court would reject Ohio's position that
McCulloch v. Maryland was erroneous, an unconstitutional
deprivation of the state's sovereignty. The crucial question
concerned federal jurisdiction in cases such as this, brought
by the bank.36 At the second hearing in 1824 Webster and
John Sergeant joined Clay in dealing with this point. Since
their printed brief, the only known source indicating what the
lawyers said, is a joint statement, Clay's particular contribu-
tion is unclear. Yet it must have been substantial, because of
his long experience with the controversy.
Marshall's opinion for the Court accepted the BUS argu-
ment that it had standing as a party in federal courts and
that an injunction against Osborn was therefore an available
remedy. Clay could remember a case he had won in the fed-
er.al Circuit Court in Kentucky on this very issue. He and his
colleagues relied upon) provisions in the BUS charter of 1816
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(a United States law) for the institution's access to federal
courts. They also prevailed, without much emphasis, against
Osborn's claim that the state of Ohio, not he personally, was
the actual defendant and therefore protected by the Eleventh
Amendment, which forbids suits against states without their
consent. Marshall ruled, superficially to be sure, that it was
sufficient that the certified record of the case listed Osborn
and not Ohio as the defendant.37
This case provides an interesting view of Clay the lawyer-
politician, using his superior professional ability to forward
the type of economy he nourished as a politician. In both legal
and political areas, he wished to strengthen property rights
beyond mere protection of vested interests, to stimulate the
country's growth and enhance its welfare. In this instance the
impact amounted to more than a reaffirmation of the bank's
legitimacy, because opening the federal court"s to that institu-
tion provided it with a favorable, much used forum in its in-
terstate operations. The decision thereby reflected a current
trend in modernizing the legal status of all corporations.
Still, Clay's close connection with the bank appeared to
his critics to be cold-hearted service in behalf of wealth and
privilege during a severe depression. Would his diligent advo-
cacy in bank suits against hard-pressed debtors hurt his polit-
ical prospects? The presidential election would follow in a few
months. Though not general or definitive, a study of legal and
voting records for 1824 in Ohio finds that districts where Clay
filed many cases against debtors nevertheless supported him
strongly for the presidency.38
As a lawyer, Clay also dealt with a difficult political and
economic issue involving land titles. In 1789, when Virginia
consented to Kentucky's separation, it stipulated that its pre-
vious land grants there be honored. Although this proviso
seemed reasonable, it turned out to be wholly impractical.
The process of distributing land had been very loose, in fact
chaotic. Since the transmontane region had not been system-
atically surveyed, Virginia had no dependable idea of what it
was doing; and parcel piled upon parcel, extending in unveri-
fiable directions. Gaining statehood in 1792, Kentucky also
granted large amounts, much of it the same as the Old Do-
minion tracts. The Kentuckians who occupied these areas by
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the 1820s were either squatters with no titles of ownership or
persons with dubious titles, now challenged by Virginia
claimants.
These circumstances led to the important case of Green v.
Biddle, heard by the federal Supreme Court in 1821 and de-
cided two years later. John Green had brought an action
claiming an old land grant by Virginia as superior to Richard
Biddle's occupancy of the property in Kentucky. The suit may
have been fictitious, fabricated to get a large question of policy
before the Court. At least there seemed to be no actual adver-
sarial relationship of Green and Biddle. But the underlying
question was real enough. It hinged upon Kentucky laws con-
ferring substantial rights upon occupants threatened by such
claimants-in this instance, the right to deduct sums spent on
improving the tract and an immunity against payment of past
rent to claimants.39
Proceedings in Court concerning this policy assumed an
unusual character. Although attorneys appeared for Green, no
counsel made an argument for the Kentuckian Biddle to
defend the land-occupancy legislation. Justice Joseph Story
delivered what he called a unanimous opinion against the va-
lidity of the statutes, although one member of the Court of
seven was absent and others, including Chief Justice Mar-
shall, probably abstained. A week later Clay went down to the
judicial chamber in the Capitol basement in an attempt to
turn the decision around. As an amicus curiae, he requested a
rehearing to allow an argument by counsel for Kentucky's
side because there had been none and because valuable inter-
ests of a great many persons were at stake. It was so ordered
for the next term.40
Just before reargument Clay and George Bibb went to
Richmond to address the Virginia legislature with an appeal
to authorize a commission of the two states to settle the dis-
pute, as set forth in the original compact of 1789.41 A few days
later they also put their case before the Supreme Court. Clay
argued persuasively, centering on the Virginia-Kentucky com-
pact. He pointed out that it had never received the assent of
Congress, as the Constitution required of all interstate agree-
ments. Furthermore, Virginia had so far refused to establish a
commission, as provided. He contended that the compact, in-
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dispensable to the Old Dominion's position and to Story's
opinion, was inoperative by its own language. At any rate, he
attacked the document because it would diminish the essen-
tial sovereignty of Kentucky, which must be free of endless
outside interference. Such states' rights reasoning, even by a
nationalist, could reach receptive ears. The time for adjourn-
ment had arrived, however, and the Court postponed its deci-
sion until 1823.42 Meanwhile Clay represented Kentucky in
another effort to get Virginia's consent to a commission. He
failed, much to his disgust, when a proposal to do so lacked
one vote in that state's Senate.43
The one remaining hope for success collapsed when the
Supreme Court refused to change its decision of 1821. Justice
Bushrod Washington's opinion defined the states' compact as
a contract, whose obligation Kentucky had impaired, the first
time the Court applied the contract clause of the Constitution
to an agreement between two states. The opinion did not
accept Clay's contentions that Congress had not approved the
compact or that a two-state commission instead of the judi-
ciary should settle disputes on land grants.44
This outcome inflamed Kentucky. The decision was three
to one for Virginia, since Justice William Johnson would have
denied jurisdiction. With two of the seven members absent and
the Chief Justice abstaining, less than a majority of the Court
had weakened a fundamental right, Kentuckians com-
plained.45 Nonetheless, the state consistently did not comply
with the decision. Then in another case the Court upheld a law
limiting claims against occupants to a period of seven years, in
effect neutralizing Green v. Biddle.46 As for Clay, politics had
demanded his responsiveness to opinion at home, where he
had several problems: the relief contest, a tangle of banking,
and the approaching presidential election. If it had not been
for them, he might have opposed widespread, extralegal occu-
pancy of lands by squatters. In fact it would not be long before
he would take a strong stand in Congress against concessions
of preemption to squatters on the public domain.
Among other economic policies, the development of trans-
portation (internal improvements) remained a fundamental
condition for growth. The War of 1812 had diverted national
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attention and resources from earlier modest beginnings; but
as soon as peace arrived, a renewed effort got under way. An
industrializing Northeast, an expanding cotton plantation
system of the South, and an accelerated migration into the
transmontane West required better ways ofmoving people and
products. Furthermore, the handicap of primitive means of
transporting troops and supplies during the war showed the
need to strengthen this aspect of national defense. Petitions
flowed into Washington to revive the spirit of Gallatin's
prewar plan. Clay insisted that the country must have "a
chain of turnpike roads and canals from Passamaquoddy to
New Orleans, and other similar roads intersecting the moun-
tains, to facilitate intercourse between all parts of the country,
and to bind and connect us together." President Madison in his
annual messages of 1815 and 1816 recommended congres-
sional action, including, if necessary, a constitutional amend-
ment. Since he approved a national-bank charter and a protec-
tive tariff, he seemed to have deserted strict constructionism.47
Calhoun set to work on the subject by moving for a House
committee report; and a week later, as chairman of that com-
mittee, he proposed a plan. It called for creation of an internal
improvements. fund, composed of the bonus of $1.5 million re-
ceived for chartering the bank and of projected dividends on
government stock in that institution. In guiding his bill to pas-
sage, the South Carolinian was the complete nationalist. His
speech emphasized its benefits to the economy, to military
needs, and to governmental operations such as the postal ser-
vice and fiscal functions. Do not worry about the constitution-
ality of federal internal improvements, he said, for at present
he merely asked for a fund to be set aside. Nevertheless, he
left no doubt that he thought a program would be valid. In
words he would later prefer to forget, he told his colleagues
(and Madison too) that the Constitution was "not intended as
a thesis for the logician to exercise his ingenuity on. It ought
to be construed with plain good sense."48
Clay was perfectly satisfied. Joining the discussion, he
also downplayed specific applications of the fund. Let that be
decided later.49 He resisted amendments for distributing
money to states according to their population and permitting
them to share with Congress decisions on the projects. But he
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and Calhoun soon found they had to accept these amendments.
Even so, the margin of House passage was thin, eighty-six to
eighty-four.
The bill went to Madison on March I, 1817, only three
days before congressional adjournment. Yet the president had
foreseen what happened, had made up his mind, and un-
doubtedly had drafted his decision, which was a veto. Ex-
pressing regret that he could not sign a desirable measure, he
explained why constitutional clauses on commerce and gen-
eral welfare did not authorize exercising such a broad power
as now proposed.50 Clay urged Madison to leave the decision to
President-elect Monroe after inauguration-a strategy itself
very questionable constitutionally. Obtaining no last-minute
help, the Speaker could only wait until Monroe revealed his
thinking at the next session.51
From the first day of his presidency, Monroe showed his
reservations about immediate adoption of a program. In his in-
augural on March 4, 1817, he did comment favorably on legis-
lative action, though "proceeding always with a constitutional
sanction."52 Then in his first message to Congress in December,
he was quite plain: only a constitutional amendment could
clarify the long-standing disagreement about such a power. He
urged that be done.53
Already irritated by the new administration, Clay was in
no mood to follow this advice. He had ruffled feelings from the
president's selection of John Quincy Adams as secretary of
state, a post he reckoned his due. And now it was unbearable
for Monroe to tell a coordinate branch of the government he
disapproved a law not yet enacted. Was it possible that Clay
translated his personal unhappiness into the area ofpolicy? No
doubt there was a degree of truth in such a suspicion. But the
Kentuckian would have strongly advocated internal improve-
ments in any event, for he had very settled views on that
matter.
As Speaker, he appointed a committee, chaired by Henry
St. George Tucker, to consider Monroe's recommendation of a
constitutional amendment. Aligned with Clay, Tucker thought
the House must be free of presidential intervention. Besides,
he believed Congress had all the power it needed concerning
roads and canals. His committee report, mainly a restatement
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of Gallatin's plan a decade ago, described a long list of poten-
tial projects and estimated their cost.54
Debate in the House centered on the constitutional
aspect more than on an economic one. Proponents of a na-
tional program, Tucker, William Lowndes of the Ways and
Means Committee, Charles Mercer, and Clay himself based
congressional authority upon clauses of the Constitution em-
powering legislation to establish post roads, to provide for the
common defense, and to regulate commerce among the states.
To "establish," they reasoned, comprehended building new
roads as well as delivering mail on those already built. Simi-
larly, construction of roads and canals for military purposes
was a means to accomplish the goal of national defense. And
facilities for transporting goods, they contended, were closely
related to interstate commerce. In short, it was a familiar con-
flict of broad and narrow interpretations, with Clay facing
strong resistance, especially from Philip Barbour and Hugh
Nelson, who were alarmed by a specter of centralization.55
Whatever the merits of his argument, Clay was willing to
soothe opponents by requiring a state's consent for internal
improvements within its boundaries-not that it was really
necessary constitutionally, he explained. And to recruit more
support, he agreed to put the bare constitutional.questions to
a vote before proceeding to specific projects.
On the basic power to appropriate money, Clay's cohorts
won, ninety to seventy-five. But on federal powers actually to
construct postal and military roads and canals and to improve
interstate commerce, they lost by two votes. Since a number
of persons had urged a provision for state consent, which the
House decided to delete, it appears that those resolutions
would have passed if nationalists had made that concession.56
In the next few years after this debate of 1818, other
problems .diverted attention from internal improvements: the
protracted controversy about statehood for Missouri, relations
with Spain concerning Florida and Latin America, and the
impact of a depression. Nevertheless, Clay lost none of his in-
terest in launching an extensive program. If for no other
reason, he wished to strike back at Monroe, who appeared to
be the main obstacle to movement on the issue. Not only had
the president influenced recent House voting against constitu-
I
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tional power, he seemed to be altogether inconsistent by
giving executive orders to build military roads. Why could he
do this while Congress could not? Clay demanded to know
how much had been spent currently on a military road from
Tennessee toward Louisiana. Upon learning that the value of
soldiers' labor on it was ten thousand dollars, he put through
an authorization for that amount to establish the principle of
legislative control. Monroe seemed unimpressed.57
Collaboration with at least one executive office was more
positive. In compliance with a House request for information
on desirable internal improvements, Secretary of War Cal-
houn reported in January 1819 on the importance of good fa-
cilities to move troops and materiel. The breadth of the
country's interior and its long coastline required a network of
transportation, he concluded. Portending what would happen,
Calhoun recommended assignment of Army engineers and
other military personnel to participate in these programs. But
politician that he was, the secretary carefully avoided upset-
ting the president and did not discuss constitutional aspects
of internal improvements.58
The most important federal internal improvement in this
period, the National Road, gradually extended westward from
Maryland toward the Mississippi Valley. It had originated in
the law of 1802 enabling Ohio's admission to the Union and
pledging 5 percent of proceeds from public-land sales in the
new state for constructing the road-2 percent for the part
leading to Ohio and 3 percent for the part within it. Later
Congress made the same provisions for Indiana, Illinois, and
Missouri. In addition to the fund from land sales, frequent
congressional appropriations financed the ongoing work. By
the time of the bonus-bill debate, 1817-18, construction had
connected Cumberland, Maryland, and Wheeling, Virginia, on
the upper Ohio River. All along, Clay had been the project's
fully committed friend in Congress and had had much to do
with selecting the route, particularly the site of Wheeling. His
enthusiasm for expediting construction probably owed as
much to his personal satisfaction in traveling between Ken-
tucky and Washington on the road and the river as to his gen-
eral commitment to developing the country's transportation.
Clay spoke eloquently about the enormous savings in time
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and cost of travel the p.ighway contributed, not merely to the
deserving West but to the entire nation.59
Despite a narrow constitutional view of federal involve-
ment in internal improvements, Monroe had no reservations
about signing all appropriation bills for them. His record coin-
cided with House votes in 1818, affirming full legislative
power to provide funds but not to construct facilities. The cru-
cial test of his ideas came in May 1822, when he received a
bill to set up tollgates to pay for maintenance of the National
Road. Ever since becoming president, Monroe had kept in his
possession a long paper he had written on the question, and
now he enclosed it with his message vetoing the bill. He de-
fined the power to appropriate funds as virtually unlimited,
but he categorically rejected any additional power to adminis-
ter a road, including plans, acquisition of land by eminent
domain, enforcement of a criminal code, and in this instance
maintenance supported by tolls. These were functions, he
said, belonging to the states. His reasoning ranged across con-
stitutional history from colonial days to the present, as he ex-
amined various parts of the Constitution, notably postal,
military, commercial, and financial clauses.6o Monroe's persist-
ent call for a constitutional amendment is strange in light of
his fear of broad federal power. An amendment would merely
countenance the danger.
Clay was not currently serving in Congress, though he
could see that his presence would neither have prevented
Monroe's veto nor have helped to override it. Furthermore,
closely divided opinion on the subject forbade amending the
Constitution. National internal improvements might have to
depend only on federal grants and some indirect approach in
collaboration with states or private enterprise, a strategy to
which Monroe would gladly assent, as he demonstrated in leg-
islation he signed in later sessions. Lacking a constitutional
amendment, the nation would have to accept these limitations
for much of the next century.61
As for the future of the National Road, construction con-
tinued, but at an uneven pace.62 There were large gaps in the
road west of Columbus and a primitive western part that
stopped at Vandalia, the Illinois capital, instead of its pro-
jected terminal in Missouri. By 1842 Congress, having appro-
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priated a total of $5 million, turned responsibility for it over to
the states through which it passed.63
When Clay returned to Congress for the session of 1823-
24, he had another opportunity to challenge the strict-
constructionist position of the administration on internal im-
provements. He could not accept Monroe's tollgate veto during
his absence as a conclusive definition of national power. The
president himself helped set the stage for another congres-
sional discussion when he recommended enactment of a mea-
sure to use Army engineers to survey potential routes for
roads and canals. At the outset, Clay insisted that there
would be no justification for governmental surveying if con-
struction of future projects were not within governmental
power. It was necessary, he said, to reexamine basic prin-
ciples. So he and other representatives ran through the fa-
miliar arguments on whether Congress could go beyond
appropriating funds to legislate upon construction and admin-
istration. The Speaker again expounded a broad doctrine rest-
ing on the postal, military, and commercial clauses of the
Constitution, while Barbour, Randolph, and other states'
righters reiterated contrary views. A bill did pass in April
1824 with a comfortable margin; yet it left the constitutional
question close to where it had been, which meant Clay's
valiant effort fell short.64 In the future, Army engineers sur-
veyed a great many areas for developing land and water
transportation, but actual construction fell to states or private
companies. Still, these surveys became a valuable public sub-
sidy, substantially softening the severity of the presidential
vetoes of 1817 and 1822.65
Within the limits of Monroe's formula of federal aid with-
out involvement in actual construction, many projects
received help in the twenties. An important area was water-
ways: clearing river channels for navigation, subscription to
stock of canal companies (the Chesapeake-Ohio and the
Chesapeake-Delaware), and land grants for canal routes (the
Wabash-Erie and the Illinois-Michigan).66 Clay was, of course,
supportive, particularly for western undertakings. Like other
politicians, his nationalist outlook did respond also to section-
alism. He often emphasized the justice of more liberality
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toward the West to counteract what he saw as a bias toward
the East.67
Still another way to develop transportation involved dis-
tribution of proceeds from public-land sales for this purpose to
the states. The idea was not new, for President Jefferson and
Secretary Gallatin had referred to that possibility. And the
Ohio enabling act of 1802 had pledged 5 percent of land pro-
ceeds in the new state for a national road. The same provision
attached also to other western states upon admission. Then
too, the Land Ordinance of 1785 had set aside a section in each
township to establish schools. As an extension of these prece-
dents, Maryland started a movement in 1821 for distribution
of land proceeds to all states, not only to the West. The pro-
posal got some positive reactions from other states and in Con-
gress. From 1824 onward there were proposals for
distribution, now linked to internal improvements. It offered
an alternative to direct federal involvement, and Clay would
tirelessly labor for it the rest of his career.68 Concurrently,
Thomas Hart Benton had shaped a competing formula, called
graduation, which would sharply reduce land prices step by
step to a free homestead level; but it had no internal improve-
ments dimension. 69 Neither plan gained congressional ap-
proval for the time being.
Looking toward the election of 1824, Clay believed the
fulfillment of his aspirations for the presidency could depend
upon his congressional record, especially upon the issues of
the tariff and internal improvements. On that basis he per-
ceived his chances to be very good. As he returned to the
House, resumed the speakership, and dominated the agenda,
his position seemed strong. He had put forward an American
System for economic growth by protecting domestic industry
and by uniting the country with an extensive network of
transportation. But he faced formidable opposition of several
candidates at this moment when the old two-party system
had faded. He had to admit that Secretary of State Adams
also had a strong commitment to federal internal improve-
ments. Though seen as a strict constructionist of the Virginia
school, Secretary of Treasury Crawford had favored the
survey bill and other national measures. Secretary of War
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Calhoun promoted the same internal improvements plans as
he had. Senator Jackson, the rising military hero, defied easy
classification; yet he had voted for tariff and internal improve-
ments bills. So at the end of the session in mid-1824, it was
uncertain what the impact of Clay's advocacy of economic na-
tionalism would have on this unusual election.70
4Secretary
of State
T he controversial election of 1824 did not meaningfullyregister popular will about economic issues, whose resolu-
tion Clay had thought would be so decisive. The collapse of
the two-party system had led to sectional and factional sup-
port for several candidates and blurred, even more than
usual, their positions on future policy. Then, with no candi-
date achieving a majority vote in the Electoral College, the de-
cision went to the House. Here maneuvering to align a
majority of state delegations pushed principles still further
into the background. Clay himself missed obtaining enough
electoral votes to be one of three (Jackson, Adams, and Craw-
ford), upon whom the House would ballot. With less popular
and electoral votes than Jackson, the Adams forces, headed by
Clay and Webster, managed to recruit votes of thirteen out of
twenty-four states, enough for victory. Few, if any, knowledge-
able observers could say that Adams won the presidency be-
cause of his muted economic nationalism in a contest with the
vague democratic appeals of Jacksonians.
Clay's contribution to Adams's election, followed by ap-
pointment as secretary of state, clouded the next four-year
term, allowing a developing Jacksonian bloc in Congress to
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defeat administration measures. Clay would spend time re-
pelling charges of a corrupt bargain when he preferred to
attend to diplomatic business.1 He felt the more frustrated be-
cause he and the president shared views on the tariff and in-
ternal improvements at home and on all matters of foreign
affairs. Their personal relations, often cool and adversarial in
the past, now became compatible. Though a seasoned diplo-
mat and Monroe's secretary of state for nearly eight years,
Adams gave Clay ample room to shape policy and manage his
department, while collaborating with him constructively.2
Upon assuming office in March 1825, the new secretary
understood that Latin America would be an area of major
interest. It had been so ever since the Spanish colonies in Cen-
tral and South America had fought a long war for independ-
ence. Early on, Clay had taken the lead in Congress to prod
President Monroe and his secretary of state Adams into official
recognition of the several Latin American republics. In the
House during sessions of 1818 and afterward, he spoke
warmly for that policy, which Monroe and Adams viewed as
premature. Perhaps Spanish recovery of the vast area had
become impossible; yet at this juncture Adams was negotiating
a treaty to purchase Spanish Florida and did not want to an-
tagonize Spain by recognizing independence of the new na-
tions. Such caution did not appeal to Clay.
He had launched a spirited argument for bolder action.
His resolution would appropriate funds for a minister to
Buenos Aires, capital of the United Provinces of Rio de la
Plata-if the president found it expedient, he added. These
neighbors to the south, he declared, had made good their bid
for freedom and promised to establish republican institutions
similar to those of this country. They should have friendly en-
couragement from the United States. He emphasized these po-
litical dimensions but did refer to an economic reason for
support. Valuable commercial avenues to and from Latin
America would open, he predicted. Already exports flowed
northward: precious metals, coffee, cocoa, sugar, and other
tropical products. In return, this nation could market agricul-
tural goods and manufactures there. And he predicted a strong
stimulus to the American carrying trade, not the economic
sector Clay would ordinarily underscore. At the moment, the
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Kentuckian could not prevail against a determined opposition
by the executive and its congressional followers. His resolution
failed in a House vote of 115-45. He was so upset by this deci-
sive vote that he did not leave the Speaker's chair for debate
again the rest of the session.3
This was merely the opening phase of a sustained cam-
paign. Clay regularly repeated his effort for recognizing the
Latin American governments. Two years afterward, in 1820,
he advanced the theme of two spheres, the Old and New
Worlds, America and Europe. If the United States extended a
helping hand to its fellow republics, the contrast would be
clear, both politically and economically. As for commercial con-
nections, "Let us become real and true Americans," he urged,
"and place ourselves at the head of the American system." The
call foreshadowed his use of the term in the later appeal for
an economy at home balancing manufacturing, agriculture,
and commerce. And the concept of two spheres, old and new,
would soop find expression in t~e Monroe Doctrine of 1823,
warning the Holy Alliance not to intervene in Latin America.
Whether a Pan-American political or economic system would
develop was unclear for some time. Nevertheless, Clay did
make a point about commercial possibilities; and as secretary
of state he would soon have an opportunity to exploit them.4
At least in 1821, his repeated resolution supporting possible
presidential recognition of independence passed the House,
eighty-seven to sixty-eight.5 This pronouncement of congres-
sional sentiment not surprisingly coincided with the adminis-
tration's decision that at last the time had come to commence
diplomatic relations with these new governments. It did so
over the next several years. Such was the situation when Clay
became secretary in March 1825.
He let it be known promptly that the United States
viewed Latin American independence as an accomplished
fact. In his instructions to American ministers abroad, he em-
phasized the necessity for Spain to abandon a forlorn hope of
recapturing its American empire. Better for that country to
relax its old trade. restrictions affecting America, he said, and
stimulate general prosperity.6
Besides negotiations on commercial and political matters
with individual nations on both sides of the Atlantic, Clay saw
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an opportunity to accomplish something on a collective basis.
An invitation arrived from Colombia to participate in an
inter-American congress at Panama for discussing common
hemispheric problems. Adams agreed to request a congres-
sional appropriation for sending delegates after Clay over-
came the president's wariness of political, perhaps even
military commitments. Unfortunately, the mission to Panama
got entangled with politics at home. For months Jacksonian
forces at the Capitol blocked approval of Adams's recommen-
dation on partisan rather than diplomatic grounds. After
much delay, one of the two American ministers arrived, too
late for any effect.7
Clay's instructions for the Pan-American mission, how-
ever, demonstrated what he sought to accomplish in future
hemispheric relations. Like the president, he disapproved any
military involvement or any centralized governmental author-
ity at the expense of American neutrality and national sov-
ereignty. Instead, he urged the ministers to negotiate
commercial treaties with individual nations at the congress in
the absence of general agreement. In bilateral treaties the sec-
retary wanted not only reciprocity of regulations by the signa-
tory nations but also equal commercial concessions to others.
Use the recent pact with Central America as a model, he di-
rected.8
His diplomatic effort td promote Latin American com-
merce had been under way well before plans for the Panama
Congress. And this also was not a new departure, for in the
preceding administration Adams as secretary had pursued
the same end with the same strategy if not with the same
zeal. A treaty of 1824 with Colombia had opened trade on lib-
eral terms, known as "the most favored nation," allowing the
United States the same privileges for shipping and imports
given to any other nation.9 Now in 1825 under Clay's super-
vision, a treaty with Central America went further by estab-
lishing reciprocity, a preferable system that eliminated duties
on United States goods and ships not levied on goods and
ships of that federation itself. lO The United States minister to
Brazil negotiated a similar agreement except for special con-
cessions to the former parent, Portugal. ll An effort in Mexico
by Joel Poinsett proved to be difficult because of that country's
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wish to grant more generous terms of trade to other Latin
American nations. Here, as elsewhere, Clay pointed out the
friendly help of the United States in warning off European in-
tervention during the wars of independence. That lecture may
have helped to induce a Mexican compromise. Nevertheless,
ratification of the treaty came so late that it passed the dead-
line for taking effect.12
Just how much the secretary's policy affected commerce
at the time is difficult to assess. For one thing, despite sus-
tained attempts, he did not get agreements with other re-
publics, such as Peru and the United Provinces of Rio de la
Plata.13 And continued turmoil broke up some states, such as
Central America and Colombia, probably disarranging pat-
terns of business. The best evidence shows no surge upward of
United States-Latin American imports and exports through
the 1820s. Annual totals were fairly stable. Yet they indicate a
very substantial commerce, nearly a third of the volume of
American trade with all of Europe. Clay's economic diplomacy
seems justified, if for no other reason than to have prevented
even more British dominance than existed.14
Of course, Clay would not neglect commercial relations
with Europe. Here too, he could build upon policy already in
place. Adams as secretary had negotiated several treaties with
most-favored-nation clauses. Congress had enacted laws in
1815 and 1824 allowing reciprocal concessions in duties on
tonnage and goods to any country abandoning discrimination
that favored its own trade. Generally, reciprocity applied to
direct commerce involving shipment of goods from one signa-
tory to the other, not indirect routes or goods of a third nation.
But Clay and Adams sought to broaden that rule to include in-
direct commerce, which a law of 1828 did cover. Like his pre-
decessor, the secretary pursued a liberal policy by diplomacy
backed up by congressional statutes. By 1830, the United
States had trade pacts with much of northern Europe.15
Commerce with Britain continued to be decidedly the
most important, in both exports and imports. On this subject
Clay had personal experience, going back to his participation
in producing the commercial accord of 1815. It had provided
reciprocal privileges of nondiscriminating duties on ships and
goods of the two signatories in direct trade. Renewed in 1818
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and again in 1827 when Clay was in the cabinet, the treaty
left much to be done. The level of many British import duties
was very high-some prohibitive. But an encouraging situ-
ation had now developed. The president of the Board of Trade,
William Huskisson, proposed in Parliament a so-called free-
trade budget, including bold reductions of duties· on imports:
from as high as 75 down to 10 or 15 percent on some com-
modities. He succeeded in passing some revisions. But duties
on agricultural goods, particularly in the corn laws, remained
high despite Huskisson's attempts. Though appearing to be a
free-trader, he would adjust his reformist convictions to retain
what he classified as moderate customs for even-handed
trade and for revenue. Just what he himself favored, Clay re-
marked.16
Another loose end in the agreement of 1815 created a
special problem, trade with the British West Indies colonies.
Clay and his colleagues had not been able to pierce the old
mercantilistic system to allow American ships access to these
islands. Since the Revolution, the United States had been an
outsider, though its exports (flour, lumber, livestock) moved
there and its imports (sugar, tropical products) were received
from there in large quantities by indirect routes, by British
carriers, and by evasion.
Dissatisfaction with the continued prohibition of Ameri-
can ships led Congress to consider measures that might break
down the barriers. In the House during the sessions of 1818
and 1820, bills did pass to shut off British vessels engaged in
this traffic between the United States and the West Indies
colonies either directly or indirectly. During debate Clay ex-
pressed his disappointment not to have fully opened"com-
merce with the islands in the convention of 1815 and strongly
supported retaliation to press for correcting an injustice.17
Still more legislation followed. Britain seemed to give way in
a parliamentary statute of 1822, permitting American ships to
land and load goods in West Indies ports, providing the
United States abolished all discriminating rates on tonnage
and cargoes of British ships. Though proclaiming the com-
merce open the following year, President Monroe did not re-
scind the discriminating duties. And Congress stipulated that
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these duties would stand until England eliminated an unfair,
centuries-old system of imperial preference for its intercolo-
nial trade. At this the British balked.18
So when Clay took over the State Department in March
1825, promising advances toward liberalization had stalled. A
flurry of legislation by both sides had not settled the dispute;
obviously they would have to rely upon diplomacy.
The secretary did not give the West Indies question high
priority. Richard Rush, the outgoing minister to London, con-
tinued unproductive conversations with the Foreign Office,
and his successor, Rufus King, spent another year in the same
groove without fresh instructions. How far Clay could depart
from past positions may have been a worry, especially since
President Adams had structured them during the Monroe ad-
ministration. In any case, Clay displayed an uncharacteristic
hesitancy, which would turn out to be costly. Through the
summer of 1825, he sent out queries on policy to several per-
sons knowledgeable about maritime commerce. The answers
inclined toward abandoning discriminatory duties and the
American proviso on imperial preference. That is how Clay
himself felt. At last the secretary concluded that the matter of
imperial preference must be left to the empire itself, for some-
what like members of the American union, the colonies were
internal parts of a unit. 19 Furthermore, he certainly could see
after three years of legislation and diplomacy that England
was not going to give in. Even the free-trader Huskisson
would not touch either discriminating duties or imperial pref-
erence.20
Clay's instructions of June 19, 1826, to a new minister to
London, Albert Gallatin, reflected this view, no longer resisted
by the president. The document authorized the minister to
recede from opposing imperial preference and merely obtain
reciprocal elimination of discriminating duties.21 That might
have worked three years before, but now a different situation
forbade success. Britain had increased the price of agreement
in a statute of 1825 requiring the United States also to grant
most-favored-nation status in this commerce, with unclear
and possibly destabilizing impact upon other trade relations
of the United States. And Foreign Secretary George Canning,
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sharing views of Huskisson and others, no longer had any in-
terest in granting concessions or even in serious talk about
concessions. In addition to differences of opinion, hostility
toward Adams appears to have been a deterrent. Possibly ri-
valry of the two countries in Latin American affairs, such as
on the Panama Congress, had an effect as well.22
When Gallatin arrived in England, he discovered to his
dismay that an order in council had declared a prohibition of
all American trade with the islands, effective the following
January (1827). That occurred, and in March Adams pro-
claimed a similar interdiction of British intercourse. Over his
year's stay in Britain, Gallatin received frequent instructions
from the secretary on withdrawing or modifying previous de-
mands and urging renewed negotiations. Canning became
prime minister but soon died. The two sides had reached an
impasse, and a completely frustrated Gallatin returned home
in October.23
Notwithstanding this diplomatic failure, American-West
Indies trade did not suffer as much as one might suppose. As it
had in the past, it moved in large amounts by way of Nova
Scotia and Caribbean islands of other European nations. Clay
found consolation in the fact that the total value of goods held
up well.24 He employed an agent to visit various islands and
report the status of this commerce, which, he learned, had re-
cently increased.25 True, American shipping suffered somewhat
in the loss of direct imports from the British colonies, yet the
situation had not deteriorated as much as had been portrayed
by critics of the administration.
One sees unfortunate mistakes in handling the West
Indies problem. Certainly inexcusable delays, especially in
Clay's first year as secretary, were costly. Other matters con-
sumed much of his time before he even sent off the Gallatin
mission. The fall-out of the aberrant presidential election, the
need to organize departmental administration, the fact that
many points of policy had been set up by ex-Secretary, now
President Adams (however defective they were) pushed this
issue to the background. Then the decision to require British
abandonment of imperial preference seriously weakened
American chances for success. It was little help for him to
know that he had dropped that objective after a year or so.
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Nevertheless, in general, he had strengthened the nation's for-
eign trade as an important element of the American System,
which, in his mind, must balance commerce with manufac-
turing and agriculture. Obviously he had more success with
European and Latin American commercial relations than with
the West Indies.
A little later, however, he would watch bitterly as the
next administration of Andrew Jackson opened the trade in
1830 and did so after deprecating the Adams-Clay approach.
Actually, Clay's Democratic successor as secretary, Martin
Van Buren, achieved it more because of the passage of time
and the cooling of tempers than because of superior diplo-
matic skill.
Although Clay gave a major share of his time as secretary of
state to foreign affairs, he remained involved in the politics of
economic policy. He and President Adams agreed on the main
issues: federal internal improvements, terms of public-land
sales, and protective tariffs. They were disappointed with
progress on the first of these yet did get sizable congressional
appropriations to assist road and canal construction. On land
policy, competing proposals for downward "graduation" of
prices and for "distribution" of public-land revenue to states
took shape without resolution. But it was the tariff that
became the chief domestic question addressed by the develop-
ing parties ofAdams and Clay and of Jackson and Van Buren.
Halfway through the Adams administration, in early
1827, Congress considered a bill to raise ad valorem duties on
raw wool and woolen textiles, subject to a scale of minimum
valuations at custom houses exceeding actual value. Passed in
the House, the bill was tabled in the Senate when Vice Presi-
dent Calhoun broke a tie vote, an ominous signal that the
Carolinian was moving from his well-known nationalism to
states-rights sectionalism.26
Soon Clay joined with friends in protectionist Pennsylva-
nia to lay plans for a broadly based tariff policy to present at
the next session. Working with leading persons in that state
and with the zealous propagandists Mathew Carey and
Hezekiah Niles, he favored calling a national convention at
Harrisburg in July 1827 to formulate a concrete legislative
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plan. On his way .home through western Pennsylvania in
June, he spoke at several towns in defense of the American
System, now a familiar term across the country. He looked
upon the forthcoming meeting as a political response to the
dangerous obstruction of Jacksonians. So the convention was
understandably viewed as an administration tactic in the ap-
proaching presidential election.27
Delegates from thirteen northeastern and western states
did gather to discuss the status of industry and the necessity
of governmental encouragement of its growth. Politicians, in-
cluding Chairman Rollin Mallary of the House Committee on
Manufactures, mingled with private individuals from many
parts of the economy to share information and ideas. While
considering manufactures of iron, hemp, spirits, cottons, and
other commodities, they emphasized wool and woolens, which
they felt Congress had failed to support adequately. On wool,
the convention urged gradual increase of rates to a nearly pro-
hibitive level; on woolens, it sought levies even higher than
the recently tabled bill.28 At the convention's request, Niles re-
ported its proceedings and recommended specific revisions to
the national legislature.
Reflecting the position of the administration, Secretary of
Treasury Richard Rush's annual report to Congress in Decem-
ber 1827 advanced an extensive argument for increased pro-
tection. Although Adams favored that policy, he did not
publicly express his views. In his diary he reasoned that "mea-
sures of detail should be matured in Congress, and it is time
for the President to act upon them when they are brought to
him in the form of bills for his signature."29 Political caution,
however, more than constitutional principle probably induced
his silence. Clay's incoming correspondence freely criticized
the president's detachment, but the secretary loyally justified
Adams's uncharacteristic deference as avoiding "a delicate
topic." He predicted Jacksonian hostility to the American
System would be exposed during the coming debate.30
Opponents of the administration controlled the House
and put through a bill there with higher protective rates on
some imports, especially raw wool, to please agricultural in-
terests of the mid-Atlantic and Ohio Valley states, but with
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imposts on woolens lower than those sought by the Harris-
burg convention. This action caused complaint by many New
Englanders because it would result in comparatively greater
costs of raw material for their mills. They charged that Jack-
sonians wanted the Northeast to reject the whole measure.
Actually, that was the aim of southern Democrats but not of a
northern contingent led by Van Buren. In the Senate his
amendments to the bill for somewhat higher woolen rates con-
tributed to passage of the so-called Tariff of Abominations
(1828).31
Clay hoped that administration forces would benefit in
the fall elections from their advocacy of a protective tariff and
other features of economic nationalism. In that contest with
the Jacksonians he relied upon a new party of which he had
been a principal architect. Much as Van Buren had done in
unifying the opposition, he had helped build a network of
state organizations of politicians, newspaper editors, and fi-
nancial contributors-all, he believed, who subscribed to the
American System. The goal now was to reelect Adams. Yet he
encountered insurmountable obstacles. Notwithstanding com-
plete agreement with the secretary on policies, Adams would
not electioneer and saw no need to revive a two-party system.
A larger obstacle proved to be the dismaying popularity of
Andrew Jackson. His personality, coupled with Van Buren's
efficient organization, swept the presidential election of 1828.
These factors, apparently more than positions on tariff or in-
ternal improvements, more even than a rising sectionalism or
an invocation of democratic sentiment, contributed predomi-
nantly to Jackson's election.32
Nevertheless, the recent enactment of the TariffofAbomi-
nations portended trouble for the new administration. Vice
President Calhoun, responding to opinion in his South Car-
olina and the South generally, now saw nothing but injustice
in Clay's protective system. He had collaborated with Van
Buren in building a Jacksonian party and envisioned himself
as successor to the Old Hero in the White House. But he felt
the maneuvers in passing the tariff had been highly destruc-
tive to the South economically and constitutionally. So he
drafted two documents, known as Exposition and Protest, ar-
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guing against Clay's brand of nationalism and contending an
injured state had the right to nullify such legislation. There
was an overtone too of secession from the Union.33 Clay not
only had lost an election but had to reckon with these disturb-
ing possibilities.
5Nullification
E arly in his administration Jackson remained cautiousabout the tariff. Quite aware of political hazards, he pre-
ferred not to tamper with rates. Ifrevenue produced a surplus,
he suggested distributing it to the states after retiring the na-
tional debt, which seemed about to occur. It would be desirable,
he said, to authorize distribution with a constitutional amend-
ment. But he emphasized his firm belief that Congress did
have full power to enact a protective tariff. In any case, he ven-
tured his opinion that the existing tariff of 1828 had not had as
much effect, either good or bad, as extremists asserted. He
would advise them to quiet down for the sake of the general
welfare.!
Here was a rare instance when Clay found some common
ground with his adversary. Of course he could not concede
that the level of rates made little difference; yet he did concur
in a moderate approach. The present schedule appeared com-
patible with the goals of the American System, he thought. It
would be enough to improve enforcement of the law, stopping
the frauds and evasions that abounded. The largest problem
bothering Clay and other protectionists centered on the auc-
tion system, which permitted sale of imports at low prices
prior to payment of customs. Another vexation was assign-
ment of goods to agents of foreign merchants at eastern cities.
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These practices undermined a true ad valorem assessment.2
In its first session of the Jacksonian era, Congress took a
modest step toward reforming procedures in collecting im-
posts. It did not stop there, as Clay wished, but lowered sev-
eral rates, on salt, molasses, coffee, and tea. And through May
1830, foes of protection, notably George McDuffie of South
Carolina, stimulated lively discussion in the House.3
A more exciting debate had been under way in the
Senate, one that marked the initial stage of a growing consti-
tutional crisis. The highlight was an oratorical duel between
Robert Hayne of South Carolina and Webster of Massachu-
setts, though many senators spoke out in alignment with one
or the other. Hayne laid out an argument for state sovereignty
against what he saw as a consolidationist trend damaging to
southern interest, especially measures for federal internal im-
provements and a protective tariff. Everyone could see he was
reiterating the Exposition of 1828, composed by Vice President
Calhoun, nQw presiding in this chamber. Webster explained
his own metamorphosis from favoring low tariffs to favoring
high tariffs and justified it with a classic statement of Ameri-
can nationalism.4
Calhoun himself was moving into the open as the fore-
most opponent of loose-constructionist politics. Shedding his
nationalism of former times, he had signaled his states-rights
transformation by breaking a senate tie vote to defeat the
woolens bill of 1827. Then the next year, though he had not
openly acknowledged authorship of the states-rights Exposi-
tion, it was well known that he had written it. His support of
Jackson's presidential candidacy in 1828 had rested on his
hope for downward revision of the tariff. But when the new
chief executive seemed disinterested in replacing the pro-
tective system, when radical agitation back home intensified,
and when Van Buren gained the advantage in their rivalry for
the presidential succession, Calhoun decided he had to set
forth his position to the public.
So at his up-country plantation in summer 1831 he
drafted his widely noticed Fort Hill address, restating the doc-
trine of interposition, based upon state sovereignty and power
to judge the validity of national legislation. He contended that
the present high tariff was plainly unconstitutional, for it
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abused both revenue and commerce powers. Southerners were
unfairly taxed, in effect, when they paid prices of consumer
goods inflated to benefit northern manufacturers. The Caro-
linian did not mention secession as a remedy, should interposi-
tion fail to remove the evil.5
Soon afterward, in October, free-traders aimed another
blow at protectionism. An editor active in their cause, Condy
Raguet, helped bring delegates together at Philadelphia to in-
fluence the public and Congress. A majority of the two hun-
dred persons attending were southerners, inclined in varying
degrees to believe the tariff laws unconstitutional as well as
unfair. And their resolutions said so. A northern wing wished
to avoid that question and succeeded in having old Albert Gal-
latin draft the convention's memorial to Congress, emphasiz-
ing the ineffectiveness and inequity of protectionism but
expressing no constitutional objections.6
Protectionists employed similar tactics. In the lead, Hez-
ekiah Niles regularly and unreservedly promoted the Ameri-
can System in his Weekly Register. An admiring friend of Clay
(he named a son after the Kentuckian), Niles published
masses of information on industry, commerce, and public
policy to support his argument. His special target was Brit-
ain, which he insisted was exploiting the United States com-
mercially while merely talking about free trade. His fellow
journalist Mathew Carey also propagandized with effect by
way of essays and personal relations. The correctly conserva-
tive North American Review in Boston carried protariff arti-
cles by Edward and Alexander Everett.7 State legislatures,
such as those in Kentucky and Louisiana, in which Clay had
particular interest, passed resolutions for nourishing "domes-
tic industry."8 Then in October 1831, shortly before a new Con-
gress assembled and before the presidential election year
arrived, a national convention met in New York, aiming to get
the better of the recent free-trade assemblage. Niles worked
hard to organize this effort. He served as secretary, and after-
ward his Register carried reports of proceedings and an ad-
dress to the people. Memorials on the tariff went to Congress
while it was considering a new bill.9
Clay had been the acknowledged leader of the opposition
to the Jackson administration since it had come to power in
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early 1829. Though at home in Ashland most of the time, he
maintained that position by an extensive correspondence with
key figures across the country. Wherever he did travel in the
West or South, he met large crowds, eager to hear his views
expressed with characteristic eloquence. It seemed clear he
would be the presidential nominee of the new National Re-
publican party. Certainly he expected it.
He had a ready-made platform, the American System, of
course. Two of his numerous speeches on that theme, in Ohio
at Columbus and Cincinnati in summer 1830, were typical.
Encouragement of industry helped everyone, he declared.
That policy would ensure economic independence of the
nation, essential in war or peace. What helped manufacturing
helped the farmer and the mechanic, the merchant and the
banker. A home market meant self-sufficiency.10 At Natchez,
Mississippi, he spoke to a large audience on his way up the
river after his winter's visit in New Orleans. He emphasized
benefits to the South. Cotton planters were badly mistaken,
he argued, in thinking that a protective tariff raised prices of
what they bought and lowered prices of their cotton. Just the
opposite. Textile mills in the United States provided a valu-
able market for raw cotton, and industrial growth stimulated
competition and lowered consumer prices. On these occasions
he was aiming his message toward the South, the pivotal ele-
ment in the approaching election, he believed. ll
Ever since the Webster-Hayne debate in January 1830,
Clay had portrayed Calhoun's nullification as an erroneous,
very dangerous theory. No one state can block a decision of
the majority, he contended, for otherwise that state would be
legislating for the whole Union. Like Webster and Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall, he relied upon Article VI of the Consti-
tution, making national law supreme over state law, together
with Article III, giving the federal courts jurisdiction in cases
involving the Constitution. Recalling his youthful opposition
to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, condemned by the Vir-
ginia and Kentucky Resolutions of Madison and Jefferson, he
found no precedent in them for Calhoun's pretended J effer-
sonianism now. Those resolutions of 1798, he reasoned, called
upon all states, not one, to resist, yes nullify, federal consti-
tutional infractions by repeal in Congress, by the turnover of
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power in an election, or, in the extreme, by resort to the natu-
ral right of revolution. So as the prospect of confrontation
between nullifiers and unionists over the tariff became immi-
nent, his position was clear.12 He advised a political friend,
"We ought to stand or fall upon our principles; and make no
compromise or surrender them."13 Time would tell.
If he took an unyielding stand against nullification, he
did seem ready to make some adjustments in a new tariff. The
treasury was reaching that unique condition of completely re-
tiring the national debt. Once that obligation disappeared, he
calculated, as much as $10 million (more than a third of the
annual budget) would be eliminated from federal expendi-
tures, allowing that much reduction of the tariff. He felt will-
ing to abolish rates on imports not competing with American
goods but wanted to continue protection of other domestic
products.14
His prescription would soon be tested. The Kentucky
legislature had elected him to the Senate for the new Con-
gress beginning in December 1831. He was very visible, not
only because he resumed his legislative leadership but be-
cause the National Republicans now nominated him for the
presidency. After that unanimous action, the party convention
approved an address, giving a resounding endorsement to the
American System. It scolded Jackson for his opinions on the
tariff, internal improvements, and banking.15
The president also had his eye on the approaching elec-
tion. His annual message to Congress revealed a shift toward a
states-rights position from his previously guarded pronounce-
ments. He urged sizable reductions of the tariff to conciliate
the restive South and to accommodate the commercial interest
in the North. Though not elaborating those reasons, he did
emphasize the decreasing need for revenue as the public debt
disappeared.16 Jackson wanted more drastic revisions than
Clay.
The first month ofthe session yielded little progress by the
Senate except to define the line of battle. As a member of the
Committee on Manufactures, Clay skirmished with Samuel
Smith, the eighty-year-old merchant-politician and chairman of
the Finance Committee. They disagreed over committee refer-
ence of Clay's proposals. Since Smith supported the adminis-
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tration's effort for deep cuts in the tariff, Clay wanted his pro-
posals to go to his own committee. On this procedural matter he
won a significant vote, twenty-two to seventeen. He could see
that a majority of the Senate shared his protectionist com-
mitment.17
Mter these preliminaries the Kentuckian explained his
plan for revision, which he offered as a resolution. With some
precision he analyzed the status of the public debt, then $24
million and soon to be retired from a sinking fund. He would
continue that process and still cancel the tariff on goods not in
competition with American products. This he would do while
retaining protective duties on competitive imports at or near
the present levels. Surely the South would be satisfied, short
of total surrender by the industrial interest. The debt could be
retired if customs collection changed from a credit to a cash
system and if home valuation (at American ports by American
officials) replaced deceptive foreign invoices. And most im-
portant, he would preserve the principle of protection.
As Clay ranged across the whole subject, he developed an
argument he would often advance later. Instead of accumu-
lating an undesirably large surplus from the tariff, he wished
the Treasury to begin transferring money from public-land
sales to the states for internal improvements and other uses.
Such distribution would not permanently fasten a high-tariff
policy on the country, he insisted, because it would draw only
from land sales. In his view, using revenue from customs for
distribution would be unconstitutional. The distinction
between the two sources, however, was quite hazy.18
Hayne, his principal opponent, moved a low-tariff amend-
ment reducing rates to bare revenue needs and to the same
percentage on all goods. The South Carolinian's argument cor-
responded exactly to that of Calhoun's Exposition of 1828. He
portrayed the tariff's impact upon the South as destructive:
low cotton prices and high consumer prices, amounting to an
oppressive tax imposed by a heartless manufacturing class. It
would be better for the United States to produce only what it
could not buy more cheaply abroad, he contended.19 As for
parliamentary procedure, Hayne and those of like mind
wished to refer Clay's resolution to the unfriendly Finance
Committee and its antiprotectionist chairman Smith. This re-
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fueled Clay's long-standing disagreement with the aged Mary-
lander. The two senators exchanged heated personal remarks,
highlighted by Smith's shouting that he could still defend him-
self.20
At the beginning of February, Clay had the floor for a
three-day set speech in a memorable defense of the American
System. The policy, he said, originated in the first years of the
republic. Washington, Hamilton, and Jefferson supported it
from 1789 onward in the form of protective legislation. He
then cited the laws of 1816 and 1824, further encouraging
manufacturing. And he displayed his pride in promoting the
latter statute, which had stimulated prosperity dramatically.
Deploring the constant call by opponents for free trade, he ex-
claimed, "It never has existed, it never will exist." Britain, the
principal supplier and customer of the United States, had not
adopted free trade despite much talk about it. Indeed, if Con-
gress rejected protection, Britain would recolonize America
economically. At this point, Clay launched into a rather cruel
attack upon Albert Gallatin, who had recently written the me-
morial of the Philadelphia free-trade convention. "Go home to
your native Europe," he commanded, "and there inculcate
upon her sovereigns your Utopian doctrines of free trade, and
when you have prevailed upon them to unseal their ports, and
freely admit the produce of Pennsylvania and other States,
come back, and we shall be prepared to become converts, and
to adopt your faith."
The senator's main target was the South on blaming the
tariff for its economic distress. He cited statistics to show a
downward trend of prices since passage of the law of 1824.
This had been the predictable impact of protection, he said, be-
cause encouragement of industrial growth brought on healthy
competition and lower prices. Even if his primitive figures
were accurate, he did not· make the qualification that many
other variables influenced price fluctuations. Nevertheless,
this led him into his stronger position, the desirable deyelop-
ment of a home market, of a balanced domestic economy. The
exchange of agricultural and manufactured goods helped all
sections and classes, according to this familiar rationale.21
Until recently, Clay remarked, few persons had doubted
the constitutional validity ofa protective tariff. Even Vice Presi-
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dent Calhoun, who was presiding over the debate, had not
doubted it. In 1816 he had strongly supported such a measure;
and in 1828, when he drew up the South Carolina Exposition,
Calhoun was merely restating what others, not he, believed
about constitutionality, the senator observed. Definitely not,
Calhoun inteIjected from the dais. He certainly did doubt it.
And in 1816, he declared, Congress did not debate the consti-
tutional issue. Well, that was because it was not debatable, Clay
retorted.22
The Senate continued to discuss every facet of the tariff
over the next several weeks. Mainly, the speeches made the
same points about the bill as before. On the economic impli-
cations, Thomas Ewing and George Dallas did broaden the
question by lecturing South Carolina not to blame the tariff for
its troubles but to consider the fixation on one crop of cotton, a
declining soil fertility, and the unproductiveness of slave labor.
The last of these criticisms touched a highly sensitive nerve.23
On the other side, antiprotectionists-Willie Mangum,
Felix Grundy, Isaac Hill, and others-encouraged Hayne to
stay the course.24 John Tyler of Virginia, the future president,
made one of the strongest attacks upon the American System
and its foremost spokesman. He charged that Clay wielded
"an influence over the legislation of Congress, as I verily be-
lieve, more powerful and more controlling than any other
man, or set of men, in this country, the manufacturers, and
they alone, excepted."25 And Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri
had moved over from favoring to opposing protection. In his
long-winded remarks, he traced the term and the policy of the
American System back to Federalist 11 (1787) and later to
Jefferson and Madison as well as Hamilton. But they had
called only for a selective response to discriminatory commer-
cial policies of particular countries, not for economic subsidies
at home such as presently urged, Benton said.26 Then several
persons joined Hayne in opposing protection on constitutional
grounds. Only his South Carolina colleague Stephen Miller,
however, went so far as to advocate the remedy of state nul-
lification of congressional legislation.27 Silence of others on
that topic must have given Vice President Calhoun pause.
At last, the disputatious solons confronted the next
parliamentary step. Several strategies had adherents and all
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were combined for submission to the Committee on Manu-
factures (sidestepping Smith), probably to put Clay, a member
and a presidential candidate, on the spot. The panel had in-
structions to report on abolishing rates for noncompetitive im-
ports and reducing them for others, on cutting all to a uniform
low level, on seeking information from the treasury and state
departments, and, strange to say, on changing public-land
policy, presumably because revenue from that source might
affect the tariff. Much to Clay's annoyance, the complex as-
signment would be impossible to handle in the limited time
available and, in any case, appeared to be a political trap.28
A week later, on March 30, the committee reported. Chair-
man Mahlon Dickerson recommended enactment of Clay's rec-
ommendations to abolish rates on noncompetitive goods and
reduce some others to bring in a revenue of $5.6 million. The
report insisted upon retaining the principle of protection, just
as the Kentuckian had argued. For fiscal or developmental
reasons, the report continued, lowering all rates to a a uniforln
level, as Hayne had proposed, was undesirable. On its other in-
structions, the committee advised postponement because
information requested from the executive branch had not ar-
rived. Hayne, Smith, and Benton led an assault against the
committee, depicting it as completely subservient to manu-
facturing interests. By a close vote, the Senate delayed action
until obtaining more facts. Clayacquiesced.29
Meanwhile, the House had been struggling with these is-
sues too. The central figure was Adams, elected to that body
after leaving the presidency. It was his misfortune to be se-
lected chairman of the Committee on Manufactures and to be
the center ofhopes for some amicable compromise. Such a role,
of course, seemed out of character for Adams,. better known for
his rigidity; but his experience and influence were resources
that he recruited in an interesting fashion. 30 Soon after the ses-
sion began in December, he and Clay attended a joint caucus of
protectionist legislators to discuss what to do. As the former
president sourly noted in his diary, Clay dominated the talk
and assumed a "super-presidential" air, unwilling to accommo-
date other views. To save the American System, according to
Adams, Clay vowed he would "defy the South, the President,
and the devil."31
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Worried that contention over the tariff posed great danger
to the Union and convinced that any alteration of the schedule
had to have Democratic support, Adams decided to collaborate
with the administration. So in conferences with Secretary of
Treasury Louis McLane, he promised concessions by his com-
mittee to reduce rates, but to do it gradually so that there
would be enough revenue for the president to achieve his goal
of retiring the national debt within the year. National Republi-
can candidate Clay naturally had no interest in that kind of
pledge to benefit Jackson in the fall elections. Nevertheless,
Adams tried to honor the agreement with McLane while main-
taining as much protection in a new tariff as possible.32 He re-
ceived a massive report from the secretary on the status of
manufactures in late April, as well as a plan to cut the average
rate from 45 to 27 percent. The House committee then ad-
justed some provisions upward, as Adams wished, and secured
passage of a bill in that chamber.33
A lively debate in the Senate added to July's heat. Though
willing to pacify his opponents somewhat, Clay thought the
House bill went too far. He sought. to rescue the American
System from destruction, especially to restore higher levies on
woolens and cotton bagging. He had some success, though the
votes were quite close, and Vice President Calhoun broke ties
to check Clay's rally. Webster heartily supported the protec-
tionist cause, and Hayne again led the opposition. An amended
bill went to a conference committee where the Senate's repre-
sentatives, William Wilkins and others, gave way on every
point. The final scene was one of unrestrained anger. Clay ver-
bally lashed Wilkins for his timidity, while from a different per-
spective Hayne deplored the result as quashing any southern
hope for justice. The bill did pass the Senate, however, and
Clay repressed his dissatisfaction enough to vote for it.34
As· his feelings calmed, he could look at the tariff of 1832
more positively.35 To be sure, it abandoned the system of mini-
mum valuation of woolen imports and abolished duties on
cheap wool. But on most grades of textiles, the rate was fairly
high-50 percent. And if imposts on cotton bagging, sugar,
iron, and glass were a little lower, one would still classify them
as protective. Over all, the average went down from 45 to
about 33 percent.36 Even the dedicated protectionists Niles (au-
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thor of the recent protariff convention's report) and Mathew
Carey spoke approvingly of the outcome. Other friends of the
senator seemed satisfied.37 Democrats, many of them southern
congressmen and one of them the president, concluded that
the threat to the nation's peace had disappeared.38 Not so the
followers of Calhoun and Hayne.
Through summer and autumn 1832 antiprotectionist feel-
ing intensified, especially in South Carolina, where extremists
threatened collection of the tariff and strengthened their po-
litical structure accordingly. Hayne became governor, and Vice-
President Calhoun took over his senate seat. Leading nullifiers
sought support from other southern states, among them Geor-
gia, unhappy about the Supreme Court's intervention against
its attempt to evict the Cherokees.39
Responding to this restiveness, Jackson sought to reas-
sure the country in his annual message of December 4 by
saying the government had all the necessary means to enforce
the laws and maintain the peace. Nevertheless, he believed
widespread complaints about the tariff required legislative
relief. The measure he approved in July as a just settlement
must now be revised down to a level only for essential revenue
and national defense. Besides, expenditures would decline due
to imminent retirement of the public debt.40
Within a few days news arrived at the capital that a
South Carolina convention had adopted an ordinance nullify-
ing the tariff statute as unconstitutional and setting up bar-
riers to its enforcement. It proclaimed that this sovereign
state would prohibit state officers from compliance. If the na-
tional government did not respect nullification, South Caro-
lina would secede from the Union.
Jackson reacted quickly. In animated conversations he
slashed at the miscreant state and its nefarious strategist. The
old general vowed he would himself head troops to put down
traitors. But characteristically he also assembled a careful if
vigorous countermove to nullification. After hurriedly drafting
a long statement of his views, he asked Secretary of State
Edward Livingston to rework the paper in the context of con-
stitutionallaw and political principles. Livingston could draw
upon his extensive governmental experience and legal scholar-
ship. The final form of Jackson's proclamation to the people of
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South Carolina on December 11, 1832, therefore advanced per-
suasive doctrine, as well as the chief executive's own convic-
tions. It emphasized the perpetuity of the Union, created by
the American people acting through their states. It rejected the
claim of a state's right to nullify a national law or to secede.
And it upheld the role of the Supreme Court in interpreting
the Constitution. As for secession, he warned, it becomes an in-
surrection; and "disunion by armed force is treason."41
Clay's reaction to Jackson's proclamation was mixed. He
privately observed that "although there are some good things
in it, especially what relates to the Judiciary, there are some
entirely too ultra for me." The senator objected to passages
pointing toward consolidation of federal power, which would
"irritate instead of allaying any excited feeling." He had in
mind states' righters such as those in Virginia who disap-
proved both South Carolina's nullification and broad national
authority.42 General reaction was mixed. Protectionists such
as Niles and Webster applauded, but the president's trusted
lieutenant Van Buren also found features of the paper on na-
tional power too ultra. The crisis affiicting the country in-
volved such differences of opinion.43 .
The administration joined conciliation with its show of
strength. To carry out Jackson's recommendation for tariff re-
duction in his annual message, Secretary McLane's report
outlined specifics: gradually cut rates from the present 33 per-
cent to at least 20 percent, down to the level of 1816 or fur-
ther, since the public debt would be retired and less revenue
would be needed. A proposed bill went to the House Ways and
Means Committee, chaired by the Democratic, commercially
oriented representative from New York, Gulian Verplanck.
Significantly, it did not go to Adams's Committee on Manu-
factures, inasmuch as the existing, controversial tariff of 1832
had been Adams's product. Predictably he spiritedly opposed
the bill, designed to upend his tortuous work of the preceding
session. The House discussed it unprofitably through the next
two months as adjournment (March 4, 1833) approached.
Chances for passage dwindled.44
Meanwhile in the Senate, instead of addressing the sub-
stance of the current issues, the members spent many days
arguing whether to ask McLane for the same kind of infor-
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mation given to the lower house. At last they voted not to do
so. Clay cared little about McLane's recommendations, even
less about Verplanck's formula, destructive to the American
System as it could be.45
Though Jackson pursued a two-part policy, rejection of
nullification and reduction of the tariff, he now emphasized
the first more than the second. Following up his proclamation
to South Carolina, he selected a number of means to overcome
the state's resistance. Some required congressional authoriza-
tion, which he requested in mid-January 1833: closure or relo-
cation of ports of entry for collecting customs, removal of tariff
cases from state to national courts, use of the military where
necessary. Incorporating such provisions, a so-called force bill
came out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, of which Web-
ster was a key member, and Congress debated it the rest of
the session.46 During that period there were protracted and
ponderous speeches on constitutional as well as economic as-
pects of the controversy, most notably extended disquisitions
by Calhoun and Webster on the nature of the federal Union.47
Clay took a critical view of all this. Not that he doubted
the doctrine of a perpetual Union formed· by the American
people and immune from state nullification. He disliked the
emphasis upon abstract principles inflaming this confron-
tation and interfering with a practical adjustment. He also
disliked the shape of the force bill, giving the president such
broad powers. Who the president was probably bothered him
more than what his powers were to be. At any rate, he visual-
ized an outcome in which Jackson might destroy the Ameri-
can System with the Verplanck bill and also emerge as a
political autocrat.48
Ever since the beginning of the crisis, Clay had been
searching for a promising plan to end it. In December 1832,
following news of the state's nullification ordinance and the
president's proclamation, he visited relatives in Philadelphia.
Here he discussed possible compromises with friends, includ-
ing several businessmen, who encouraged him to go forward
with a proposal. It would maintain present tariff rates until
1840 and then lower all of them to an equal revenue level with-
out regard to protection. Webster happened to pass through
the city, was shown a statement of this approach and vigor-
~
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ously disapproved abandoning protection.49 On the other hand,
Clay had received advice from Carey months earlier, suggest-
ing a similar solution. And Niles was now urging him to re-
solve the controversy with some concessions to the South.50
Returning to Washington on January 3, he conferred
with colleagues and listened day after day to speeches reveal-
ing a wide variety of opinions on what ought to be done. He
discovered he would have to modify the plan he drafted at
Philadelphia, then somehow recruit sup~ort from different
sections, parties, and interests. Notwitlistanding the diffi-
culty, he believed that compromise was indispensable to pre-
venting a terrible civil war. Yet it was imperative too, in his
judgment, to head off passage of the Verplanck tariff bill,
which could destroy the principle of protection. in the Ameri-
can System either this session or the next. He also wanted to
counter what he perceived as Jackson's grasp for power, not
merely his determination to pacify South Carolina.51
In fashioning his revised proposal, he consulted a number
ofbusinessmen and senators, ofwhom the most important was
Calhoun. The Carolinian felt great pressure from fire-eaters at
home as he searched for a reconciliation of his state's demands
with the value of Union, according to his definition. Mter con-
versations with Clay about a new approach, he pledged his co-
operation. It seemed more palatable than going for the
administration's bill and hoping the hostile president would
then extricate him from an uncomfortable position.52
Clay explained his compromise to the Senate on Febru-
ary 12, 1833. He would reduce rates gradually. Beginning that
year, then at intervals in 1835, 1837, and 1839, he would cut
10 percent off the excess over 20 percent in all rates. From the
remaining 60 percent excess he would cut half in 1841 and
the other half in 1842. Thereafter, all duties should be "laid
for the purpose of raising such revenue as may be necessary
to an economical administration of the Government; and, for
that purpose, shall be equal upon all articles, subject to duty,
according to the value thereof. And until otherwise directed by
law, ... such duties shall be at the rate of twenty per cent ad
valorem." He added a few provisions as consolation to Ameri-
can manufacturers: cheap woolens would be levied at the
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same rate as those of high quality (50 percent), the free list of
raw materials would be expanded, and cash payment of cus-
toms would replace the existing credit system available to for-
eign exporters.53 After saying he wished to avert civil conflict
and preserve the American System, he pointed out that both
sides in the current crisis would gain much. Northern and
western industry would keep most of its protection for a
decade, and southern planters would eventually get low rates.
It was truly a balanced compromise, he reasoned. But why
cave in to nullification, of which he definitely disapproved? He
weakly answered that despite his earlier strict response, he
now saw South Carolina avoiding any violent tactic and
peacefully testing a national policy by legal procedures.54
Hugh White, president pro tem of the Senate, appointed a
committee to report the bill-Clay as chairman, Felix Grundy,
George Dallas, William Rives, John Clayton, Webster, and
Calhoun, who had dramatically announced he supported the
plan. Though Jackson tried to get a panel more favorable to
his views, White resisted, so that Clay had a majority with
him.55 In preliminary debate one of the committee, Webster,
attacked the compromise for what he believed to be an aban-
donment of the protective principle. He would make some con-
cessions for lower rates but do so selectively and not all to the
same level.56 Apart from this and a few other negative reac-
tions, the prospects for accepting the Kentuckian's proposals
seemed good.
A week later, Clay reported a measure substantially as
he had drafted it. Before much discussion he did move an
amendment for home valuation, a requirement that each
American custom house fix the value of imports instead of ac-
cepting valuation by shippers at foreign ports. An important
reform, Clay said, to eliminate extensive fraud in paying tar-
iffs. This section came from John Clayton of the committee,
who insisted he would not vote for the bill unless modified.
His vote could be pivotal for passage. Still, Calhoun disliked it.
And in subsequent debate others did too. They argued that
valuation at individual American locations would produce
variations in violation of the Constitution's prohibition against
preferences to one port over another. No doubt they disliked it
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because it could result in higher prices of goods, a higher tax
they would bear, in their view. Webster proposed specific in-
stead of ad valorem duties as the only way to prevent inaccu-
rate assessments. However true that may have been, it did
not generate much enthusiasm, and Clayton's amendment
passed. While complaining strongly, Calhoun voted yes, gath-
ering other votes of hesitant senators for a majority of twenty-
six to sixteen.57
A finespun question bothering many senators involved
the constitutional requirement that the House must initiate
laws to raise revenue. No matter, said Clay, he was lowering
revenue and rescuing the country from bloody strife at that.58
As the discussion neared an end, the gulf between Clay
and Webster became very clear. Time and again Webster
charged that this formula would abandon the very principle of
protection, the heart of the American System. How else could
one describe the point when after ten years all rates would fall
to a flat 20 percent with a commitment never to exceed it? Re-
peatedly Clay tried to blunt that criticism by saying that after
1842 this good-faith assurance would carry very great weight,
yet every Congress would retain the power to do that which
was necessary for the safety and well-being of the nation. He
also countered the objection that all rates would have to be a
flat 20 percent by stipulating that some could go below the 20
percent amount.59 _
Turning on the New Englander, Clay asked, ''Would the
Senator from Massachusetts send his [force] bill forth alone
without this measure of conciliation? ... The integrity of the
Union" is at risk. The reporter of the debate recorded that Web-
ster muttered, "The gentleman has no authority for making
that assertion," to which Clay exclaimed that "he would not
submit to interruption." As a matter of fact, as Webster empha-
sized, he had advocated his own reductions but not so low and
not at a uniform rate.60
Granted that Clay had a strategic reason to pick up sup-
port from states-rights senators, one is struck by his steadfast
caution, seemingly inconsistent with his opposition to nullifi-
cation. Nowhere was it more apparent than in his silence
during the full-scale debate between Calhoun and Webster on
the nature of the Union and the claimed right of state interpo-
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sition. When the force bill to collect the tariff in South Caro-
lina was voted upon during an evening session, Clay was
absent. Though later saying he would have voted for it if
present, he had continued to avoid entanglement in a J ackso-
nian policy he had called too "ultra."61
Clay rounded out his advocacy of compromise with one of
his best-known speeches. He reviewed the advantages to both
northern industry in the next ten years a~d tQ antiprotection-
ists in the long run. Repeating his reasoning in sponsoring the
settlement to preserve the American System and to prevent
sectional war, he again made some pointed remarks about
Webster's opposition. "The difference between the friends and
the foes of the compromise, under consideration," he declared,
"is, that they would, in the enforcing act, send forth alone a
flaming sword. We would send out also, but along with it the
olive branch, as a messenger of peace.... While we would vin-
dicate the federal government, we are for peace, if possible,
union and liberty. We want no war-above all, no civil war; no
family strife. We want to see no sacked cities, no desolated
fields, no smoking ruins, no streams of American blood shed
by American arms!"62
The next day, February 26, he learned that the House
had passed a bill identical to the one pending in the Senate.
No unforeseen coincidence. His fellow Kentuckian, Robert
Letcher, had managed to hurry it through the lower chamber,
thereby crowding out the administration's Verplanck bill. So
ended whatever problem there may have been about the
constitutional requirement that only the House originate reve-
nue laws. Southerners, including Calhounites, could find some
satisfaction in thwarting Jackson in this way. In any case,
Verplanck's measure might not have passed the Senate.63
The new tariff and the force bill had been moving concur-
rently through the two houses. And their relation to one an-
other was important. It seemed certain that Clay's compromise
tariff could not win acceptance by some members without an
assertion of federal authority over states. And vice versa, some
uneasiness about Jackson's display of the sword subsided only
with the show of Clay's olive branch. Both bills had passed,
and the president signed them on March 2, just before the ses-
sion ended.
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An analysis of House and Senate voting shows strong
support for the compromise from the middle Atlantic states,
with an overwhelming affirmative from the South. Opposition
from New England was solid, together with a significant
number of nays from Atlantic and western states. As for par-
ties, Democrats favored the legislation two to one, while Na-
tional Republicans (Clay's ranks) opposed in about the same
ratio. Using House votes as a gauge, one finds 188 representa-
tives voted on both bills, of which 114 voted for only one or the
other. The outcome was therefore not a firm consensus on the
entire compromise, since only 74 out of 188 accepted both
parts. Nevertheless, this may be typical of many parliamen-
tary compromises that would be impossible to attain without
such a middle group adding to majorities for parts of a pack-
age. On the individual measures, some northerners and west-
erners would not have voted for the lowered tariff if it had not
been coupled with a force bill. And there were many southern
votes for the force bill, indicating either dislike of states-rights
radicalism or acceptance of this route to tariff relief.64
Dissatisfaction with the settlement prevailed in several
quarters. As a spokeman of New England, Webster left no
doubt of his views. The intensity of his exchanges with Clay
over the tariff matched those with Calhoun over nullification.
He persisted in charging the Kentuckian with trading off the
very principle of protection. Through the next decade when-
ever his relations with Clay hardened, Webster might recall
the history of the compromise. He claimed to have seen Clay's
written statement of his first plan in late December 1832, call-
ing for a tariff "without regard for protection." And he author-
ized publication of his copy of that statement to prove this was
the chief characteristic of the ultimate legislation.65 The cool
relations of the two senators fed a widespread belief that Web-
ster would go over to Jackson, perhaps succeed him as a Demo-
crat in the White House. The fact is the situation never got
close to that kind of alliance, despite suspicions of contempo-
raries and many present-day historians.66 As for Clay, he put
the best face he could on the affair. "There is no breach
between Webster and me," he said cheerfully. "We had some
friendly passes, and there the matter ended."67 Despite per-
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sonal rivalry throughout their careers, they usually cooperated
with one another politically.
Among those who had previously collaborated with Clay
and now found fault with the compromise, Adams stood out.
In the House, he spoke unreservedly against this retreat from
protection, a ruination of the manufacturing interest,he
charged. The flawed policy could not last, he correctly pre-
dicted. 68 Undoubtedly the criticism Clay received from his
faithful advisers Carey and Niles hurt most. Carey was so
upset he gave up his journalistic advocacy of the American
System, "I am sick, sick, sick, of the prospects of the country,"
he moaned.69 Niles, too, saw the outcome as a disaster. In his
Register during and after the debates at the Capitol, he de-
plored the new policy. "We render all possible respect to the
motives of our honored friend," the editor declared, "but
cannot go with him in a measure, which in our humble opin-
ion, contains the surrender of a power which is vital to the in-
dependence of the United States-which is firmly held and
daily exerted by every commercial nation in the world."70
There was naturally a good deal of praise from others.
Madison commended the agreement as strengthening the
Union and quieting the unsound nullification movement. 71
Abbott Lawrence, the New England cotton-textile manufac-
turer, not feeling the need for much help from the tariff, lauded
Clay's achievement.72 And Clay's friend Nicholas Biddle, presi-
dent of the national bank, perceived the senator's position as
"firm and commanding."73
A major figure in the story, President Jackson, emerged
quite pleased· about turning back nullification with the force
bill. Dependable followers, such as Silas Wright, John Forsyth,
Felix Grundy, even Gulian Verplanck, author of the discarded
House bill, voted for passage of the tariff. Not so Thomas Hart
Benton, who unceasingly voiced opposition. Jackson himself
took pride in the nationalistic exposition ofhis proclamation to
South Carolina, which woulp. have a lasting impact on Ameri-
can politics.74
Leaders in that state believed they had triumphed. _Cal-
houn not only escaped an embarrassing squeeze between fire-
eaters there and unionists everywhere but also felt more con-
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fident of enhanced justice to the South.75 Governor Hayne
happily concluded that "South Carolina by her brave and de-
termined course, had driven the tiger within his den-that
the tyrant with his bloody bill had to succumb to the brave
and chivalrous spirits of Carolina, and that they never would
lay down their arms till congress had repealed the force bi11."76
The last-mentioned goal would be elusive. Of course, some
Carolinians worried about a threat to slavery when outsiders
pressed for a high tariff. Some of the events and disputes of
1833 were a prelude to subsequent controversy over that pe-
culiar institution.
Clay himself felt proud of his contribution to peace and
continuing protection over the next decade. In his opinion, the
day the president signed the two parts of the compromise, the
tariff and force bills, March 2, 1833, was "perhaps the most im-
portant Congressional day that ever occurred." The South's
victory, he thought, was only "nominal whilst all the substan-
tial advantages have been secured to the Tariff states."77 Ifpar-
ticipants on both sides of the controversy had such positive
reactions, then the nation may have fashioned a true com-
promise.
6The Bank War
Concurrently with a protective tariff, the issue of a nationalbank moved to the political foreground. Though the char-
ter of t~e Bank of the United States would not expire until
1836, the question of congressional renewal was assuming im-
portance as early as 1829, Jackson's first year in office. His
annual message then had convinced Clay that the adminis-
tration seriously threatened the bank. Its constitutionality
and expediency were questionable, the president declared, and
"it had failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and
sound currency." This signaled the beginning of a so-called
Bank War, an enormous controversy about financial policy
soon inflaming the Capitol and in fact the whole country.l
Jackson had several reasons for criticizing this institu-
tion, whose president, the talented Nicholas Biddle, conducted
operations at its headquarters in Philadelphia. For one thing,
Old Hickory had already tangled with banks, including the
BUS branch at Nashville, and tended to distrust them all.
When he had settled in at the executive mansion, he had con-
cluded that the underlying cause of this bank's misbehavior
was political. Disturbing reports came in from several states.
In New Hampshire, Webster's intimate friend Jeremiah
Mason became president of the branch office, and Jacksonians
accused him of partiality in his loan policy. From Kentucky
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charges arrived that appointments to boards ofdirectors at the
Lexington and Louisville branches were loyal Clay men. In
other places, it was said that the bank had meddled in the
recent election to help Jackson's opponents. Then at Washing-
ton was it not well-known that many pro-bank congressmen
had received overly generous loans? And to widen the abuse,
what of the same sort of laxity favoring newspaper editors
aligned with Clay and Webster? The most notorious example,
the president felt, was a clumsy, indirect loan to Watson Webb
of the New York Courier and Enquirer, pulling him over to pro-
bank ranks. 2
Partisanship aside, Jackson thought the BUS, such a
large corporation with such immense capacity to affect the
entire economy, was not only dangerous but also unconstitu-
tional. It could set the prevailing interest rate and regulate the
flow of credit as it discounted loans. It could substantially
control the currency, since its notes were the dominant legal
tender. At the top of the huge pyramid, Biddle could alone
make most decisions. A charter creating this monopoly was
surely not necessary and proper to carry out congressional
powers enumerated in the Constitution.3
Jackson's objections to recharter drew upon the current
of anti-BUS opinion that had been building. Radical reformers
pointed to the need to counter the impact of all banks upon a
republican society. Others would at least remove this bank's
grip upon the currency and exchange, probably on other parts
of the financial system.4 Close to the president's side were ad-
visers urging a bold remedy. Amos Kendall, erstwhile follower
of Clay and now one of the influential "Kitchen Cabinet" at
the White House, emerged from Kentucky's relief struggle
suspicious of banks. Another former Kentuckian estranged
from Clay and now editor of the Jacksonian organ, the Wash-
ington Globe, Frank Blair expressed the same opinion. In
1831 the new attorney general, Roger B. Taney, joined Ken-
dall and Blair in pressing Jackson to kill the BUS. Some
people thought Martin Van Buren was also a factor, but he
probably was not a large factor, since he was in England as
United States minister during the first battle of the Bank
War. He displayed even more caution than usual about in-
volvement in the question upon his return in mid-1832.5
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Clay and Webster headed the bank's supporters. Both
had been its ablest advocates in Congress whenever legis-
lative action affected it as the federal fiscal agent. They had
been well compensated, successful bank attorneys in the
courts, working closely with Biddle. And the banker had been
helpful to them as they obtained liberal personal loans. By the
1830s Clay had paid off most of his debts, though Webster
added much more to his borrowings. Even in a period when
such mixture of public and private interests was fairly
common, the two senators' connections were noteworthy and
would be more so.in the· mounting controversy.6
The Kentuckian recognized the importance of Jackson's
views. It was premature, he advised Biddle, to advance the
issue of recharter ahead of time. Better to delay and sidestep
the general.7 He did not say so but no doubt thought he might
become the chiefexecutive himselfbefore the deadline arrived.
Meanwhile, an extensive effort to enlist public opinion for
renewal developed. In a number of places National Republican
meetings supported it, which showed it could be an important
question in the next election. Biddle recruited veteran finan-
cier. Gallatin to contribute a long article in the American
Quarterly Review (November 1830) supporting the bank. An-
other Jeffersonian elder statesman, former president Madi-
son, wrote a public letter contending that the experience of
having no such institution during the. War of 1812 demon-
strated how essential it was. An unsigned piece in the North
American Review early the next year fully described the valu-
able features of the currency provided by the BUS. Even Hez-
ekiah Niles, whose Register had long deplored undesirable
banking practices, would accept recharter with modifications.8
While some state-incorporated banks understandably would
welcome the elimination of their powerful competitor, many of
them in all sections favored renewal because of the advan-
tageous credit and exchange operations of a national network.
Because Kentucky was losing its only state facility, the Com-
monwealth Bank, people there would depend upon the two
BUS branches.9
By late 1831 Clay shifted his thinking about strategy
from opposing to favoring a recharter petition. He reckoned a
presidential veto was less likely before than after an election.
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Jackson might be more accommodating if he faced a formid-
able opponent in the coming contest. That person would be
Clay himself. The National Republican convention nominated
him in December, and its address strongly defended the bank.
If Jackson did not come around, Clay would count on victory
to enable him to sweep away the present obstruction to re-
newal. In any case, he urged Biddle to move ahead with a pe-
tition.10
What Clay, and Webster too, advised may have had an
effect upon Biddle's decision, but not as much as sometimes
portrayed. Instead, the BUS president depended mainly upon
his own assessment of the congressional situation. Sending his
associate Thomas Cadwalader to Washington to survey possi-
bilities, receiving specific reports on lawmakers' sentiments,
relying especially upon the enthusiastic recommendation of
Calhounite George McDuffie, chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, he concluded that the president would
probably veto a recharter bill but that Congress might over-
ride. If not, he would hope for Clay's election and an amenable
new Congress. Biddle's prediction of a veto would prove to be
more accurate than Clay's assumption that the president
would not dare to take that risk. At any rate, both of them saw
that the entire question had been thrown into the political
arena.11
Biddle also pursued a compromise with Jackson, as he
had from the beginning. He continued to negotiate with Secre-
tary of Treasury McLane, who himself wanted recharter and
sought to persuade Jackson to accept it. Assembling a package
designed to retire the public debt, to secure the bank's help in
selling the government's shares of bank stock to finance it,
and to get the president to take a passive position on the char-
ter problem, the secretary felt he would succeed. A draft of the
annual message in early December 1831 included a passage
leaving the question to Congress. But Taney and Kendall
jumped in to forestall such a neutral statement. Mterward
about all McLane could do was personally recommend re-
charter but observe the chief executive taking the opposite
course.12 As late as February 1832, when Congress was de-
bating the subject, Biddle tried to get an understanding with
Jackson by way of Secretary of State Livingston, another pro-
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BUS cabinet member. But Livingston had no leverage in this
partisan area where the president preferred counsel from the
Taney-Kendall-Benton bloc.13
In .January, George Dallas, a Pennsylvania Democrat,
had presented a bank memorial to the Senate, requesting re-
newal of the charter. A committee of five, including Dallas and
Webster, gathered information from the Treasury and the
bank, then reported a bill two months later.14 Recurring debate
and roll calls revealed that senators favorable to recharter had
a majority of about ten votes. Opponents resorted to a strategy
of delay. Their very visible leader, Benton, therefore had a
representative, Augustin Clayton, move an investigation by a
House committee of alleged bank misconduct.15
Meanwhile Benton accelerated his attack against the
bank. One of its worst abuses, he charged, involved branch
drafts. BUS offices in various places had issued this paper in
large quantity to avoid the cumbersome rule that the president
and cashier at the main office sign all notes, which made up
much of the currency-a difficult task as business increased.
So the numerous branches across the land, by arrangement,
issued drafts upon the Philadelphia office, which endorsed and
circulated them as an important medium of exchange. But the
requisite safeguards were inapplicable to branch drafts,
Benton contended; and the Senate should forthwith declare-
them "illegal" in a resolution he offered. How could this body
make such a serious charge without getting more information,
several members asked. A good question, thought a majority,
defeating Benton's precipitate move.16
Benton also complained about the projected retirement of
the federal government's 3 percent bonds, issued to pay the
state Revolutionary War debts, which it had assumed. Biddle,
he said, had earlier discouraged the government from buying
up these low-interest bonds with its funds at the bank when
their market value was low. Later the BUS president ob-
tained an arrangement with bondholders to delay presenting
the securities for payment. Otherwise the government would
have drawn out a large amount of its funds from the bank,
which had been pressed for ready cash. That maneuver had
interfered with a fiscal function of the Treasury, the Missouri
senator asserted.17
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Branch drafts and 3 percents were only two of a long list
of Benton's indictments possibly amounting to felonies or at
least misbehavior. While not making much progress in the
Senate, Benton had better results in the House, where he
gave his list to Clayton's investigating committee. Its critical
report could have an impact upon the public and, of course,
upon Andrew Jackson.1s
The Senate did not seriously discuss Dallas's bill until
late May, much to Clay's displeasure. The recommendations
were chiefly for minor revisions of the existing charter, with
nothing said about constitutionality. As the committee mem-
ber most experienced in the bank's operations, Webster guided
the debate through a series of amendments proposed both by
Dallas's report and by the Massachusetts senator himself.
Mter making an impressive case for the bank's benefits to the
nation's economy, he moved several reforms, calculated to
soothe the opposition. Among those adopted were provisions
loosening the restriction on who could sign bank notes (to sup-
press branch drafts), prohibiting notes of small denomination
(to expand hard money), raising the corporation's bonus paid
to the government, and regulating the holding of real estate
by the bank.19 Argument became heated over unsuccessful mo-
tions from the floor to allow states to exclude the BUS
branch~s and to tax them. Webster and Clay could recall their
own participation in the McCulloch and Osborn cases on the
subject before the Supreme Court and were alarmed when
several speakers insisted that Congress could override such
decisions protecting the bank.20
Only a few members delivered full-scale attacks on the
policy of incorporating the institution. The tireless Benton did
so in many hours of talk, emphasizing abuse of power subver-
sive of democratic government. Ike Hill of New Hampshire,
prominent Jacksonian editor-politician and fierce adversary
to Webster, developed the theme as well. And Hugh White of
Tennessee, a future Whig presidential candidate but now in
Jackson's ranks, made a strong impression.21
Clay seldom entered the bank debate, leaving it to Web-
ster to guide the bill through. The Kentuckian gave attention
in this session primarily to the tariff and land questions. But
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he was always present and regularly voted-in behalf of the
bank, naturally.
The Senate passed the recharter bill on June 11 and sent
it to the House. Here McDuffie had been leading the recharter
effort, mainly by turning back hostile amendments. So after
unproductive orating and maneuvering, the lower chamber
adopted the Senate measure with no substantive change.22 As
for sectional opinion, the Northeast was probank, the South
decidedly opposed, and the border and western states di-
vided.23 Neither vote of the two bodies supported renewal by a
two-thirds count, spelling trouble if, as expected, the presi-
dent vetoed.
At the White House Kendall and Taney were at work on a
message expressing presidential objections to recharter on
grounds ofjust policy and strict-constructionist constitutional-
ism. It became a leading statement of Jacksonian Democratic
tenets.24 The veto emphasized undue favors granted to the
bank's stockholders, particularly the "gratuity" of a large en-
hancement of the value of their stock if the charter were re-
newed. It played upon patriotism too, by a strong attack upon
numerous foreign stockholders, declared to be a serious danger
to America. A more convincing argument, probably Taney's
contribution, found no constitutional warrant for such an insti-
tution as this. No matter that the Supreme Court and other
sources had pronounced its validity as a necessary and proper
execution of the enumerated powers of Congress. This could
not bind "coordinate" branches of the government at the stage
of making a law. The president therefore, in his "legislative ca-
pacity," must determine whether a bill was necessary-it was
a question ofdegree. The obligation to prevent special privilege
conferred by government, such as this "monopoly," infused all
parts of Jackson's reasoning and would be a durable influence
upon politics.25
As soon as the chief executive's veto arrived in the
Senate, on July 11, Webster fired a mighty blast against it.
With the message at hand, he proceeded through it, para-
graph by paragraph. He rejected the argument about undue
favors and privileges to stockholders as groundless, just as
the supposed peril of foreign investors was. His response to
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the charge of unconstitutionality was not only what one would
expect of the nation's renowned lawyer but also quite spirited:
"If that which Congress has enacted, and the Supreme Court
has sanctioned, be not the law of the land, then the reign of
individual opinion has already begun."26
Clay, who had hardly spoken during the debate leading
up to the bill's passage, rose up as an eloquent spokesman for
the bank. His emphasis was a denial of the executive power
being flourished. None of Jackson's predecessors had em-
ployed the veto to the present degree, he lamented. Indeed, it
reminded him of its use by kings of times past, now aban-
doned. "The veto is hardly reconcilable with the genius of
representative Government," he declared. "It is totally irrec-
oncilable with it, if it is frequently employed. . . . Ought the
opinion of one man overrule that of a legislative body twice
deliberately expressed?" Like Jackson, Clay was establishing
a party principle, in his view opposition to excessive presi-
dential authority. On various substantive points of the .mes-
sage, the Kentuckian reinforced Webster's preceding attack.27
Inevitably Benton had his say. In addition to his well-
known criticism of the bank monster, he gave great weight to
Jackson's patriotic character, ever a formidable resource. And
when Clay appeared to have sullied the old hero's reputation
by recalling Jackson's brawl with Benton in frontier days, the
Missourian shouted an angry response, ruled out of order
along with Clay's remarks. The skirmish showed that then, as
so often in discussions of high policy, emotion could easily
crowd out sober colloquy.28
Finally, on July 13, 1832, the Senate voted on a motion to
override the veto. The tally was twenty-two to nineteen to do
so, six less than the required two-thirds.29 Whether this would
be a lasting decision hinged upon the fall elections. With his
usual optimism, Clay· envisioned a repudiation of King An-
drew's pretensions.
Through much of this administration he had believed the
principles of the American System would be the critical factor
in the coming contest. That reasoning had persuaded him to
return to the Senate at the start of the present session and to
encourage the movement for his presidential nomination,
made by the National Republican convention in December. He
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had felt assured that the party agreed with him on the tariff
and internal improvements as well as the national bank. Now
the controversy over the bank had intensified, offering him a
definite advantage, he concluded. The Democrats, it seemed
to him, were relying solely on the personal popularity of Jack-
son, for they did not even adopt a platform on the issues; and
their national convention in May had met only to nominate
Van Buren for Vice President.30
Clay had Biddle's active support. The bank president had
cast aside any show of detachment from politics. Convinced
that the veto was self-destructive, he characterized it as "a
manifesto of anarchy," such as Robespierre issued to the mob
during the French Revolution.31 So he spent some of the bank's
funds, as much as forty thousand dollars, in the National Re-
publican cause. Part went to printing and circulating copies of
the veto message, which would amply demonstrate its obvious
weakness. Another part went to getting out copies of the
speeches of Clay and Webster against the veto. 32 Benton later
recalled that the bank had also orchestrated popular meetings
in cities across the land, protesting an economic downturn.33
Another source of support came from Niles, whose Regis-
ter published many editorials and documents calling for re-
charter with modifications. It was even more heartening
because the editor had made a reversal from his longstanding
hostility toward the institution. 34 Surprisingly, Niles's journal-
istic adversary, the Philadelphia free-trader Condy Raguet de~
nounced Jackson's despotism, revealed in the veto.35
Speculation grew that Clay would form an alliance with
Calhoun since both had a common foe and since they shared
views on the bank. To tell the truth, the Kentuckian needed the
kind of help from the South that Calhoun might give him, be-
cause support for the American System in that section was sag-
ging, especially due to passage of the protective tariff this year.
But Clay doubted such a coalition was practical, despite giving
it some serious thought. Already talk of state nullification of
federal legislation was building, a development he could not
countenance. The best he could expect from Calhoun was de
facto collaboration, hopefully to continue on the bank question.36
Then there was the current movement of the Antimasons,
a new party developing strength, much of it from National Re-
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publican quarters. Could their presidential candidate, William
Wirt, be persuaded to bow out in favor of his friend Clay? As
the election approached, that appeared unlikely.37
In November the outcome was a clear victory for Jackson,
who swept the South and large northern states. Though Wirt
got 8 percent of the popular vote, Clay had needed more than
that in addition to his 37 percent.38 One must guess whether
the president was reelected mainly because of his personal
popularity or because he had killed the monster bank and had
stood for states' rights instead of economic nationalism. It was
a mixture, of course; yet the charisma of a heroic tribune,
speaking for a democratic people, was probably the more sig-
nificant element.
In December 1832, shortly after the election, Jackson fol-
lowed up his victory. In his annual message to Congress he di-
. rected attention to the next phase of the Bank War. The
country could now see the corporation's dangerous character,
he said. So much so that it was "no longer a safe depository of
the money of the people." One proof of that situation, in his
judgment, had surfaced when Biddle interfered with retire-
ment of the 3 percent securities, reflecting poor liquidity of
BUS assets.
As a first step toward disengagement from the institu-
tion, the chief executive recommended legislation for selling
the government's extensive holdings of bank stock. To lay a
foundation for withdrawing all its deposits as well, he recom-
mended a congressional investigation of the bank's general
condition. A House committee with a four-to-three pro-BUS
majority did inquire and reported favorably on the safety of
deposits. Jackson discounted this finding and a House vote
(109 to 46) approving it as misguided partisanship. Nor did he
welcome a congressional refusal to authorize sale of govern-
mental bank stock.39 Pleased with these setbacks of the execu-
tive, Clay predicted that Old Hickory could not now venture to
remove the deposits.40
The senator's confidence turned out to be unjustified.
Jackson continued to plan how to do that very thing. He ex-
plored opinions of his cabinet, only to find that all except At-
torney General Taney did not favor removing deposits, at
least for the time being. The member who could cause the
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most trouble was Secretary of Treasury McLane, who by coin-
cidence or otherwise was now shifted to the State Department
as replacement for Livingston, another bank supporter and
the new minister to France. William Duane, a Philadelphia
Democrat who opposed rechartering the bank, seemed to be a
desirable substitute in McLane's vacated spot. Since consti-
tutionally the secretary of the treasury ·had a degree of au-
tonomy in the executive branch because of special fiscal
responsibilities to Congress, one wonders why the president
did not inquire about Duane's attitude toward removing de-
posits. Soon it was evident he was no better than McLane on
this subject. He did promise to resign if overruled on removal,
a promise he later rescinded on the ground of the Department
of Treasury's distinctive role in the cabinet. Despite these dif-
ficulties in his official household, Jackson did not retreat. And
notwithstanding Vice President Van Buren's characteristic
caution about moving ahead, he would not wait.41
So in September he followed a course he and his intimate
advisers Kendall and Blair had long preferred. He ordered re-
moval of deposits, dismissed an obstinate Secretary Duane in
the process, replaced him with Taney, and dispatched Kendall
on a mission to eastern cities to select some state-chartered
banks for the deposits. In a paper read to his cabinet, he set
forth his familiar reasons to shut off Biddle's bank: its po-
litical partisanship, its conduct concerning the 3 percents, its
exclusion of the governmentally appointed directors from in-
formation, its tremendous, monopolistic financial power, and,
above all, its corrupting impact upon the morals and demo-
cratic principles of this republic.42 On all these points, Clay
disagreed. At stake, he declared, were "the free institutions
inherited from our ancestors," under assault by the "will of
one man."43
By the end of 18~3 Kendall and Taney had chosen
twenty-two state-bank depositories, otherwise known in oppo-
sition circles as the "pets," because the selection in most cases
depended upon the bankers' politics. Considering the inevi-
table confusion of such an operation, the process of gradual
transfer went rather well. Except in some unfortunate in-
stances. For example, Taney's friend, the president of the Bal-
timore Union Bank, unjustifiably drew funds from the BUS
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that the secretary had made available to depository banks
only in pressing circumstances. He applied Taney's rather
flexible authorization for his more flexible purposes, for per-
sonal investments, it was suspected.44
The climax of the Bank War came during the legislative
session under way in December 1833. All the economic and
constitutional arguments of the past two years reappeared at
Washington and echoed through the entire country. As head of
the bank forces, Clay tried strenuously to reverse what the
administration had done, while Democrats pressed their
attack upon the "monster."
In his annual message, Jackson depicted the govern-
ment's fiscal condition as excellent, with the prospect of re-
tiring the debt as centerpiece. He then reviewed events con-
cerning the national bank: removal of Treasury deposits and
transfer to selected state-chartered institutions, due to BUS
misconduct. Biddle's corporation, he said, had interfered in
politics, had become a veritable "electioneering engine." And
now it was sharply curtailing credit and inducing a depression
to compel return of the deposits. The president felt confident
that Congress would find removal quite proper.45
Secretary Taney's report arrived at the same time. What-
ever the legality of his earlier removal of deposits, he did
comply with a provision of the bank's charter to explain his
reasons for doing so. Like Jackson, he enumerated several
types of misbehavior-BUS extension of loans to influence
legislators and editors, interference in governmental retire-
ment of the 3 percent bonds, and immense financial power
amassed in Biddle's office. Most unpleasant to Clay, no doubt,
was Taney's conclusion that the people had already approved
the antibank policy by reelecting Old Hickory.46
Each side blamed the other for hard times. The bank was
curtailing its loans and note issue, in fact had begun the previ-
ous summer in response to the recharter veto and in antici-
pation of deposit removal. Biddle justified this contraction as
preparation for shutting down operations and blamed Jack-
son's policy for tight credit and economic suffering. For his
part, the president condemned curtailment as unnecessary,
only proof of the dangerous power at the bank's disposal.
"Biddle's panic" was cruel manipulation.47
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Throughout the tumultuous session, December 1833 to
June 1834, economic distress or at least perceived distress
fueled the intense controversy. A flood of petitions poured into
the Capitol. Some were descriptions of popular suffering, busi-
ness paralysis, unemployment, shortage of credit, conditions
calling for revival of a proven financial system. Others, equally
strident, attacked the bank along lines laid out by the patriotic
tribune in the White House. Clay assumed a leading role in
the battle. He and Webster presented many memorials, then
pled for returning governmental deposits and renewing the
charter to relieve an afflicted nation.48
As a first step, he moved a resolution asking Jackson to
send up a paper read to the cabinet in September, advancing
his now familiar reasons for removal. To be sure, Clay said, a
copy had appeared in the press. Still, he wanted an authenti-
cation. In the document the president had not only criticized
the bank but had also assumed full personal responsibility for
removal without requiring any cabinet member to take a posi-
tion. This could help the senator fix Old Hickory as his main
target. Benton and other Democrats objected to requesting the
paper. The Senate seemed to be gathering evidence for a later
impeachment trial, they complained. The House constitution-
ally must first gather evidence for a trial; and then the Senate
must sit as a court, not as a partisan body, the Missourian lec-
tured his colleagues. Though Clay got his resolution through,
Jackson relied upon executive privilege, protecting internal
presidential discussions, and briskly refused. Beyond a little
scouting, the skirmish did not yield much of a tactical advan-
tage to either side in the continuing warfare.49
Clay's main attack began with two more resolutions in
late December. The first charged the president with assuming
power "not granted to him by the constitution and laws, and
dangerous to the liberties of the people." The second charged
Taney with removing the deposits for "unsatisfactory and in-
sufficient reasons."
As for Jackson, his dismissal of Duane and appointment
of Taney were unwarranted, not because he could not replace
a cabinet officer but because he did so for an unconstitutional
object, taking into his own hands the decision to remove the
funds. Only Congress and the secretary (limited by the statute
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chartering the bank) could decide upon that action, he
contended. So as in the case of the recharter veto, the problem,
in the Kentuckian's opinion, arose from abuse of executive
power. To support his reasoning, Clay pointed to Jackson's
letter to his cabinet, saying he took full responsibility for re-
moval and did not require the assent of his subordinates.
Furthermore, where did the chief executive find the authority
to "preserve the morals of the people, the freedom of the press,
and the purity of the elective franchise"?
As for Taney's mistakes, Clay rejected the secretary's rea-
sons 'for removal of deposits as set out in his recent report to
Congress. The senator ticked off a series of flaws in that state-
ment. Taney had condemned the bank's financial and political
involvements, but Clay exonerated it completely. He also argued
that the deposits had been safe and that, if they were not, the
secretary need not have been in such a hurry to act while the
legislative branch was not in session but could have waited a
few weeks for congressional direction. Of all the criticisms of
Jackson and Taney, the last was perhaps the most persuasive.50
In the weeks ahead Clay wou~d use his considerable re-
sources to obtain a censure of the president for what he had
labeled lawless behavior and to block the confirmation of the
Secretary's appointment. In a flourish, he warned that "if
Congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy,
the fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die-ignobly
die! base, mean, and abject slaves-the scorn and contempt of
mankind-unpitied, unwept, unmourned!"51
A three-month debate on his resolutions was one of the
longest, most acrimonious discussions of a question in the
Senate up to this time. At the end in March 1834, few, if any,
opinions had changed; but they had been exhaustively ex-
pressed. For about a month there were long, set speeches on
both sides, notably by Benton and Silas Wright (Van Buren's
ally) for removal,52 by Calhoun and Samuel Southard against
it.53 Then Webster, chairman of the Finance Committee, re-
ported an ample endorsement of the propositions. Afterward
most senators who spoke also presented memorials signed by
hundreds and thousands of "respectable" persons from both
political parties, it was said. There were mounds of petitions
complaining of acute economic distress, caused by the heart-
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less president of the bank or by the wild president of the
nation. Two speakers who would later play important roles in
the politics of public finance were John Tyler, the future chief
executive who had not liked a national bank but now did not
like Jackson's high-handed conduct, and Nathaniel Tallmadge,
spokesman of New York's state bank system in competition
with the BUS.54 Clay monitored progress and added argument,
supported with more memorials.
Anti-BUS senators, again spearheaded by Benton, re-
peated the familiar charges: Biddle's dangerous command
over credit and currency, subversion of the political process
and of the press by leverage of loans, and presently the cur-
rent suffering brought on by curtailment. They upheld
Jackson's power, both constitutional and inherent, to control
the secretary of the Treasury and thereby the handling of
governmental deposits. In fact, they tended to focus on this
issue of presidential authority more than upon broad policy
concerning the bank, obviously due to the thrust of Clay's
pending resolutions. Yet they did not exploit available histori-
cal evidence on executive status to any extent. As for the way
Taney removed deposits, they relied upon the language of the
congressional statute chartering the bank, providing that if
removal occurred when Congress was not sitting, the secre-
tary must report the action as soon as it assembled. They saw
no need for waiting three months in this instance to get prior
legislative approval. Of course, nearly everyone agreed that
Congress could pass a law reversing removal, but that would
be quite unlikely now when the administration had a majority
in the House. Looking ahead, they praised selection of state-
chartered banks as depositories-otherwise known among
National Republicans as the pets. Not only would they be
safe, insisted the Democrats, but the Treasury might regulate
these institutions more effectively than the nearly autono-
mousBUS.
Clay's contingent of probank senators was largely unified
in pursuing a well-charted route. The point of departure was
the constitutional necessity and propriety of a national bank,
so unwisely assaulted by Jackson. In a political sense, how-
ever, the most interesting comments came from Calhoun.. Not-
withstanding his sponsorship of the BUS charter in 1816, one
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might have expected his conversion to states' rights to have
caused him to reverse his opinion. But in the short run, he be-
lieved such a bank was desirable. Whether or not some other
fiscal agent would eventually replace it depended upon Con-
gress instead of the rapacious chief executive or his ready in-
strument, Roger B. Taney. The precipitate order to remove
funds reminded the Carolinian of Caesar breaking into the
Roman treasure house. Calhoun's remarks showed that his
thinking on the bank issue had developed from the recent nul-
lification crisis and from his perception of Jackson's arbitrary
conduct in brandishing the force bill, which he considered
proof of Jackson's domineering character. Here, for the time
being, was an unforeseen ally of Clay. Did the alliance prom-
ise a permanent connection with the new Whig party?55
Webster was a key figure in this story. Very knowledge-
able about the law and politics of banking, particularly of this
corporation, he had taken the lead in shepherding the re-
charter bill through Congress two years earlier. Now he
served as chairman of the Finance Committee, instructed to
report on Clay's resolutions to censure the president and
reject Taney's reasons for removal. His major speech made the
best case for this bank's survival. As he often did, he reasoned
on the basis of mutual interest of all parts of the economy. It
was a mistake, he declared, to array the poor against the rich,
the farmer against the businessman, the worker against the
banker. Webster spoke the Whig creed, to which Clay also
subscribed: "Sir, the great interest of this great country, the
producing cause of all its prosperity, is labor! labor! labor! We
are a laboring community. A vast majority of us all live by in-
dustry and actual employment in some of their forms." The
person who had the greatest interest in sound currency, such
as the BUS supplied, was the laborer, he concluded.56 In his
subsequent committee report, Webster urged condemnation of
Jackson's removal of deposits as an invasion of the sphere of
congressional power. Indeed, even Congress would have to
defer to a judicial hearing on the question. There must be
clear proof, lacking in Taney's statement, that the funds were
unsafe.57
In the last phase of deliberations on removal, Clay took
the floor a few times for brief comments but did not introduce
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any new views, let alone persuade any colleague to shift posi-
tions. He himself persisted in his belief that the nation had
fallen into the depths of a terrible crisis brought about by an
unrestrained partisan. It was imperative that the people's
representatives move against the present danger.58
On March 28, 1834, after these many weeks of disputa-
tion, the Senate voted for Clay's two resolutions: (1) to censure
Jackson for assuming "authority and power not conferred by
the Constitution and the laws, but in derogation of both" (on a
vote of twenty-six to twenty); and (2) to reject "the reasons as-
signed by the Secretary for the removal [as] unsatisfactory
and insufficient" (on a vote of twenty-eight to eighteen).59
In mid-April the president returned fire. He sent back a
spirited, wide-ranging protest, emphasizing that the Senate,
not he, had overstepped the dividing line beween the two
branches. Cabinet members, whom he appointed, were subject
to his supervision, he contended; and if legislators attempted
intervention in the executive sphere such as they had done,
they undermined the principle of checks and balances, basic to
American government. This principle was double-edged, of
course, also used against Jackson in the censure denouncing
presidential invasion of congressional ground. Then, like
Benton and other supporters, Old Hickory interpreted the
present reprimand as amounting to an impeachment, though
not brought by procedures the Constitution required. He
closed with a stirring appeal to his reputation of patriotic ser-
vice to the nation, belying these unfair allegations; and he re-
quested that his protest be entered in the senate journal.60
Immediately George Poindexter moved not to receive
Jackson's offensive statement, a parliamentary tactic pro-
viding a substantive question the two sides could address
while refusing to record the protest. Naturally, Benton was
out front in condemning censure, further worsened, he ex-
claimed, by this disrespectful motion. He compared it to the
case of John Wilkes, a member of the British Parliament in
the late eighteenth century, who was harshly deprived of his
election several times by that body. Eventually, it reversed its
rulings and seated Wilkes. Benton vowed he would work un-
ceasingly for a similar outcome, expunging this censure from
the journal. He did just that in the next several years.61
104 Henry Clay and the American System
Among those repelling Jackson's protest was Webster,
who spoke confidently about constitutional implications. The
Senate had not impeached the president by a shortcut, he
held. Instead, it was perfectly in order for the upper house to
point out an executive invasion of its legislative power and to
protect popular liberty. It had not charged him with a high
crime, an impeachable offense. Nevertheless, Webster was not
soothing the president's feelings when he obliquely compared
him to the divine-right Stuart kings of the seventeenth cen-
tury.62 On that point Calhoun agreed by deploring the chief
executive's tyrannical tendencies, fortunately opposed by a
gathering coalition known as the Whigs. Where there was
threat to liberty, he would act with the new party, he an-
nounced.63
Clay entered the discussion at several intervals and
joined his friends in focusing on these constitutional aspects,
giving only slight notice to economic issues. His position suf-
fered a weakness in denying Jackson the right to transmit a
message of protest while maintaining Congress could send a
message ofcensure. Both branches ofthe government, it would
seem, ought to have communicated more sensibly on a leading
problem of the day. Still, the Kentuckian's greatest difficulty
was the barrier of a House majority ready to support the ad-
ministration regardless of what the distinguished senators
thought. With refusal to receive the protest as the only move
possible at the moment, he pushed forward for the vote to do so
on May seventh. It passed, twenty-seven to sixteen.64
As this session moved from one angry phase to another
without producing anything more than sharp disagreements
over increasingly rigid principles, a growing number of the
public understandably asked if the outcome would be stalled
efforts to deal with the nation's difficulties. Clay, in Washing-
ton, seemed far more interested in castigating the president
for an unwise, harmful policy than in coming forward with
positive proposals to heal the economy. What else could be
done besides censuring Jackson and rejecting his protest?
This was the sort of question Webster had been ponder-
ing from an early stage of the Bank War. At first, the New
Englander felt handicapped in attempting anything, for Clay
and other leaders suspected he was flirting with the adminis-
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tration, possibly with a view toward exchanging support of
Jacksonianism for a high Democratic appointment and per-
haps succession to the presidency. Such thinking grew out of
Webster's help to the chief executive in countering South
Carolina's nullification a year before. Clay and Van Buren,
from different perspectives of course, both feared he was
undergoing some kind of conversion. But Clay was soon con-
vinced that such an unholy alliance would not develop and
was pleased that Webster welcomed election as chairman of
the critical Finance Committee. Nevertheless, on through this
tumultuous Congress, even though the two senators worked
harmoniously on censure, Webster was seeking a compromise
or, more likely, a short-term approach to the banking problem,
a different outlook from Clay's single-minded determination
to bring Jackson down.65
After many weeks of waiting, the Massachusetts senator
reported his interim plan. He would extend the present bank
charter six years in order to extricate the country from what
was now known as the administration's "experiment" of resort
to state-institution depositories. It had an appalling impact
upon currency, credit, and business activity, he thought.
Governmental deposits should be returned to the BUS. To
sweeten the proposal, he would restrict small-note issues, put
limitations on the branch offices, and consider what other
changes the Senate found desirable. Calhoun also moved into
action by putting forward a weird remedy: extend the charter
twelve years, increase the value of gold in relation to silver at
the mint to bring on a wholly metallic medium of exchange
with no paper notes, and ultimately "unbank the banks" to
get rid of these exploitative enterprises.66
Clay had no interest in either antidote. Discussing them
merely delayed action on the censure resolution.67 Biddle, who
was kept informed about movement for compromise, told
Webster he believed his plan was good but did nothing to help
beyond that polite comment.68 In a few days after presenting
his recommendations, Webster gave up hope and moved to
table his own report. So much at the moment for Clay's repu-
tation as a compromiser.
If Whig proposals for settling the national-bank question
foundered, there was some Democratic sentiment for going
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beyond mere negativism in financial policy. Toward the end of
the session in spring 1834, Benton made another effort for
hard money as replacement for bank notes, both national and
state. He had gathered a great deal of information on the his-
tory and present status of metallic currency, which he length-
ily explained to the Senate. The mint had not coined much
gold or silver for many years, he pointed out, so that rank-
and-file Americans had to depend upon paper notes, easily
manipulated by banks. In answer to critics' characterization
of him as the "gold humbug," he admitted he did share the
people's preference for money "which would jingle in the
pocket." As Secretary Taney and a House committee had
urged, Benton pressed for revaluation of gold in relation to
silver from a ratio of one ounce to fifteen up to one to sixteen,
thereby drawing gold bullion to the mint. Before adjourn-
ment, Congress adopted such a measure, which Webster and
his Finance Committee approved.
Though cold toward such a recipe, Clay did not speak on
the question, in fact did not vote on it. Whether a hard-money
system was practical remained uncertain. The country contin-
ued to use paper currency much more than specie. Even
Benton restricted his call for more gold to small denomina-
tions, below twenty-five dollars. This movement gave many
Democrats a political argument for years to come.69
Another Jacksonian goal looked toward development of
the state-bank depositories. Taney sent up recommendations
for expanding and monitoring this network with requirements
on note issue, amounts of reserves, reports to the treasury, and
so forth. Though failing to get effective legislative action, the
administration proceeded on its own by executive orders.70 One
ad hoc arrangement involved using an agent of these banks
themselves as liaison to Washington, perhaps as supervisor,
which Clay and his friends thought contrary to the public
interest.71
One thing seemed clear. There was little hope of return-
ing governmental deposits to Biddle's bank. Clay's resolution
in the Senate on May 28, 1834, for doing so generated more
talk and then approval, twenty-nine to sixteen; but predict-
ably the House tabled it forthwith. 72
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The leverage Clay's coalition had was therefore confined
to the Senate, where the final scene late in June 1834 con-
sisted of taking up Jackson's long-delayed appointment of
Taney to the Treasury. The Whigs were so confident the nomi-
nation would fail they sat silent before voting to reject. If the
Kentuckian had looked ahead realistically, he would have had
to concede this was definitely not the political demise of the
president's "pliant instrument." Just as Jackson would con-
tinue to combat his own censure in the Bank War, he would be
all the more attached to his valued adviser after this offensive
treatment.73
For the previous five years the bank question had been a
solvent of ideas and parties. In large part two persons, the
popular president and the magnetic leader of the opposition,
had shaped the issues and affected the course of history. Jack-
son had made a persuasive case against a powerful national
corporation that he found incompatible with democratic prin-
ciples. Clay had strenuously attempted to continue a long-
established policy of providing a central institution to promote
economic growth. From perspectives of both public and pri-
vate finance, the chief executive's actions may have been more
destructive than constructive, but the senator's response
lacked the practical statesmanship for which he was known.
So the economic outcome was indecisive and would be for
quite a while. Politically, the two protagonists had solidified
the two-party system with definable differences about the role
of government in the economy: the Democrats for avoidance of
special privilege and for dependence upon individual freedom;
the Whigs for an active national government to stimulate
modernization.
7Internal
Improvements
During John Quincy Adams's presidency (1825-29) and thatof his successor Jackson, the question of internal improve-
ments continued to generate lively discussion, some of it
ending in important legislative action. As secretary of state,
senator, and party leader, Clay attempted to advance pro-
grams developing transportation, which he viewed as an inte-
gral part of his American System. If a protective tariff was
essential to industrialization and if a central bank was essen-
tial to economic growth, he believed a positive policy must also
include an active role of the national government in promoting
a network of roads and waterways unifying the young nation.1
On entering the cabinet, he knew that he and Adams
agreed on the fundamentals of internal improvements. Both
subscribed to flexible constitutional doctrine, permitting broad
scope not only to spend but also to shape projects along with
states and private enterprise. In their opinion, Jefferson, Gal-
latin, Madison, and most recently Monroe had too narrowly
interpreted federal authority to act. In the new administration
congressional dynamics and precedents from the previous
twenty years instead of executive scruples would limit what
could be done. During Adams's tenure more than four times as
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much money would be appropriated for this purpose than in
any earlier comparable period.2
The president sketched a bold program in his message of
December 1825 to Congress. In addition to favorable comment
on various plans initiated in surveys by Army engineers, he
extended his definition of internal improvements to cultural
and moral progress. Would it not invigorate republicanism to
establish a national university and an astronomical observa-
tory and to promote scientific knowledge further by an explor-
atory expedition to the far Northwest? His remarks on these
topics worried most of the cabinet, including Secretary Clay,
who thought the country would find such forays too radical.
To press for their adoption was hopeless, the Kentuckian said.
With encouragement only from Secretary of Treasury Richard
Rush, Adams did tone down these passages in the message.3
Clay would find less common ground with President
Jackson. To be sure, when Old Hickory had been in the Senate,
he had voted to appropriate funds for roads and canals, justifi-
able as a military necessity. But as chief executive he moved
toward strict constructionism and states'rights, though he did
sign many internal improvement measures.4 The issue roughly
separated party ideologies by the early thirties. Yet in some re-
spects the division was sectional-the Middle Atlantic and
West for national action, the South against it, other areas di-
vided. Local advantage by pork barreling was a factor, regard-
less ofwho was in the White House. 5
This was a time ofmuch canal digging. The highly success-
ful undertaking that impressed people everywhere was the
Erie, connecting the upper Hudson River with Lake Erie. It
was a project financed and constructed by New York. In the
East too, work began on the Chesapeake-Delaware, the Dismal
Swamp, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canals. The West hoped
to link the Ohio and Mississipi Rivers with the Great Lakes.
Clay strongly supported Adams's recommendations for federal
aid. When adopted, that assistance was substantial: grants of
five square miles of public land for every mile of the route, or
generous governmental subscription of stock in the mixed
public and private corporations developing the waterways.6
Clay took the greatest personal interest in the Portland
Canal around the falls of the Ohio at Louisville. Ever since he
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had first attended Congress twenty years ago, he had advo-
cated federal assistance to cut a two-mile bypass at this throat
of western navigation. Nothing came of this proposal except
adoption of a state law incorporating a canal company, with no
financial help. When steamboat traffic increased spectacularly,
momentum for action picked up, since boats had to unload car-
goes at Louisville, run the falls, and then reload at the expense
of money and time. So in 1826 and 1829 during Adams's term,
as construction neared completion, Clay's friends got a meas-
ure through Congress to subscribe a substantial amount of
company stock. Soon the Treasury held all the stock, while the
corporation managed operations. Quite an interesting public-
private mixture. In 1874 the federal government took the
canal over completely and stopped taking tolls. Like the Erie,
it contributed significantly to expansion of domestic com-
merce. 7
In contrast, Clay criticized the protracted effort to cut the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, beginning along the Potomac at
Washington and aiming toward the upper Ohio. This was
probably Adams's favorite project. The president referred to it
in his congressional message of 1826, succeeded in getting
federal subscription to Chesapeake and Ohio stock, and shov-
eledthe first dirt at Little Falls on July 4, 1828. The secretary
of state, however, correctly predicted that construction would
be too difficult and too costly, compared to alternatives such
as the National Road and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. It
took years for the canal to reach Cumberland, Maryland, and
it never got to the Ohio.8
When Clay served in the Senate during the Jackson
terms, he consistently supported river and harbor bills, to
which that chief executive usually had no objection because,
strange to say, he distinguished them from those for roads and
canals. In the session of 1832, for example, the Kentuckian
voted with the majority in appropriating funds for clearing
river channels, including the James and the Cumberland. And
he concurred in measures to improve coastal installations,
though frequently complaining about the preference of policy
toward the East over the West.9
Paralleling development of water routes, governments at
all levels energetically promoted construction of roads. The
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most visible example was the National Road, commenced ·in
the Jeffersonian era and now in the twenties and thirties
being extended westward from Wheeling, Virginia, at the Ohio
River through the Old Northwest. Though there were some
horrid gaps, the road reached Vandalia in southern Illinois.
Legislation had projected it to the state capital of Missouri,
but it never got that far. This lapse was one of Missouri Sena-
tor Benton's chronic irritants. Congress appropriated money
for the road, in addition to drawing upon a fund from land
sales, but did not provide enough for completion, nor enough to
keep the highway in adequate repair. Traveling often on the
road and remaining one of its most dependable advocates,
Clay pushed for a program of federal maintenance, supported
by erection of tollgates. But there was the uncomfortable
precedent of Monroe's veto of such a measure on constitutional
grounds in 1822. Clay remembered it well and bitterly. Many
members of Congress still believed they lacked the power, so
that state after state from Virginia to Illinois began erecting
tollgates to finance essential repairs. As they did so, Congress
turned segments of the National Road over to them, a process
that continued into the fifties. Altogether, it was an untidy pro-
cess, one that the Kentuckian found imperfect; but he thought
the road had moved the economy ahead significantly.10
When Clay traveled from Lexington to the East, he
began his trip on a primitive road with wicked twists and
turns and forbidding hills to Maysville, sixty-four miles to the
northeast on the Ohio, thence up that river to Wheeling and
on the National Road to the capital. He shared the frus-
trations and delays of fellow Kentuckians on the first leg of
the journey; and as sentiment for improvement of the Mays-
ville Road mounted, he was very interested on both personal
and political grounds.
This sentiment was, in fact, long-standing. As early as
1812 the state unsuccessfully petitioned Congress for support.
Ofr and on, meetings were held and the legislature passed
bills to organize turnpike companies. By the late twenties
Clay had assumed leadership of these efforts and looked upon
the timing as opportune, since the spirit of internal improve-
ment was in·the air, he remarked. Though he was not in Con-
gress himself, his associates in the enterprise tried again to
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get federal help for the Maysville Road company. The Senate
did pass a House bill on May 20, 1830, providing a subscrip-
tion of $150,000 in company stock, now a fairly common
means of assisting internal improvement enterprises. ll
Jackson was poised to kill the measure. Here was a good
opportunity, he thought, to make a statement checking the
current trend toward consolidated power at the expense of
states'rights and of the Treasury. No doubt, another motive
was to strike at an adversary by denying Clay's home town its
coveted turnpike. The president's principal adviser was Secre-
tary of State Van Buren, who years later in his autobiography
recalled how he participated in the decision. Considering him-
self a latter-day Jeffersonian strict constructionist who had
forged the new Democratic party as a North-South alliance,
Van Buren had long opposed the idea of national involvement
in developing transportation. Now as cabinet member and
presidential companion, he had urged the chief executive to
take a firm stand. In fact, he prepared a "brief," as he called it,
laying out the reasoning. Giving this document, along with his
earnest advice, to Jackson, he saw the Maysville bill as an ex-
cellent occasion to take the necessary step. Whether one can
accept this ex parte recollection as wholly reliable history is a
legitimate question, but there is probably something to it. 12
At any rate, Jackson vetoed the bill. His main objection
contended that the project was local, not national. The road
would extend only sixty-four miles from Maysville to Lexing-
ton, all within one state, whereas congressional power could
only apply to national projects, he declared. He could not say
that this rule had always been applied previously. Other
constitutional considerations also required rejection, he be-
lieved. Looking back to Madison's veto of the BUS-bonus bill
of 1817, he reasoned that its disapproval of appropriations for
internal improvements supplied a proper guideline in the
present instance. A further defect, in his opinion, was the very
process of governmental subscription of a private corpora-
tion's stock, a dangerous overlap of two spheres. If govern-
ment were to help internal improvements, it would be well to
add a constitutional amendment permitting federal distri-
bution of funds to states for their selection and administration
of programs. Distribution, though not requiring a constitu-
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tional amendment in their judgment, would appeal to Clay's
National Republican following but not to many Jacksonian
Democrats.13
Not surprisingly, Clay and his disappointed ranks found
much in the veto message to criticize. They had no doubt
whatsoever that the Maysville Road had national, not merely
local importance. Across the Ohio River it would connect with
Zane's Road, which branched off the National Road at Zanes-
ville; it was also intended to continue the route south from
Lexington into Tennessee, then on the Natchez Tr~ce to New
Orleans. As for the president's reliance on Madison's veto to
disapprove appropriations, they pointed out that Madison
himself would allow appropriations if related to a delegated
power in the Constitution; moreover, Jackson admitted that
the practice since 1817 had been quite flexible. They could cite
a long list of internal improvement measures, some clearly
local and most of them mixing national and state and private
elements. Madison's successor Monroe had broadened the
scope of appropriations, and so had Congress in its resolutions
on the issue.14
Putting aside constitutional niceties and Van Buren's
brief, supposedly the reference used by Jackson, one must say
that two other factors must have influenced the veto. The
first, lightly treated by the chief executive but a consideration
much on his mind, was his desire to payoff the public debt,
which seemed reachable soon. The Treasury should therefore
not spend $150,000 in this instance. But that motive did not
prevent him from signing other internal improvement bills at
this session, amounting to a large sum. The second, in the
realm of personalities and politics, was his awareness that the
Maysville bill was the pet project of a man he truly hated,
Henry Clay.
The Kentuckian responded with scathing denunciations,
and yet he predicted the veto would be self-defeating. Jackson
had poorer prospects for reelection two years hence, Clay said,
because of the damage his action inflicted upon his popularity,
not only in the West but also across the land.15 Soon after
news of the veto arrived, Clay urged National Republican
leaders in the state to hold meetings and circulate counteract-
ing addresses. This occurred. Following his advice they called
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for a constitutional amendment to replace the requirement for
a two-thirds vote to override a veto with one for a mere ma-
jority. Already the main thrust against Jackson was a charge
of excessive executive power. Though the proposed amend-
ment did not .have a promising prognosis, these meetings also
spurred thinking about a presidential nomination, perhaps a
surer remedy.16
Despite failure to get federal aid, the people in Lexington
and other towns did not abandon the idea of a Maysville Road
and continued work on the project in the next few years. Con-
currently, they promoted construction of a railroad to Louis-
ville by way of Frankfort, one of the first such undertakings
west of the mountains. Again Clay was enthusiastic and
pledged a handsome sum, more than he could later deliver, it
turned out.17
As Clay's efforts for federal aid to internal improvements
encountered stronger resistance, he sought an approach that
might bypass states-rights objections and reconcile diverse
economic interests. The formula he settled upon involved link-
ing internal improvements with public lands. Both became
critical parts of his American System, in some respects as
critical as national banking and protective tariffs.
To understand how this may have been, one has to look
at the main characteristics of land policy in those days. The
public domain was vast-over a billion acres. Only part of it
was available, free of Indian possession and surveyed into rec-
tangular sections of 640 acres, necessary conditions before
sale at auction in government land offices or before grants of
one kind or another. In the late twenties annual sales totaled
about 1 million acres, though in the next few years a land
boom brought the total up to 20 million. Even at this rate it
would take a long time to divest governmental holdings.
Despite the enormous value of this territory, revenue
from sales had never been the only objective. From colonial
days until the end of the eighteenth century, land policies had
often aimed at extending settlement by large grants on very
generous terms. Legislation from the period of the Articles of
Confederation to the 1820s gradually shifted toward ever
smaller parcels at lower prices, even on credit for a while. By
1832 a purchaser could acquire a mere forty acres at a mini-
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mum auction price of $1.25 an acre. The trend had been to ac-
celerate the westward movement by individual settlers of
modest means. Nevertheless, the objective of gathering reve-
nue not only to supply the Treasury but also to help the states
establish schools and build roads remained a major feature of
land policy. The political issue involved the relative im-
portance of revenue for national development and of stimulus
to western migration. Realistically, the issue seemed some-
what hypothetical until the surge of land sales in the thirties,
because revenue had not equaled the costs of administering
the system.18
President Adams expressed his views in a congressional
message of 1827, warning against undue lowering of terms of
land sales. The public domain, he contended, was a national
resource, much of it derived from cession in that spirit by
states during the Confederation period. To dispose of it now
on overly generous terms would be quite unjust to those
states and to the Union as a whole. Clay, his secretary of
state, wholly agreed, as one might expect of an economic na-
tionalist.19 The secretary of Treasury, Richard Rush, similarly
referred to this topic in his report. He added another dimen-
sion, however, in urging cautious disposition of lands so as not
to draw off too much industrial labor of the East toward the
West. Clay had a better grasp of capital politics than to en-
dorse that inflammatory passage; yet for a long time he did
have to downplay it whenever land was discussed.20
No one used the Adams-Rush statements as a spring-
board for advocating the opposite principle more often than
Benton, an indefatigable spokesman in behalf of the sturdy
pioneer. Throughout his thirty-year career in Congress, the
Missourian never ceased working for liberalizing .land policy.
His chief proposal was graduation, annual reductions of the
minimum price of unsold land down to twenty-five cents an
acre, indeed outright donation to actual settlers or cession of
such tracts to the states at that point. Governor Ninian Ed-
wards of Illinois liked the second option and influenced other
westerners to favor it. In Congress, beginning in 1824 and
every year afterward for a long while, Benton introduced such
a graduation bill. Though failing to get adoption, he recruited
much support.21 During the Webster-Hayne debate of 1830 in
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the Senate, Benton fought an eastern attempt to slow down
land sales, which, he said, reflected a reprehensible bias
against the West. Instead, he advanced his formula of cheap
land as an ingredient of a sectional alliance with the South.
The West would help the South get a low tariff in return for
southern acceptance of a generous land policy. Hayne and
some others of his section had been converted, but not enough
to enact a measure for graduation. A bill did squeak through
the Senate, though not the House.22 Benton's threat, as Clay
viewed the problem, was rising, particularly because Jackson
was showing an alarming interest in this wild notion of
graduation.23
The Kentuckian responded with the proposal of distri-
bution. Precedents existed. The transfer of federal funds from
land sales or of land itself to states had been employed to de-
velop education and encourage internal improvements. In
Congress, beginning in 1824 and recurring each year, mem-
bers had introduced bills for distribution, just as Benton had
done in the cause of graduation.24
When Clay took his seat in the Senate in December 1831
after several years' absence from the legislative branch, he
wished not only to forestall Benton's campaign for graduating
land prices downward but also to shore up the rest of his
American System. He might save the beleaguered protective
tariff if distribution removed land revenue from the general
fund and sustained the need for high customs rates. No
matter that his opponents would charge that this linkage of
tariff and distribution was underhanded strategy.25 Perhaps
more important to the senator was the way distribution would
help his stalled internal improvements effort. Jackson's dis-
turbing veto of the Maysville Road bill seemed to signal much
trouble, maybe a national withdrawal from this vital re-
sponsibility.
As a member of the Committee on Manufactures, he as-
sumed the task of preparing a report recommending distri-
bution. That it was this committee, usually concerned with
matters far removed from land, resulted from a Democratic at-
tempt to put him in an uncomfortable position relating to a
sensitive topic just before the fall presidential election in which
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he was a candidate. Ordinarily the task would have gone to the
Public Lands Committee, controlled by his opponents. During
the course of his work he repeatedly complained about this
anomaly. To make it all the more strange, the committee was
instructed to report not on his plan but on that of Benton,
graduating prices and ceding land to states. Nevertheless,
after a long discussion rejecting these impractical ideas, in his
opinion, he had the opportunity of laying out the rationale for
distribution.
Shortly, in mid-April 1832, he presented his report-he
would look back upon it as one of his best state papers. He
ripped into graduation as wholly unjust and undesirable. To
reduce land prices from the existing minimum of $1.25 per
acre to $.50, then probably to free gift, would surely have the
effect of devaluing lands already purchased by settlers or in-
tended for sale by states. Citing figures, he sought to demon-
strate that the trend was now for sales to increase, which
proved that terms were fair. As for the proposal of ceding land
to the states, he predicted that a tangle of disparate terms and
procedures would replace the present uniform, quite satis-
factory system. The fundamental defect in these Jacksonian
concoctions, he argued, lay in departing from the initial
character of the public domain. It originated with cessions of
western territories by a number of states to the new nation in
the 1780s. While agreeing to do this, they stipulated that this
would be a common resource of the entire Union. If such no-
tions as graduation or donation were accepted, some states
and many people would be deprived of precious rights, he de-
clared.
Turning to his own formula, Clay would distribute land
proceeds to all states, according to their apportioned represen-
tation in Congress. But to extend special assistance to seven
newer states, he would continue to grant them 5 percent of
land sales within their borders for roads and aid them by 10
percent more. This concession would precede general distri-
bution in which they and the rest of the states would partici-
pate. Obviously the senator wanted to sway these westerners
from their current attachment to Benton's scheme. The money
granted to all states would be used for education and internal
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improvements, including debts on old projects. A controversial
authorization would be expenditure for colonizing free blacks
abroad.26
Mter Clay presented his report, the Senate stalled in
parliamentary maneuvers. Benton's side now wished the
report of the Committee on Manufactures referred to their
sympathetic Committee on Public Lands. If they believed this
procedure was correct, Clay wondered, why did they not
assign the task to that panel in the first place. Mter many
speeches, the matter was referred to Public Lands by a tie
vote broken by Vice President Calhoun. Not a friendly gesture
by the Carolinian. Predictably, the chairman of this commit-
tee, William King ofAlabama, made a report that was almost
entirely a refutation of what the Kentuckian had said.27
King, Benton, and others, mainly southerners and west-
erners, argued that distribution would decidedly slow down
desirable migration to the frontier, while it unfairly tilted
toward the older eastern states. So they adhered to downward
graduation of prices and cession of land to newer states. A
number of them also seized upon the proposed expenditure of
funds for colonizing free blacks as a dangerous attack upon
slavery.28 Clay replied with a set speech in late June 1832, fill-
ing some gaps and mixing flights of eloquence with aggressive
sarcasm.29 He shot a round at Governor Ninian Edwards of
Illinois. His excellency had succumbed to Benton's siren song
from Missouri across the Mississippi for cession of "refuse
lands, refuse lands, refuse lands," a vague description for less
desirable or at least unsold tracts. Indeed the honorable gov-
ernor had "joined in chorus, and struck the tune an octave
higher" to ask for donation of all the public domain in western
states.30
Near the close of this session in July, the Senate passed
the distribution bill, twenty-six to eighteen; but Clay's satisfac-
tion disappeared when he learned that the House had tabled
the measure. If the heated issues ofbanking and tariff had not
occupied so much attention during the session, perhaps it
would have passed. Still, the known negative views of the
president clouded the question.31
In fact, when Jackson's annual message arrived at the
Capitol in December 1832, it carried a clear recommendation
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for reduction of land prices.32 Nonetheless, Clay announced he
would again introduce his proposal; and since it was exactly
the same as that already considered, he saw no reason to refer
it to a committee. A majority disagreed and voted to send it to
the dread Committee on Public Lands, which soon enough re-
ported a substitute in Benton's mode of graduation.33 Clay
quickly rose in opposition. Not only repeating his familiar ar-
guments, the Kentuckian warmly defended the provision for
colonization of free blacks, a cause he had long supported as
president of the American Colonization Society. It would be
the "happiest of all events," he asserted, when all blacks, free
and slave, were removed from the country.34 Calhoun, no
longer vice president but now a fiery senator in the midst of
nullification, must have groaned when he heard that.
Debate resembled what had already been said re-
peatedly, with opposition coming from southern and western
senators.35 More attention centered on the connection of tariff
and land policies, because concurrently the compromise tariff
was developing. Clay emphasized the relationship, saying
that his concessions on the tariff ought to be matched by
southern acceptance of distribution. He did not persuade very
many to that view, however, for Calhoun and a number of his
followers foresaw excessive national power beyond consti-
tutional limits in administering Clay's land program. They
voted against the bill for that reason. The Kentuckian still
hoped that Jackson would view tariff and distribution as
parts of a grand compromise.36 He prevailed in the Senate in
January and in the House in early March at the very end of
the session. Much to his dismay, the president did not return
the bill with his signature. So it was a pocket veto.
When Congress convened in December 1833, Jackson
sent up a veto message. He had not be.en able to consider the
legislation adequately, he weakly explained, in the short time
before adjournment in March. But now he had found a
number of objectionable features. He saw no justification for
building up a huge fund from land proceeds, which would
benefit some states much more than others. Furthermore,na-
tional power would endanger the states' sovereignty by in-
truding into the basic workings of their governments. Far
better, he reasoned, to lower land prices and turn much of the
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public domain over to the states. In other words, put Benton's
plan in motion.37 Clay was furious. Again presidential power
by way of the veto had interfered with the will of the people
expressed in their representative legislature.38 He had wished
to resign his Senate seat, he said, but this setback on internal
improvements and land required him to persist. He intro-
duced his bill with no changes, yet the effort was hopeless.39
Besides, this session, running on through early 1834, was a
very busy one, concerned with removal of governmental de-
posits from the national bank, the Senate's censure of Jack-
son, and the mountain of memorials on financial distress
induced by Biddle's panic. In the long run, Clay would make
other attempts; but he might have to find alternatives to a
land fund for internal improvements, particularly while
states-rights Democrats occupied the presidency.
8Jacksonian
Ascendancy
Despite Jacksonian opposition to many proposals for federalinternal improvements, Clay did not wholly abandon his
effort. Although stung by the Maysville Road veto, the senator
sponsored or supported other measures during the middle
thirties.
Completion of the National Road was a recurrent issue.
In February 1835 the Senate took up a bill for repairing and
extending the road before turning it over to western states.
He helped passage but believed that the national interest in
this artery of transportation surpassed any state interest. And
he continued to disagree with Monroe's veto of 1822 as consti-
tutional precedent prohibiting national administration of a
tollgate system to maintain the road.! Nevertheless, he later
favored reducing appropriations for this and other projects,
while complaining that Kentucky was not getting its fair
, share. His friends wondered why he had lost some enthu-
siasm for what had been his favorite project, yet on second
thought they could recognize that a deep-seated localism af-
fected even an economic nationalist.2 A majority in Congress
seemed also to have tired of federal assistance to this road, for
it soon stopped.3
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Clay demonstrated his basic commitment to federal in-
ternal improvements, however, by repeated introduction of
distribution bills. At each session the provisions were much
the same: annual allocation of proceeds from land sales, an in-
itial bonus to newer states, distribution of the remainder ap-
portioned by population to all states, to be used for internal
improvements, education, or black colonization. He had come
close to success in March 1833 but suffered Jackson's pocket
veto. Available funds were now much larger because of a land
boom, which would bring in $25 million of revenue in 1836, an
increase from $1 million in earlier years.4
In the Senate during Christmas week 1835 he reviewed
the background and several benefits of his proposal and then
countered objections, especially those to its constitutionality.
He based authority on the clause empowering Congress to
make rules for United States territories and property, which,
he reasoned, allowed full discretion on disposition of public
lands. He s.aw no danger to states' rights, as portrayed by op-
ponents.5 In later debate he warded off other options: Benton's
graduation for lower land prices, Robert Walker's full-scale
advocacy for preemption rights to purchase by prior settle-
ment and for preference to actual settlers, even Hugh White's
startling amalgamation of distribution and graduation. He
also rejected a new option, using land revenue to increase ap-
propriations in the current fortifications bill, a poor idea, in
his opinion, since Jackson had foolishly generated a crisis
with France.6
The Senate passed his bill on May 4, 1836, by a vote of
twenty-five to twenty-one. Whigs were solidly for it, Democrats
opposed. But Clay was again disappointed, because the House
tabled it. He could have predicted that the president would
have a veto ready anyway, and that was the case.7
Another version of distribution took shape shortly after
the failure of this plan. It consisted of joining land and finan-
cial policies in an intricate, dubious formula that drew a great
deal of attention. Rather unexpectedly, Clay might get distri-
bution from the entire surplus in the treasury, not just from
land sales.
The first stage of this development had appeared the pre-
vious year, February 1835, with Calhoun the principal figure.
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Always suspicious of big government and upset about the so-
called spoils system, the South Carolina senator sought some
way of reducing what he believed to be the source of these
threats to liberty and morality, the huge surplus. He would
reduce it by a constitutional amendment allowing distribution
to the states. Getting this enabling amendment, however,
would be quite difficult. The other part of his reform involved
stricter regulation of the state banks holding government de-
posits, indispensable to eliminate Jacksonian corruption, he
reasoned.8
Though Calhoun's idea did not receive serious notice that
session, it did in spring 1836. The fast growing surplus had
attracted numerous interests hungry for capital, but it had
also alarmed many persons at the Capitol in addition to the
Carolinian.9 Webster delivered a comprehensive speech on the
present undesirable impact of the surplus on the state-bank
depositories, whose note issues and loans rapidly mounted
along with public funds at their disposal. He argued for dis-
tributing the surplus to state governments as a remedy.IO
Parallel to this unusual collaboration of Calhoun and
Webster, Clay was pressing for passage of his perennial bill to
distribute land revenue. When that attempt collapsed in May,
the Kentuckian supported the move involving the general sur-
plus. The proposal now called for apportioned "deposits" with
the states, technically subject to the Treasury's recall but rec-
ognized practically as a donation. It was nothing less than a
transparent disguise for Henry Clay's faltering land scheme,
Benton growled. ll The measure got through Congress in a few
weeks, its path made easier because Calhoun gave up his re-
quirement of a constitutional amendment. And the Jackson
administration reluctantly accepted distribution in order to
get a much needed means of regulating the depository banks.12
Perhaps, too, a possible favorable effect upon the approaching
presidential election counted for something among Democrats
working for their candidate Van Buren.
This deposit act directed quarterly distribution of surplus
to states in apportioned amounts for one year only. Congress
could, of course, extend the process, or it could supplement or
replace it. In the next session, beginning December 1836,
many proposals appeared, some involving the surplus and
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some going to its· main source, public-land sales. No one must
have been surprised to see the determined senator from Ken-
tucky introduce his distribution bill again. But the initiative
came from the administration. Secretary of Treasury Levi
Woodbury's recommendations in his annual report would re-
duce the surplus instead of distributing it and would do so by
restricting sale of land to actual settlers, not to entrepreneurs
and speculators. The Senate Committee on Public Lands fa-
vored a version of this approach. Calhoun urged cession of the
public domain to the states, while Benton and his followers
renewed calls for graduating prices downward, and a growing
number of members favored preemption by "squatters" at
minimum price, which would bypass bidding to a higher level
at auction. More formidable than any of these formulas was
the order Jackson had issued, known as the Specie Circular,
requiring payment for land purchases in specie rather than
bank notes and therefore cutting revenue. William Rives
came up with a more lenient model to accomplish the same
purpose by gradual steps toward nonacceptance of bank notes
in small denominations.13
Clay's prescription of distribution was the only serious
proposal to maintain the present level of land revenue, but he
lacked the necessary support. He therefore concentrated on de-
feating measures that would lower receipts. Walker's bill to
limit sales to actual settlers and to establish a policy of pre-
emption suited the administration and probably a majority in
the Senate. So Clay aimed criticism chiefly against it as well as
against several amendments brought forward.
Restricting sales to actual settlers, proponents believed,
would forestall excesses by speculators. Here was a favorite
target for nearly everyone, the rapacious operator grabbing
large tracts at cheap prices to the detriment ofhonest yeomen.
Even Clay did not try to defend speculation and indeed de-
clared he had bought only a quarter section of public land in
the last twenty years.14 In truth, many senators, such as Web-
ster and his colleague John Davis, were active speculators but
did not admit it.15 When accused by Calhoun of speculating,
Jackson fiercely denied it in public print.16 About the only good
word for the practice came from Thomas Ewing, who pointed
out its substantial contribution to economic development.17
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Clay had very strong objections to the new provision for
general preemption, permitting unauthorized settlers on
public land to buy it at the minimum price in quantities up to
1,280 acres for each family member. For one thing, he con-
tended, selling such large parcels was not consistent with its
supposed democratic impact. Would not speculators fraudu-
lently swear they met the requirements of such a statute-to
place the land under cultivation, for example? Preliminary ex-
perience with an earlier limited law showed that would be the
inevitable result, especially so in light of inadequate adminis-
trative machinery. The waste of a great national resource
would be tragic, he insisted. Throughout his career, Clay re-
mained intensely hostile to preemption.18
Again the demand for downward graduation of prices of
unsold land enlivened legislative debate. Benton, of course,
urged it, and many other senators did too. Calhoun now came
over to that position, however quixotically. He would adopt
graduation quite gradually, indeed would lower prices over
thirty-five years until 1862. And he would connect it with ces-
sion of all lands to the states, which nevertheless would have
to sell at a price set by Congress and would have to share the
revenue with Washington. Such a policy would be an even
greater plunder of this valuable resource, Clay exclaimed.
Besides, he saw no justification for selling already cheap land
more cheaply when land offices were crowded with purchasers.
Nonetheless, Calhoun stirred a great deal of interest among
states' righters, especially westerners, even if the Democratic
leadership did not incorporate the Carolinian's complicated
scheme in its bil1.19
The outcome of the solons' colloquy on land policy in re-
lation to public finance was passage of Wright's measure for
sales restricted to actual settlers and for preemption, twenty-
seven to twenty-three, in the Senate. It was to no avail, how-
ever, for the House tabled it.20
Now, in March 1837, the last month of the congressional
session and of Jackson's administration, proponents of distri-
bution tried to extend payment of installments from the gen-
eral surplus to the states beyond October, the terminal date of
the deposit law. The House had attached a provision to the
fortifications bill to do so; but in the Senate, Wright, who had
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never liked distribution, moved to strike that prOVISIon.
Others joined him in deploring state dependence upon na-
tional largesse. And a number touched upon a subject largely
avoided for several years, the protective tariff, which might be
lowered as a better means to reduce the surplus. With ma-
jority backing, Clay had steadfastly opposed tampering with
the compromise of 1833.21 On the other hand, in his annual
message Jackson had suggested that this could be a way to
escape the present ill-advised distribution.22
Never failing to seize the opportunity, the Kentuckian
argued that those who opposed the House provision for ex-
tending distribution of the general surplus ought to come over
to his formula of drawing only from land proceeds. During an
excited exchange with Wright, he erupted, "Take the land bill,
like an honest man."23 Buchanan, ordinarily not an ally, de-
clared he would do just that but chided Clay for also "cherish-
ing and caressing" the House measure as an alternative.24
Webster and Calhoun, concurring with Clay that there was no
possibility of passing anything else, joined him in willingness
to accept the House provision.
The Senate voted to follow the insistent Wright, however,
in twice refusing to go along with the lower chamber after re-
ceiving conference committee reports.25 The last hours of the
session had arrived, so that the question ofdistribution carried
over to the new administration of Van Buren. Meanwhile, by
the previous law there would be three more quarterly install-
ments to the states in 1837-unless something unexpected
happened to the economy.
Over the period of discussion and legislation on distri-
bution of surplus to states, a related question concerned regu-
lation of state-chartered banks holding federal deposits after
their removal from the Bank of the United States in 1833.
The deposit law of 1836 addressed both subjects. It built upon
previous efforts by the administration and the states, such as
specifying reserve requirements for notes and their redeem-
ability in specie. Jacksonians, especially the president him-
self, tolerated inclusion of distribution in the statute in order
to get bank regulations, which now provided for periodic re-
ports to the Treasury, limits on the ratio of deposits and notes
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to capital stock, restrictions on paper of small denominations,
and other controls.26
Whether the impact of the new system would be helpful
or a cause for later financial troubles of the country remained
to be seen. Like most Whigs, Clay favored large scope for
banking operations in order to stimulate growth, though he
had bad memories of the Kentucky relief episode. He did not
share the rising antipathy toward banks in general, voiced by
radical Democrats like Kendall and Blair. So he voted for the
regulatory provisions in the law but did not believe they were
an adequate substitute for the late national bank. Although
he did not enter the current debate, he would have much to
say as banking and politics remained entwined for a long time
to come.
Democratic criticism of banks increasingly favored gold
and silver instead of notes for currency. Of course, "Old Bul-
lion" Benton had long advocated that policy; and as the war
with the BUS reached a climax, the president himself took this
position as a means of protecting the people against unstable
paper issues. In pursuit of an enlarged metallic medium, the
administration had put through gold revaluation in the law of
1834. The next year Congress considered proposals to add
branches to the Philadelphia mint for the same objective. In
the Senate Clay jumped into a lively discussion about whether
to set them up in New Orleans and other southern locations.
He launched an animated attack upon the whole idea. Just a
waste of money for an unnecessary operation, he declared. He
must have hesitated a bit when he joined other special inter-
ests and recommended a branch in Lexington, unsuccessfully,
it turned out. And he lost his main argument when Congress
did authorize establishing several new branches of the mint,
which could increase the hard-money supply.27
The movement for bullion, however, made little progress.
The hundreds of banks across the land, issuing ever more
notes feeding all the insatiable segments of the economy, not to
mention the decided trend toward deposit currency, effectively
blocked this reform. As a lawyer in the Supreme Court, Clay
contributed to the maintenance of bank-note currency. In rep-
resenting a bank chartered by Kentucky, he secured a ruling
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affirming the constitutionality of notes issued by this institu-
tion entirely owned by the state. The decision in Briscoe v.
Bank of the Commonwealth (1837) held that the state itself
had not issued the paper and had therefore not violated the
constitutional prohibition of state bills of credit. The finespun
distinction cleared away a legal objection of many Jackso-
nians, the president included, but not their political criticism
of this medium. It is interesting to notice, however, that the
new chief justice, concurring with the majority, was Roger
Taney, Old Hickory's right hand in the Bank War. No doubt he
was influenced by a states-rights argument as well as by the
undesirability of judicial intervention in this deeply rooted
practice ofcirculating notes. 28
Jackson had also sought to advance a hard-money policy
by his Specie Circular in July 1836, directing collectors to re-
ceive only gold and silver, not bank notes, for purchases of
public land. The Senate had rejected Benton's bill to this
effect, whereupon the Missourian had persuaded the presi-
dent that an executive order could accomplish the same thing.
He offered to supply a a draft, which Jackson accepted and
signed.29 As soon as legislators gathered for a new session in
December, Clay's lieutenant Thomas Ewing introduced a reso-
lution to revoke the Specie Circular. An angry discussion
ensued over the next two months.
Benton and other supporters of the administration con-
tended that it had been necessary to curb wild land specu-
lation, stimulated by financial excesses of western banks.
Conditions would worsen next year, they predicted, when the
Treasury would distribute large funds to states under the re-
cently adopted deposit law. Benton added a conspiracy theory.
Biddle, he warned, was planning to create another panic in
the economy, to find an excuse to retrench credit, and to
blame the resulting distress on anti-BUS measures in still an-
other effort to gain a recharter.
These senators justified the executive procedure em-
ployed in the Specie Circular. An old joint resolution of 1816
had provided that dues to the government could be paid either
in specie or in notes redeemable in specie, intended at the
time to require the new national bank and other institutions
to issue only convertible paper. Now, they reasoned, the regu-
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lation authorized the secretary of treasury at his discretion to
select only one medium, either specie or notes, in transactions
involving the government. In the present instance, it was
specie only. This interpretation might check a Whig objection
that the executive had unconstitutionally bypassed Congress
in high-handed fashion. 30
Clay and his partisans attacked each point. To be sure,
they deplored destabilizing conduct of land buyers and banks,
but they identified the fundamental cause to be the sustained
Jacksonian attack upon the BUS. In other words, the Specie
Circular was only one more misstep in this conflict over the
last eight years. Then they criticized, in good Whig rhetoric,
the dangerous, unilateral application of executive power to
establish a policy after Congress had refused to do so. Further-
more, the resolution of 1816 did not mean what the Democrats
claimed, they persuasively concluded, for it allowed those
paying dues to the government, but not the Treasury receiving
them, to select either of two media.31 Actually, Clay believed,
the preferable course at present was to blend the proposal of
William Rives with that of the Specie Circular: allow reception
both of a metallic medium and of bank notes redeemable in
specie yet in denominations no less than twenty dollars. It
would avoid the undesirable effects of small notes but assure
reliable, reasonably available currency.32
At last, a bill to reverse the Specie Circular passed by a
decisive vote of forty-one to five, then in the House by a large
margin. The provisions were just as Clay wished: either specie
or notes of at least twenty dollars redeemable in specie could
be paid to the government.33 When the president received it on
the last day of his administration, he pocket vetoed; c and
though he prepared a message of explanation, he filed it. So
the question remained for the incoming Van Buren adminis-
tration and would have a longer, still acrimonious history.34
Another episode during the final stage of the Bank War
involved a vindication of the chief executive. Finally, Benton,
who had been attempting for nearly three years to counteract
the Senate's censure ofJackson for removing deposits from the
BUS and for dismissing Secretary of Treasury Duane's refusal
to do so, had the necessary votes. He introduced his familiar
resolution to expunge this censure from the journal. The Mis-
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sourian delivered an encomium on the president's character
and contributions to the nation's well-being that surpassed
any previous version.35 Knowing they were outnumbered, the
Whigs nevertheless recorded an opposite assessment, center-
ing on BUS politics. Clay surveyed at length the events of the
controversy, the veto of recharter, the removal of deposits, the
recent declaration of the Specie Circular. To expunge, that is to
blot out the official record totally, violated the constitutional
requirement to keep a journal, he said.36 Webster closed the
speechmaking in similar vein. Then in a tense evening ses-
sion, Benton's side looked on with satisfaction as the clerk
drew black lines around the words of censure in the journal
and wrote "Expunged" over them.37 Clay remarked to Benton
he should be known as the knight of the black lines.38
Notwithstanding this triumph, no legislative roll call
could expunge the memory of repeated battles over national-
bank issues. Party politics had generated confrontations that
neither Democrats nor Whigs were willing to resolve by com-
promise. A useful, if too powerful, financial institution had
fallen victim to the polarization of opinion across the land.
The few efforts to make a practical adjustment, such as that
of Webster, had made no progress as positions on the bank
became hardened articles of faith. Though Jackson and his
advisers had initiated the Bank War, Clay had fought back
with an unyielding strategy, not consistent with his well-
known skill of negotiating a resolution of disparate interests.
Now, as Old Hickory turned over the presidential office to his
intimate associate Van Buren, who was also recognized for his
ability to settle conflict of political elements, future financial
policy might be somewhat less channeled than it had been.
But a factor about which neither Clay nor Van Buren could be
certain was the health of the economy in the next few years.
9Financial
Problems
W hen Jackson handed the presidency over to his valuedfriend and chief lieutenant Martin Van Buren in March
1837, he could not have been more pleased. This New Yorker,
principal architect of the Democratic party, prototype of a sea-
soned politician, experienced in high-level offices, and fully
committed to Jeffersonian ideology, seemed certain to con-
tinue the policies of his popular predecessor. Yet almost as
soon as he had been inaugurated, his misfortunes began, not
to end during his four years in the White House. A financial
panic, followed by a protracted depression, afflicted the coun-
try and beclouded his unhappy term.
The new president's first problem involved a continued con-
troversy about the Specie Circular, requiring payment of metal-
lic.currency for public-land sales. Whigs and some Democrats,
irritated by Jackson's last-minute pocket veto of the bill to
revoke this executive order, now pressed Van Buren to withdraw
it. Merchants and bankers from his state sent a delegation to
Washington, urging revocation in order to correct a growing
shortage of specie, which was being drained to transmontane
land offices, they believed. On the other hand, hard-moneyadvo-
cates eml?hasized the need to retain the circular and put down
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the persistent land boom, which, they complained, had been
stimulated by speculators, supplied with western paper cur-
rency. Probably more persuasive was the correspondence ar-
riving from Old Hickory, lecturing the besieged chief executive
about the importance of standing fast. Whatever the reason,
Van Buren decided not to touch the Specie Circular. By commu-
nicating his decision to the New York committee in writing
instead of by a give-and-take conversation he revealed his un-
easiness.!
Already the first phase of the panic had appeared. In
mid-March, just two weeks into Van Buren's tenure, the bank
of I. and L. Joseph in New York City failed because of losses
from the collapse of the cotton market in New Orleans. The
difficulty at the busy southern port had arisen from an over-
production of cotton and a contraction of the large supply of
British credit, which had previously absorbed that output.
Soon other banks in New York and across the country were
also affected, inducing them to suspend specie payment of
their notes. A general impairment of confidence throughout
the economy developed by early May. Through the following
months of 1837 it was clear that the enormous growth in the
numbers and operations of banks that had occurred in the
Jacksonian period was slowing to a halt, if not signaling
something even more serious. Curtailment of credit, weak-
ened agricultural markets, faltering business activity, unem-
ployment, all were worrisome. To be sure, the problem could
be mainly deflation and necessary readjustment; and perhaps
there would be relief after a short while. But the long-range
situation could be a sustained cyclical depression. 2
Predictably, Whigs blamed the Democrats for their policy
on banks and currency. As Clay charged, "The intelligence
from the South, as to our commercial embarrassments, is
dreadful. The most alarming circumstance is the reduction in
the price of Cotton. That, if it con~inues, must affect every
interest and every part of our Country.
"The measures of Government have beyond all doubt
contributed largely to produce the present calamitous state of
affairs."3
Webster agreed. In an .extensively reported speech in
Manhattan, he reviewed the entire Jacksonian record nega-
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tively and forecast more trouble ahead unless the adminis-
tration promptly applied remedies, particularly assistance to
banks by revoking the Specie Circular. Later the institutions
in the city, citing the scarcity of specie,' suspended redemption
of their notes. Webster's critics complained that his speech
had encouraged a needless step.4
Democrats blamed unsound practices of the banks, princi-
pally Biddle's BUS, for causing the panic. Excessive note
issues in relation to reserves, manipulation of credit for their
political advantage, stimulation of land speculation and of
unwise commercial expansion-these and other mistakes and
abuses, they insisted, had brought on a dangerous, inflated fi-
nancial condition leading to a downward plunge. It was there-
fore the responsibility of those who had created this alarming
dislocation to provide remedies, since the national adminis-
tration was neither culpable nor empowered to intervene.5
Although contemporaries divided along party lines in ex-
plaining causes of the panic, historians later inclined toward
the Whig version. Thus removal of governmental deposits at
the national bank and their transfer to state institutions fed
an overexpansion of credit to business, to land purchasers,
and to unrealistic state internal improvement programs. Mter
1836, in the absence of desirable control by the BUS, a crash
was inevitable. Furthermore, a hard-money antidote was then
unproductive, according to much scholarly literature.6
Although this interpretation was credible, a modern re-
visionist view gained ground. Econometricians analyzed
monetary and price data, from which they concluded that
bank-note issues had more than adequate reserves and that
actually the problem was a sharp contraction of excessive Brit-
ish specie and credit before the cotton crisis of 1837. Because
of pressures at home, England curtailed this source ofAmeri-
can capital, and the impact damaged the general economy,
though never as severely as depicted. Institutions in this coun-
try, in fact, maintained large reserves for their notes in circula-
tion, both before and after announcement of the Specie
Circular. So the international dimension was more important
than Jacksonian policy as a cause of panic and depression,
these researchers concluded. One must accept this corrective,
yet recognize that not everything can be measured quantita-
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tively, that political and psychological elements surely carried
much weight as well.7
Examination of these elements is revealing. State-char-
tered banks, some of them depositories of treasury funds,
show an interesting relation to Jacksonian politics. As the
Bank War progressed in Washington, dissatisfaction with all
financial institutions increased. In states across the country,
concern about their excessive power and various abuses led to
efforts toward stricter regulation. Inflated paper currency pre-
cipitated legislation such as higher reserve requirements for
notes. Entanglement of banks in overextended state internal
improvement programs led to public and private retrench-
ment. Increasingly the movement for hard money to replace
paper strengthened. The next step by an advance guard for
reform was to demand abolition of banks altogether. Mter a
decade or so, the force of these thrusts diminished; neverthe-
less, it left a substantial residue of corporate regulations, par-
ticularly affecting banks.
To some extent, the same pattern obtained at the na-
tional capital. As Jackson beat down Biddle's bank and put
deposits in state banks, the secretary of treasury imposed a
number of rules to assure the safety of federal funds. Then
Congress passed the distribution act, which set forth further
regulations-on the ratio of reserves to deposits and notes, for
example. When the panic hit in spring 1837 and banks sus-
pended specie payment, however, disillusionment with banks
abounded. Much as on the state level, the demand for hard-
money currency was followed by sentiment for separation of
all banks from the government's fiscal operations.8
Such was the direction of Van Buren's thinking as eco-
nomic conditions worsened. Mter the banks suspended specie
payment on their notes, the Treasury was prohibited by the ex-
isting law of 1836 from making deposits in these institutions.
Gradually funds accumulated in the custody of federal offi-
cials, thereby increasing the distinction between private and
public sectors of finance. With this first step, the adminis-
tration moved toward a permanent separation, an independ-
ent treasury. Through May and June, the executive considered
such a plan, which had been floating around for more than
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three years and had even been debated in the House. A clerk in
the Treasury, the antibank radical William Gouge, drafted a
measure for the president to send to Congress. Before doing so,
Van Buren consulted associates and found that some of his
friends were unenthusiastic. Wright, his stalwart leader in the
Senate, had to be swayed from a negative reaction. And Wil-
liam Rives, Nathaniel Tallmadge, and even Taney opposed
abandoning connection with state banks. By midsummer
Wright and some others were brought around, making it pos-
sible to give adoption of an independent treasury high priority
in the work ofthe next congressional session.9
Van Buren had decided he could not wait until the usual
opening date in December. Having called a special session to
meet in September, he sent up a message to Capitol Hill,
reporting on the country's economic problems and recommend-
ing measures to alleviate them. He saw a number of causes of
the present crisis: the abrupt curtailment of British credit
previously extended too far, undue expansion of loans by
American banks, the consequent "overaction in all depart-
ments of business," and reckless speculation, yes also the "lux-
urious habits," of the citizenry. He had nothing good to say
about banks, misusing government deposits and now suspend-
ing specie payment of their notes. The national bank had been
no better. Fortunately, Congress and the electorate had repu-
diated it. It was therefore imperative for the government to
separate its fiscal operations from all banks and rely, as it was
necessarily beginning to do, upon its own officers to maintain
custody of Treasury funds. His only enthusiasm was the prom-
ise he saw in a new policy, soon known as "divorce."
The president asked the legislators to deal with several
other matters, such as issuing Treasury notes to carry on
public business, granting a delay in payment of import duties
by merchants, and discontinuing installments to states under
the deposit act, now that the surplus had disappeared.
If his prescription to relieve hard times seemed too cau-
tious to his opponents, almost a retreat by the people's gov-
ernment at a time of their need, the Fox of Kinderhook would
answer that the best course must be to adhere to proven
Jeffersonian doctrine. National power was strictly limited. It
136 Henry Clay and the American System
must not intervene in the concerns of commerce and agricul-
ture to favor one interest or class against another. "The less
Government interferes with private pursuits," he declared in
Adam Smith's mode, "the better for general prosperity." One
can visualize Senator Clay grimacing when the clerk read
that part of the message.10
The bill that Wright, chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, introduced on September 14, 1837, would enact
Van Buren's recommendation of an independent treasury,
what Clay and fellow Whigs deprecatingly dubbed a "subtreas-
ury" under the thumb of a powerful executive. To check as
many objections as possible, the proposal would not add a layer
of federal appointees but use existing officers to maintain cus-
tody of public funds and disburse them as ordered. Hopefully
this would avoid the appearance of party advantage from new
patronage. The plan would also bypass the highly contro-
versial question of specie or paper currency receivable by the
government. The strategy not to forbid notes of state banks
was a concession to these institutions, which would already be
deprived ofall the federal deposits they presently held.
Then the unpredicted happened. Calhoun announced his
strong support of the bill, despite years of antagonism toward
the president. That assistance came with a price, however, for
the Carolinian offered an amendment gradually requiring
specie payment of all dues to the federal treasury. Wright saw
that the net effect of Calhoun's new-found support could be
negative because of state-bank reaction to rejection of their
paper. The problem had been difficult enough, owing to alien-
ation of some states' righters at the hands of Van Buren, high
priest of states' rights. Benton, at least, was very pleased that
the amended measure could at last put the country on a hard-
money basis, free from bankers' manipulation. ll
The Democratic argument for an independent treasury
rested mainly on dissatisfaction with the role of depository
banks after transfer of funds to them from the BUS. Senators
such as Wright and Buchanan concurred with the chief execu-
tive that the result had been overextension ofcredit and overac-
tion of business generally: It was now necessary to prevent
recurrences by detaching the connection with government. In
effect, they were conceding a failure ofwhat had been called the
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Jacksonian experiment. If this was a sensitive point, the unwel-
come Calhoun amendment against reception of state-bank
notes was also worrisome. Indeed, these party managers ad-
mitted they were accepting the proviso in spite of reservations.12
A middle group of conservative states-rights Democrats
posed a real threat to the administration. One was the able
Virginian William Rives, who sought to rescue state banks
from the damaging impact of an independent treasury. Rives
had been a regular Jacksonian, but now he was entering a
phase of political independence. If he could not preserve the
existing state-bank deposit system, which he ardently wished
to do, he was determined at least to kill Calhoun's utterly un-
workable scheme of exclusive specie payments to the federal
treasury. The New York senator, Nathaniel Tallmadge, shared
Rives's views. It embarrassed Van Buren, since Tallmadge
came from his own county and from a compatible association
with him in ·politics. He represented the interest of powerful
New York banks, influencing the financial condition of the
nation. During the present debate, he criticized the Specie
Circular for driving these banks to suspension of specie pay-
ment of notes, currently a very contentious subject. 13 Would
the Fox in the Executive Mansion, master party chief that he
was, manage to avert a terrible split in the Democracy?
Midway through all the speechmaking, Clay had his
turn. For days he had been uncharacteristically silent, realiz-
ing that his opponents controlled both houses as well as the
executive. Of course, he disliked the proposal. It would es-
tablish two media of exchange, he thought: hard money for
the government and paper money for the people. "We are all-
people, States, Union, banks-bound up and interwoven to-
gether, united in fortune and destiny, and all, all entitled to
the protecting care of parental government," he declared, and
this subtreasury would not provide that care. As for the ad-
ministration of such a system, he found no assurance that it
would be efficient and honest. Federal officials could be influ-
enced to handle funds for personal gain or political advantage
and would probably become autonomous, unreliable banks
themselves.
Lacking the votes, he conceded that he could not succeed
in an attempt to restore the national bank, although such an
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institution was precisely what was needed for recovery. The
sad state of affairs came about, he insisted, because of Jackso-
nian policies-veto of the BUS recharter, removal of deposits,
the Specie Circular, and the pocket veto of the distribution of
land proceeds. He urged a common effort to meet the crisis.
Indicating a willingness to compromise, he even sympathized
with the state banks now under attack and offered support for
Rives's attempt to come to their rescue.14
All the while, petitions for chartering another national
bank continued to arrive, and Wright felt that Clay's speech
provided a good opportunity to demonstrate that a contrary
opinion prevailed-this despite the Kentuckian's remark he
would not then try to get congressional action on the subject.
Wright's motion not to grant the petitioners' request produced
a series ofparliamentary tactics, among them Clay's resolution
that it would be expedient to establish a bank only when a ma-
jority of the people favored it. As the whole Senate well knew,
that body was not minded to set up another such institution.
Clay's resolution failed, twenty-six to fourteen; and Wright's
motion passed, thirty-one to fourteen. 15
After this national-bank interlude Webster spoke on the
Whig side, focusing on the need to provide a uniform currency,
impossible with an independent treasury, he argued. One of
his telling points was a blow to Calhoun, now allied with the
administration and committed to exclusive specie currency.
Webster recalled the circumstances in 1816 when he and the
Carolinian collaborated to pass a resolution to accept either
specie or notes redeemable in specie in payments to the gov-
ernment. And had not Calhoun managed the bill chartering
the national bank? Calhoun weakly replied that he had as-
sumed this responsibility because of pressing problems the
country faced after the War of 1812, without regard to con-
stitutional considerations. Webster's rejoinder underscored
the southerner's title of nullifier, presently denying essential
financial powers. The United States must have a national
credit system, available for transactions of business beyond
the jurisdiction of a single state or the reach of a single bank.
And, he continued, uniformity was needed to support active
use of bills of exchange throughout the economy. The govern-
ment should assure that uniformity, should avoid the pro-
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posed negativism. It was a practical viewpoint, to be sure, if
unlikely to prevail.16
The Senate approved the independent-treasury bill by a
narrow margin, 25-23, and Calhoun's specie amendment even
more narrowly, by one vote. In the House, there was still
greater opposition, because of less effective Democratic lead-
ership and because of speeches moving into the sensitive sub-
ject of slavery, so that it failed, 120-107. Whigs solidly opposed
and were joined by some conservative Democrats.17 This dis-
senting segment of the majority party disliked the threatened
impact upon state banks, which would lose government de-
posits and would find their notes no longer acceptable at the
Treasury. The states-rights president had paid a price in un-
dercutting this wing of his party, and Calhoun's connection
with the bill was not helpful.
In addition to its effort for an independent treasury, the
administration had to address an acute fiscal problem of
shrinking revenue and, needless to say, vanished surplus. This
was a major reason Van Buren called the special session. As
soon as Congress convened, it received a message urging circu-
lation of treasury notes to keep the government operating. The
secretary of treasury recommended notes of a twenty-dollar
minimum denomination bearing no interest. What an oppor-
tunity for the Whigs to jump on the hard-money people! What
an about-face to resort to this kind of paper currency, the oppo-
sition cried! In the Senate, Webster and the Finance Commit-
tee got an amendment raising the minimum to one hundred
dollars and providing interest. Benton naturally liked this con-
servative change, and so did Clay; but the terms of the meas-
ure, as passed, compromised at a fifty-dollar minimum, with
interest. Whatever the details, the Kentuckian would remem-
ber the discussion of this question with more than a little sat-
isfaction.18
Another proposal to help the hard-pressed Treasury
would postpone the fourth quarterly distribution to the states.
Since the government lacked enough surplus, $3 million short
of the necessary $9 million to fulfill its scheduled obligation, it
only made sense to delay or stop this strange operation. Nev-
ertheless, Clay and other partisan Whigs believed the statute
of 1836 had created an obligation to the states, which ought to
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be honored since they had exisiting commitments based upon
receiving the installment. Why not draw upon general funds if
the designated surplus was insufficient, he asked? Congress
did not find that reasoning convincing and approved mere
postponement of distribution, which would become an exten-
sion to the present day.19
Except for this modest success and the authorization to
issue treasury notes, Van Buren's recommendations to allevi-
ate economic difficulties failed adoption. Certainly he got no
help from Clay. A proposal to extend credit to importers of for-
eign goods, he contended, would only hurt American manufac-
turers and violate the compromise tariff.20 A bankruptcy bill to
apply only to banking corporations would be unfair and un-
productive, he thought.21 Though not speaking much on issues
other than the deferred independent treasury, the senator
voted consistently with the opposition.
After the congressional adjournment he concluded that
the president had been cornered, having abandoned both na-
tional-bank and state-bank options with little hope of estab-
lishing his substitute, widely recognized as altogether faulty.
"I do not see he has any thing left but to hang himself," the
senator predicted.22 But such a diagnosis was premature, for
the Fox had three more years to run the race. The president's
opponents also had problems, particularly an obvious lack of
unity about how they would relieve the troubled country.
When Clay took his seat in the Senate for the new session
in December 1837, he listened to a presidential message again
urging approval of an independent-treasury system. Though
Van Buren was determined to prevail on this issue, he at-
tempted to placate pivotal opponents, particularly conserva-
tive states-rights Democrats. His tone was moderate and
deferential, inviting compromise. It would be possible, he said,
to make exceptions for som'e federal deposits in state banks by
"special arrangement."23 Whig gains in recent elections and
evidence of negative public opinion in New York, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and elsewhere influenced this adjustment of
strategy. Insufficient adjustment, thought the senator from
Kentucky: "The Message of today adheres to the Sub treasury
scheme! Nothing more was needed to consummate the over-
throw of the President."24 Nevertheless, that would have to
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wait until the next election, three years away; meanwhile
Clay's option of rechartering the national bank would also
have to be deferred until sentiment for it ripened.
After several weeks of debate, on February 19, 1838,
Clay had the floor to make a major speech, one fully reviewing
the Democratic record. From his first year in office, the Ken-
tuckian charged, Jackson had attacked the BUS in order to
replace it with a government bank under the complete control
of the president. Step by step over eight years, he advanced
toward that objective, so that when Van Buren entered office,
the rationale of an independent treasury had been estab-
lished. The ingredients included separating government and
banks, replacing paper currency with hard money, and curb-
ing privileges of corporations. The new chief executive had de-
clared he was the honored instrument to continue Old
Hickory's policy. Instead of an "instrument," Clay snapped, he
would be a "tool."25
After this long, animated attack upon the adminis-
tration's bill, the senator struck at Calhoun, who maintained
his support of an independent treasury with a provision
gradually requiring payment of all dues to the government in
specie. That in itself rankled Clay, who had lost the
Carolinian's cooperation on banking issues. But worse, Cal-
houn had recently published a letter in a newspaper in Edge-
field, South Carolina, defending his switch back to the
Democratic side and proceeding to slash at Clay's entire
American System. In fact, Calhoun looked back upon the tariff
compromise of 1833 and claimed that his implementation of
nullification had put an end to protectionism. Clay categori-
cally denied such had been the case. As for the southerner's
present inconsistency about parties, the Kentuckian remarked
sarcastically: "He took up his musket, knap sack, and shot-
pouch, and joined the other party. He went, horse, foot, and
dragoon; and he himself composed the whole corps."26
When the Senate voted on passage of the independent-
treasury bill, Calhoun and others supporting the full specie
requirement deserted the administration because that provi-
sion had been abandoned .during debate. Some, Buchanan for
example, opposed the bill in response to opinion back home
despite their own favorable views. Of course, Clay voted nay.
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Even so, the Senate voted to adopt the independent treasury,
27 to 25; but the House again disappointed Van Buren by re-
jecting it, 125 to 111. The disapproval of sixteen conservative
states-rights Democrats in the lower chamber supplied the
margin for defeat there.27
In the next session, the short one ending in March 1839,
the president made another attempt. The economy had wor-
sened after a brief recovery from the panic, and he put an
independent treasury forward as the solution to problems
created by banks. Seemingly, if the government were to con-
trol behavior of these institutions, then it would hardly be
pursuing the earlier goal of separation of public and private fi-
nance. Interestingly, he would now accept Calhoun's proposal
of exclusive specie payments to the treasury. The Senate did
pass the bill by a decided majority, twenty-eight to fifteen, but
the House persisted in its role of spoiler and did not even de-
velop a committee report to consider.28 Addressing large
gatherings in eastern cities through the summer, Clay bore
down on the danger of vast executive power if the adminis-
tration eventually succeeded.29
The country did not have to wait very long to test the
senator's predictions. Several conditions finally allowed enact-
ment of a measure. The deepening depression caused many
people to demand at least something be done for recovery. In
the next session Rives and Tallmadge, the pesky conserva-
tives, were not present. Still more noticeable was the rap-
prochement of Calhoun and Van Buren, highlighted by the
Carolinian's friendly visit at the White House, the first time
in years. Westerners had been courted by the administration's
endorsement of favorable public-land proposals. Furthennore,
five New Jersey Democrats were awarded contested House
seats. The lower chamber had been the main barrier to pas-
sage, but it could now join the Senate in delivering a long-
delayed present to the chief executive. How satisfying it was
to him on the Fourth of July, 1840, when he happily signed
the independent-treasury bill. It was the nation's second Dec-
laration of Independence, he truly believed.30
For Clay that was far from an accurate assessment. He
charged that the destructive Bank War waged by Jacksonians
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had led to a very unwise decision. It sought the impossible by
attempting to abandon paper currency in a modern age relying
upon other media as well as bullion. The government itself
would have to resort to paper in the form of treasury drafts
, and notes. It had destroyed an indispensable national bank. It
concentrated in the executive an unprecedented degree of
power. Just as objectionable was the heartless attitude of the
president, who "deliberately wraps around himself the folds of
his India-rubber cloak, and lifting his umbrella over his head,
tells [the peopleJ, drenched and shivering as they are, under
the beating rain and hail, and snow, falling upon them, that he
means to take care of himself and the official corps, and that
they are in the habit of expecting too much from government
and must look out for their own shelter, and security, and sal-
vation!"31 As for himself, Clay eagerly anticipated a glorious
revolution when the next election would drive these ineffec-
tual incumbents out.
One of the highest priorities when that day arrived, he
thought, would be chartering a national bank. With prospects
for congressional approval at this time so poor, indeed nonex-
istent, it would be fruitless to attempt anything before clear
popular approval in a national election. Meanwhile, he inter-
jected comments to this effect during discussions of an inde-
pendent treasury. Toward the end, more and more petitions
for a bank arrived at the Capitol; and as he presented them,
he repeated his position.32 He maintained a friendly corre-
spondence with Nicholas Biddle, who naturally hoped that
Clay would manage to revive the BUS. For his part, Biddle
lobbied the Pennsylvania legislature to instruct Buchanan to
vote against an independent treasury in the Senate.33
If Clay could have followed his personal preferences, he
would have been pleased to revive the old bank with Biddle at
the helm; but that was not the case. However much he con-
demned the Jacksonian assault upon the institution, the
years of bank politics could not be ignored. The Kentuckian
knew he would have to make adjustments in light of that his-
tory when the opportunity to act arrived. Earlier, in May
1838, while presenting a batch of petitions, he had sketched
some possible features of a new institution. The capital stock
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should be raised to $50 million from $35 million, subscribed
by states in addition to the national government and individu-
als. He mentioned several other departures from the old char-
ter, particularly to regulate credit and exchange functions
more strictly and to require a greater degree of disclosure to
the public. He dismissed all constitutional objections as no
longer open to question. 34
At present the whole question was abstract. The only
banks on the scene were state chartered (even the old BUS),
many of them depository pets. Despite his preference for a na-
tional bank, Clay had suggested to Tallmadge that he might be
willing to "make a full and fair experiment" with these institu-
tions. One has to discount such a remark as. political maneuver.
He could not have been seriously interested in a state-bank
"experiment," a Jacksonian term he had often ridiculed.35
Bank problems almost always involved currency, which
was true now. Mter the onset of the panic in spring 1837, all
institutions stopped redeeming their notes in specie. Among
the first to suspend were the New York banks. By state law
they had to resume specie redemption ofnotes within one year,
a deadline ofMay 1838, and they did so. Other banks followed,
but the BUS held back. Biddle decided to use resumption as a
lever on the government to revoke the Specie Circular and
thus allow bank notes for land purchases. He delayed also in
order to block passage of the independent-treasury bill then
pending in Congress, obviously to promote a BUS recharter.36
To assist Biddle as well as to restore the pre-panic system of
paper currency on its own merits, Clay introduced a resolution
in 1838 to receive paper redeemable in specie as well as specie
itself for all dues to the Treasury. Concurrently Webster at-
tempted much the same thing, though he felt that the Ken-
tuckian had unfairly preempted him. In any event, Congress
approved Clay's resolution, repealing the Specie Circular by a
large margin.37 The outcome was a recognition of the need for
both types of currency, but it did not advance the cause of the
old national bank as Biddle had wished.
Although issues of public finance received the greatest atten-
tion in the late 1830s, another significant question involved
land legislation. It was a time of heavy migration into the Mis-
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sissippi Valley, of settling a broad territory where land was
cheap and plentiful. While liberal terms of purchase had re-
flected a steady trend ofgovernmental policies since the begin-
ning of the century, political pressures aimed at an ever more
generous system. The gathering depression had stopped a land
boom and spurred sentiment for helping this economic sector.
In his first message to Congress in 1837, Van Buren
made some cautious recommendations, which could also at-
tract western votes on other questions, such as the independ-
ent treasury. Like Benton, who had focused on the matter for
years, the president endorsed graduation, a scheduled reduc-
tion of prices of unsold land, but he wished for it to be based
on actual value, not length of time after the first offering for
sale. He also favored a permanent preemption law, much
broader than previous temporary measures, to give extralegal
settlers a prior right of obtaining land at the minimum price.38
There were additional options, carried over from earlier con-
sideration: federal cession or nominal sale of land to the states
(now embraced by Calhoun, courting western support) and, of
course, Clay's favorite formula of distributing land proceeds to
states for internal improvements or other programs. At each
congressional session in the four Van Buren years, these
possibilities were extensively explored.
In the Senate Clay fought a defensive battle against low-
ering prices in graduation bills. Repeatedly he contended that
existing terms of sale were eminently fair (a minimum of $1.25
per acre) and need not be reduced to give-away levels. The
public domain belonged to the whole Union, to the older states
as well as the new, toward which this plan tilted, he insisted.
The term "waste land," often applied to unsold tracts, was in-
accurate, for sales of these valuable parcels proceeded as rap-
idly as reasonable development required. If the government
reduced the price to as little as $.25 per acre, it would wrongly
donate a national treasure. When his arguments seemed hope-
less, he tried to postpone action until a new Congress would
better register popular opinion. Nevertheless, his opponents
made headway in picturing him as hostile to deserving fron-
tiersmen while shielding speculation by well-to-do entrepre-
neurs. In votes in three consecutive sessions, the Senate
approved graduation; yet the House disagreed.39
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Concurrently, Congress discussed and passed preemption
bills. Whereas unauthorized occupancy of public land had been
a trespass under an early statute, Congress had condoned,
indeed encouraged it in legislation from 1830 onward, covering
only previous settlement and in force for only two years. But in
the late thirties there were strong efforts to adopt a permanent
and not merely retroactive measure. Proponents, particularly
Benton, Robert Walker, and Clement Clay, advocated the
policy as a constructive strategy to develop new areas, to pro-
vide opportunity for people in sore circumstances, and even to
prevent speculators from dominating the business at govern-
ment land offices.40
In opposition to these Democratic leaders, many Whigs,
Clay included, objected that such a preemption policy encour-
aged fraud, intimidation, and false paper work. Besides, it de-
prived the Treasury ofbadly needed revenue during these hard
times. Clay attacked preemption with extraordinary vigor
during the session of 1838, citing statistics and specific in-
stances to show flagrant abuses it had allowed. The substance
of his argument resembled that against graduation, but his
tone had escalated. Naturally the other side responded in kind
and later liked to attribute an offensive viciousness to his re-
marks on the subject.41
Notwithstanding a good bit of truth in his emphasis upon
wholesale abuses in the administration ofpreemption, as there
would be generally in the history of the public domain, he was
in the minority when retroactive laws of two years' duration
passed in 1838 and 1840. He was disappointed that his fellow
Whig Webster went for preemption and other relaxed policies.
More than that, Clay was mortified to see that his own vote
was a solitary negative among western senators.42
Though making no progress in his adherence to distri-
bution of land proceeds to the states, he felt the times de-
manded that policy. The depression had badly weakened their
financial condition, the more so because many of them were
greatly overcommitted after marketing huge bond issues in
England for enthusiastic programs of internal improvements.
By 1839 Clay's colleague John Crittenden unsuccessfully intro-
duced a measure in the Senate for distributing land revenue to
assist them to meet these obligations. Some Whig newspapers
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supported this idea. And in travel to England late that year,
Webster was listening to his long-standing legal clients at the
banking House ofBarings, as they sought cooperation from the
national government for payment of the state debts. Webster
did agree to issue a statement assuring creditors that the
states must and would honor their obligations, although he did
not recommend national assumption of those debts. Neither
did Clay nor other congressional Whigs, despite approving in-
direct help by way of distribution. Democrats made some po-
litical capital out of characterizing federal intervention as
improper and unconstitutional but never had to cope with an
explicit proposal to intervene.43
When the senator looked back on Van Buren's presidential
term, he could find very little to approve. It seemed a true ex-
tension of the Jacksonian precedents that had put this nation
on a deplorable economic and political course: wreckage of a
working banking system, wild ideas about credit and currency,
cramped notions of the scope and responsibilities of govern-
ment, rejection of positive policies for improved transportation
and land use, and an altogether cynical attitude toward the
citizenry suffering from a deep depression. Whether this esti-
mate of his opponents was largely biased by partisanship is, of
course, a perfectly legitimate question. But at least these were
the views that would now influence Clay and his party in the
coming election of 1840 and, it seemed likely, in the changing of
the guard afterward.
10
Log Cabin
L ate in 1839 politicians were thinking seriously about thenext presidential election, then only a year away. As a key
figure in the coming contest, sure of Democratic renomina-
tion, Van Buren still had every reason to worry about the
outcome. From the very beginning of his term, he had encoun-
tered endless problems, most of them rising out of the troub-
led economy. The financial panic, spreading across the land
soon after his inauguration, had eased in the following year
but then had led into a nasty depression. Despite his com-
mitment to states' rights, the chief executive had alienated
even fellow Democratic states' righters by his relentless pur-
suit of an independent treasury and other measures at the ex-
pense of state banks. And hard times had alienated many
others whose economic plight was apparently beyond the
president's power or willingness to relieve. Though known for
his political magic, he seemed only to be defending against a
mounting siege. Buoyed by victories in recent state elections,
including a sweep of the Northeast, Whigs projected un-
bounded confidence that 1840 would mark the end ofJackson-
ian dominance in national affairs.1
No one felt more certain that would happen than Clay.
Architect in his party's formation, skillful legislative strate-
gist, and the voice of Whig tenets, he fully expected the na-
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tional convention, scheduled for December 1839, to nominate
him by acclamation. To ensure party harmony he had moved
somewhat toward the center on economic issues. While
staunchly opposing an independent treasury, he advocated a
national bank, but a substantially modified version of the old
BUS to remove objections. A firm believer in a protective tariff,
he would not touch the compromise of 1833, at least not for
three years, until rates reverted to 20 percent or less. And just
as he had long urged, he would finance internal improvements
by distributing land proceeds to the states. In a general call to
arms, he would emphasize the danger to liberty of executive
power at the expense of that held by the people's representa-
tives in Congress.
More than any other potential Whig candidate, Clay
could count on support across the South. One reason was his
moderation on economic issues, especially adherence to the
tariff compromise, but also advocacy of state administration of
internal improvements. On slavery, too, he seemed to this sec-
tion to be safe. Was he not a slaveholder himself, and had he
not recently taken a conservative position concerning aspects
of slavery during a protracted exchange with Calhoun at the
Capitol?2 The Kentuckian was pleased as well to have an early
endorsement by Hugh White, the former Jacksonian who had
been the principal southern Whig candidate in the last elec-
tion. White shared Clay's antipathy toward an independent
treasury; he had even resigned his Senate seat to· avoid com-
plying with instructions of the Tennessee legislature to vote
for it.3
Logically, Clay should have had solid approval by the
Northeast, the part of the country that stood to benefit so much
from his American System. It was not turning out that way. In
New York the editor-organizer Thurlow Weed decided Clay had
accumulated too many handicaps for vote· getting and was
backing General Winfield Scott. In Pennsylvania another tac-
tician, Thad Stevens, had come to the same conclusion about
Clay's chances and was promoting another general, William
Henry Harrison, who had shown a great deal of strength in the
campaign of 1836. In New Jersey the senator would lose to
Scott, and in Massachusetts there was his rival Webster, who
would go for Harrison if he could not get the nomination him-
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self. What the Northeast revealed was a great deal of instabil-
ity of opinion, vulnerable to noneconomic appeals and a good
bit ofmanipulation by the politicos.4
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, Clay seemed to
have the votes for nomination by the Whig convention in De-
cember 1839. Then Weed and Stevens engineered procedural
changes to sidestep straight majority balloting by the dele-
gates. The three-cornered contest ended with a decision for
Harrison, victimizing poor Clay. For appearances and for party
success, he pledged his support of old Tippecanoe, as he was
known because of his encounter with Tecumseh's Indians
along Tippecanoe Creek in the Wabash Valley years ago. 5
At the time and in later historiography, the election of
1840 was seen as one of campaign emotionalism and evasion
of substantial issues. Pictured as an honest, rough-hewn hero
of the West, the Whigs' version of Andrew Jackson, Harrison
would stay in a log cabin at North Bend, Ohio, drink his cider,
and remain above partisan politics. It is true that this cam-
paign had these characteristics to some extent. Tippecanoe
owed his nomination to a belief that Clay and other prominent
figures had accumulated a record on specific matters that
were negative factors automatically.6 And the old soldier did
avoid concrete statements, as party leaders directed. When he
spoke out, his message was unclear. He hardly sounded like a
Whig when, among some remarks at Fort Meigs in June, he
emphasized that he had been a strict-constructionist Jeffer-
sonian Republican in his early Virginia days. 7 At Dayton in
September he referred cautiously to chartering a national
bank. "There is not in the Constitution an express grant of
power for such purpose," he declared; and he would not sign a
bill for one unless a majority of the people thought it essential
to collect revenue. 8 Did popular demand determine constitu-
tionality?
Granted that the candidate, known in some quarters as
General Mum, neither discussed problems and plans mean-
ingfully nor made frequent public appearances. Granted there
was plenty of hoopla at barbecues and parades. A careful look
at activity of other Whig and Democratic leaders, however,
can provide a different view of the election. For example, Clay
thought it was a mistake for the national convention not to
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have issued a statement of principles. He did remark that
"unless you are fully convinced that what you mean to say is
right," it is best to remain silent, "and in this instance I do not
wish to depart from the rule."9 And it is true that he had mod-
erated his positions on economic nationalism to fit current
conditions. But it is also a fact that he supplied his own state-
ment of principles, skirted by the convention, in the course of
the campaign.10
In summer 1839 before the convention met, he had trav-
eled from Buffalo through upper New York into Canada and
down the East Coast, speaking at many places along the way
about economic policies he would pursue. ll In June 1840, after
a quiet period, he had visited his native Hanover County, Vir-
ginia, where he fully discussed these subjects, generally to re-
iterate what he had very often said in the Senate-he could
not conceal the record anyway.12 Near the close of electioneer-
ing, he invaded Jackson's home territory, Nashville, to veer off
to personal thrusts at Old Hickory, who characteristically re-
plied in kind.13
In the Virginia speech, though conceding that sound
state banks might supply the nation's need for a reliable cur-
rency, he left no doubt, on both constitutional and political
grounds, that a national bank was far preferable. Certainly
an independent treasury must be avoided, he contended,
particularly because it would be subservient to executive will.
"Fellow citizens, there is one divorce urgently demanded by
the safety and the highest interests of the country-a divorce
of the President from the treasury of the United States."14 As
for the tariff, he· adhered to a protective system, obtainable
under the compromise of 1833, he believed. On land policy, he
stayed with his congressional position for distribution as op-
posed to graduation or cession to the states, both unfairly dis-
criminating against the older members of the Union. So he
neither retreated from established views nor sought to ob-
scure them with hazy generalities.
Admittedly, the Kentuckian was not constantly busy cam-
paigning, perhaps because ofwounded feelings about being un-
fairly denied the nomination. Actually, the other Whig giant,
Webster, devoted more time and energy to the cause. He had
backed selection of Harrison after being passed over himself
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and was quite aroused about defeating Van Buren. He helped
organize an immense gathering in Boston, perhaps as many as
fifty thousand, and reached many ofthem assembled at Bunker
Hill with his powerful voice. He traveled through New England
and the middle Atlantic states, paying special attention shortly
before the election to the New York area, from Wall Street over
to Long Island. Here he had a sharp exchange with Van Buren's
legislative leader Silas Wright. The two of them did lapse into
some petty byplay, but they confronted the issues, especially fi-
nancial policy, just as they had on the floor ofthe Senate.15
When electoral votes were counted, Harrison had over-
whelmed Van Buren, 234 to 60. One reason for the victory, to
be sure, was the Whigs' effective use of log cabin tactics, pio-
neered by the Democrats before them. But it is safe to say
that the winners'largest asset was the poor condition of the
economy, naturally blamed on the incumbent administration.
And the skill with which they did it involved substantial argu-
ment for alternative policies as well as excitement of the
crowd.
During the three-month meeting of the old Congress, be-
ginning in December 1840 and ending with Harrison's inau-
guration, Clay returned to center stage. He did not yet have
the newly elected majority in place and so could not move
very far on a program. Perhaps the mere fact of a sweeping
Whig victory might help a little, but he would use this period
mainly to demonstrate things to come. Mter a dozen frustrat-
ing years of Jacksonian ascendancy, he was in no mood to be
patient and forgiving, so much so that his opponents found
him downright dictatorial.
In this spirit he brought in a resolution to repeal the
fresh independent-treasury law, which had been the center-
piece of the outgoing administration's financial system. The
people had unmistakably spoken, Clay declared, and he was
surprised that the Democrats, for all their popular rhetoric,
had not themselves called for repeal forthwith. Peculiar rea-
soning, thought Wright, coming from a party that had unfail-
ingly avoided discussion of substantive issues during its log
cabin frolic. Though the Senate soon tabled the resolution for
repeal, Clay was fashioning a strategy to put through a na-
tional-bank charter. 16 That it ought to be a prime objective he
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had no doubt. "Without a Bank," he believed, "the new vessel
of State will be thrown on the same Rock which was fatal to
the old one."17 His first step was to present a resolution by the
Kentucky legislature that such an institution was indispens-
able. ls Then in a Whig caucus, he got agreement on the ne-
cessity of a national bank.19
While Democrats were on the defensive against Clay's in-
itiative to kill the Independent Treasury, they countered ag-
gressively with a land preemption bill similar to those often
debated but not passed previously. They were making a seri-
ous attempt finally to obtain a permanent instead of a tempo-
rary, limited measure permitting occupants of public land to
buy it at minimum price without regard to auction. In doing
so, they portrayed Whigs as insincere friends of log cabin folk.
That was the way Benton characterized them when he intro-
duced the bill. Indeed, the Missourian charged, Clay's side
was more solicitous of British creditors by favoring national
assumption of state debts to them or perhaps retirement of
these obligations by distributing land proceeds. As usual,
Benton urged attaching a graduation clause to the preemp-
tion proposal.20 Calhoun, too, would add his favorite amend-
ment for ceding public lands to the states and sharing
revenue from sales with them.21
Clay took the lead in combatting preemption, still a very
unattractive, unworkable notion in his view. This was not a
time to deprive the empty Treasury of vital revenue, he con-
tended. He was unimpressed by Democratic claims that with
land currently going at auction for only a few cents an acre
above the minimum of $1.25 (the price under preemption)
there would be- little reduction in revenue. If you also adopt
Benton's graduation, you will lose still more of the national
treasure, he warned. But most objectionable were the inevi-
table frauds committed by preemptioners at the land offices,
an inescapable result of a lax system.22
He could see, however, that he lacked the votes to reject
the bill outright. So he and his reliable colleague John Crit-
tenden resorted to the strategy of moving amendments. One,
to prohibit preemption rights to aliens, was disapproved deci-
sively.23 Another, to bar non-whites, passed nearly unani-
mously, to his satisfaction.24 The most important amendment
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was distribution of land proceeds to the states, which the
Democrats condemned with customary zeal on financial and
constitutional grounds. Defeated again, distribution retained
a central position on his agenda for the new administration.
As for preemption itself, the Democrats in the Senate picked
up fourteen Whig votes to pass it, thirty-one to nineteen.
Though the House tabled the bill on the last day of the ses-
sion, friends of that policy felt encouraged.25
If Clay could get a provision for distribution, he believed
that would be all that the national government needed to do
about internal improvements. Despite the criticism directed
against the short-lived deposit act of 1836, distributing sur-
plus funds for several months, he still seemed satisfied with
that formula instead of outright federal expenditures and ad-
ministration ofprojects.26 Now when measures, such as appro-
priations for extending the National Road, were reported to
the floor, he was reluctant to vote for them unless they would
be financed by distribution. He wanted internal improve-
ments and had often defended the constitutionality of federal
help, but he had concluded that a system benefiting all states
equitably was necessary. And he left no doubt that generous
support for some states in the past, Ohio for instance, and less
for others, Kentucky for instance, affected his opinion.27
In looking ahead to the new Whig presidency, Clay felt
certain that another leading issue would involve revision of
the tariff. Although nothing much could be done about it now,
he wished to gather information on the subject for an exten-
sive debate, which was certain to arise. So he presented a
resolution, which was approved, asking Secretary of Treasury
Levi Woodbury to submit a plan for a "permanent" tariff. 28
The compromise of 1833 had called for a huge reduction to a
maximum of 20 percent on all rates over that level. This ad-
justment was to take place during the coming year, by July
1842. It did not prohibit further legislation, though a widely
held view interpreted the compromise as nearly sacrosanct
and as essential to preserve harmony in the Union.
Off and on, there had been forays into this hazardous
thicket to change the schedule ahead of time. Wright, Benton,
and some other Jacksonians did not believe the compromise
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was untouchable; they had attempted reductions on salt, coal,
and woolens. They targeted other items then below 20 percent
because, it was argued, the compact allowed adjustments on
them. Clay invariably fought off attempts as contrary to its
spirit and letter. At first he had the assistance of Calhoun,
who, of course, wished to preserve the downward course of
rates under the compromise. Beginning in the midthirties,
however, the Carolinian advocated lowering some rates im-
mediately.29
Clay's ability to translate his thinking about economic
policies into action depended, of course, on his relationship to
President Harrison after March 4, 1841. For a while following
the election he believed there would be no difficulty about
that, for he and Tip had been on very good terms over the
years, not only in the West but at the Capitol, where Harrison
had served in both the House and the Senate. In politics the
general had supported the American System, and in personal
relations he was a warm friend and admirer of the Kentuck-
ian, who had helped him in political and military situations.
Soon after the election, when he started preparing to assume
office and was traveling in Kentucky, Harrison spent several
days visiting the senator at Lexington. The two had long con-
versations concerning issues and appointments. Clay had no
interest in a cabinet post, and indeed recommended Webster
for the State Department. He would later be pleased that
some of his friends would also be chosen. Though not his first
recommendation, Thomas Ewing, a fellow economic national-
ist, would go to the Treasury; John Bell, a dependable Whig,
to become secretary of war; and Crittenden, his closest ally,
would be attorney general. As for the views of the president-
elect on measures, Clay remarked he was "happy to find him
coinciding with those which I entertained."30
Harrison's inaugural address in March 1841 assured the
senator all was well. It rejected an exclusive hard-money cur-
rency and pledged to leave questions of public finance to Con-
gress, amounting to approval of a national-bank bill. In
general, it affirmed the Whig doctrine of executive deference
to the legislative branch, including restraint of the veto
power.31
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Despite all these positive signs, Clay had worried for some
time that there could be problems. Soon after their meeting at
Ashland, he wrote: "I must observe that, notwithstanding pro-
fessions of the most ardent attachment to me by Harrison,
circumstances have transpired which confirm an opinion 1
have long since formed, that he is apprehensive that the new
Administration may not be regarded as his but mine. Artful
men for sinister purposes will endeavor to foster this jealousy.
And to preserve my utility, 1 must avoid giving it any counte-
nance."32 Though most presidential appointments seemed
quite satisfactory, he had failed in a strong effort to put his
friend John Clayton instead of Ewing in the Treasury. It was a
foolish move, for both were party men of Clay's persuasion and
well qualified. And he had become very upset when, in face of
his repeated complaints, Harrison had adhered to his nomi-
nation of Edward Curtis, a prominent opponent of the Ken-
tuckian, as collector ofNew York port.33
Another annoyance developed out of Clay's insistence
that a special session of Congress be called immediately to
launch the new program. Well before the chief executive had
taken his oath, Clay had told a Whig caucus in the Senate
that an early meeting was imperative, and the caucus had so
voted. When some days passed after Harrison took over with-
out issuing a call, Clay sent him a reminder, with an enclosed
draft the president might use. The response was a mild repri-
mand, saying that the senator was too impetuous, that first
other circumstances had to be considered and other persons
consulted. This was not a bold declaration of independence or
a serioy.s·rift, as depicted in historical accounts, and it post-
poned ~onvokingCongress hardly at all. Four days later, Har-
rison announced the special session for May 31.34
He did not live to see it, for he died on April 4 after a
short illness. Unexpectedly, Clay and his triumphant party
now had to work with John Tyler, whose willingness to follow
their agenda remained to be tested. The former vice president
was a well-known states-rights Virginian, an aristocratic con-
servative Whig. Earlier an anti-BUS Jacksonian, he had left
the Democratic party because of what he viewed as Old Hick-
ory's executive high-handedness in removing deposits from
the national bank. His ideological position was closer to that
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of Calhoun than of Clay, as he would soon demonstrate.
Withal, he had been friendly toward Clay and had admired
him for his defense of the Union by fashioning the compro-
mise of 1833.
After taking the presidential oath, Tyler issued an ad-
dress in which he said he would approve any constitutional
measure passed by Congress. He would "resort to the fathers
of the great republican school for advice and instruction," he
explained. That could mean he would consult either Madison's
opposition to a national bank in 1791 or Madison's approval of
one in 1816. In any case, he left no doubt that he wanted the
Independent Treasury repealed.35 At Ashland, not yet having
read this statement, Clay was wary of what course Tyler
would take: "I believe-I should rather say, hope that he will
interpose no obstacle to the success of the Whig measures."36
As he thought of the possibilities, the Kentuckian speculated
that the new president would feel obligated to observe the
party's principles because of the circumstances of his succeed-
ing to office. Certainly so, if he expected to be elected later in
his own right.37 But in an exchange of letters with Tyler, he
found him negatively inclined on the bank question. "I would
not have it urgd prematurely," the chief executive declared. "I
have no intention to submit any thing to Congress on this
subject to be acted on."38 Privately, he expressed an interest in
a bank with states only as shareholders, an institution much
different from the old BUS.39
No matter what Tyler's model might be, Clay did not
change his own thinking. He had outlined a plan very similar
to that which he had set forth in the Senate during the debates
on the Independent Treasury.40 It was a revised version of
Biddle's bank. He asked Ewing to draw up such a proposal,
and the secretary of treasury hesitantly agreed to do so, saying
he thought Tyler would probably concur with a congressional
decision.41
On other subjects the senator had a well-defined agenda.
He would not change the tariff more than revenue needs re-
quired and would, stay within the terms of the compromise of
1833.42 As usual, he gave priority to land policy, which should
be improved by distribution. Fortunately, Tyler was on record
in favor of some such legislation about it.
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On the eve of the special session Clay had "strong hopes,
not, however, unmixed with fears. If the Executive will cor-
dially co-operate in carrying out the Whig measures, all will
be well. Otherwise every thing is at hazard."43
11
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When Congress assembled for a critical special session onMay 31, 1841, Clay was the most visible figure in the
Senate chamber, probably in all of Washington not excepting
the "accidental" president, John Tyler. He had a modest ma-
jority of followers in both houses and a key position as chair-
man of both the Finance Committee and a select committee to
handle banking and currency affairs. Typically, he had pre-
pared a series of resolutions as a legislative agenda and pre-
sented them within a week. Heading his list was abolition of
the Independent Treasury, an item of old business he had not
completed in.the last Congress. As a replacement, he called for
a national bank. Then he urged revision of the tariff, if more
revenue was needed, and distribution of land proceeds.!
Now that he had the votes, he made short work of getting
rid ofwhat he called the subtreasury. The matter had been suf-
ficiently discussed, he announced, and senators should be pre-
pared for the yeas and nays. Nevertheless, there were some
flourishes, chiefly to justify Van Buren's policy. While the
upper house was attending to this matter, it also decided to
repeal the Deposit Act of 1836, regulating state banks and, in
better times, distributing the short-lived surplus, all of which
made a national bank more necessary, as Clay unhesitatingly
pointed out.2
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What did Tyler recommend? In his message to Congress,
he had plainly rejected other options, an independent treas-
ury and state-bank depositories, which he declared had such
horrible records. Yet he was quite vague about the sort of na-
tional bank he wanted. In fact, he referred to a "fiscal agent"
mainly to perform services for the Treasury. What he did not
want was a copy of the BUS, considering it just as bad as the
two recent experiments. And he did not conceal his well-
known support of Jackson's veto of recharter years ago. For
the time being, he would leave it to Congress to solve the
problem, but he would only accept an institution free of
constitutional objections (his own, of course).3
In another resolution Clay formally requested Secretary
of Treasury Ewing to submit a bank plan, which he had al-
ready sought personallY,and the cabinet officer therefore pro-
duced one in a few days, on June 12. His recommendation
reflected an accommodation by an economic nationalist to
Tyler's strict constructionism, though it appears the two of-
ficials did not communicate clearly with each other. This
shortcoming in the executive branch would reappear in the
following weeks. He proposed locating the bank's head-
quarters in the District of Columbia, where Congress had un-
doubted jurisdiction, and authorizing branch offices of deposit
and discount only in states consenting to entry.4
Clay could not have been surprised when he read
Ewing's communication, for he had had warnings of Tyler's
dislike of what was called an old-fashioned institution. Com-
menting on the president's preferences as expressed in the
secretary's plan, he exclaimed, "What a Bank would that be!"5
Mter several meetings of a cooperative Whig caucus and of
the select committee, the senator reported a counterproposal:
return to a BUS model, and do not require state approval for
locating branches.6
William Rives supported his fellow Virginian in the
White House by moving to add Ewing's proviso for prior state
consent to branching, so that he and the Kentuckian were the
principal advocates of two different formulas around which
the first phase of debate revolved. Clay pressed ahead by op-
posing Rives's concession to the president and easily prevailed
in this first test of strength.7 Then one of his committee mem-
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bers, Richard Bayard of Delaware, offered another choice, not
widely noticed but later quite important. He favored the Rives
amendment, but he would alter it by allowing the bank to es-
tablish branches if states did not disapprove during the next
meeting of their legislatures. So mere state silence would
amount to approval· and was more generous toward the bank.
The Senate did not act on Bayard's proposal at this point.8
By early July, despite his satisfaction with the outcome of
his skirmish with Rives, Clay was upset by slow progress.
Day after day, his Democratic opponents presented amend-
ments to his bill, all for stricter limits on the institution. His
irritation and rigidity caused senators to call him a dictator.
When he proposed a rule to expedite discussion, he said, "If
the clerk will follow me, I will dictate a modification, though I
do not like to be a dictator in any sense." Buchanan inter-
jected, "You do it so well, you ought to like it."9 No one was
more offended by the Kentuckian than Calhoun, who charged
him with riding a hobby horse, the worn-out BUS.1O At one
point, Clay lashed Rufus Choate of Massachusetts, Webster's
friend. and successor in the Senate, for predicting defeat and
implying a presidential veto if the present version was
adopted. How did the New Englander know this, demanded
Clay? Obviously he understood Choate was in close touch
with Webster and therefore the president. Like the secretary
of state, Choate put aside his Whig orthodoxy in order to
make essential concessions and stoutly refused to explain his
source of information.11
For his part, Clay had not been playing his familiar role
of compromiser, voted nay to amendments repeatedly, and in
nearly every instance quashed them. His opponents would
have required reporting more information on the bank's oper-
ations, even concerning individuals' stock holdings and loans.
Members of Congress, bank directors, and aliens would be re-
stricted or prohibited in certain relations to the institution.
And reflecting recent trouble about redemption of notes, these
amendments would have invoked penalties for suspension of
specie payment, in extreme circumstances forfeiture of the
corporate charter.12
Finally on July 27, Clay pushed the bill through with few
revisions, twenty-five to twenty-four, far short of the two-
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thirds necessary to override a veto, which he was convinced
would follow passage. The stickler, he thought, was the provi-
sion on unlimited branching power, against which Tyler was
immovably arrayed. So now the Kentuckian began to explore
an alternative, the earlier amendment proposed by Bayard of
his committee to allow branching unless a state disapproved
at its next legislative session.13 It had lain dormant with no
vote for a while, but now it seemed acceptable to the president
according to Virginia congressman John Botts, who had shown
Tyler a copy and relayed a mistaken favorable impression.14
Clay had also been drawing upon the advice of his trusted po-
litical friend Peter Porter in searching for some common
ground with critics. Porter promoted an adjusted plan in New
York and among southern Whigs. 15 Soon Clay got the Senate's
acceptance of the Bayard-Botts formula on branching, which
also had a probank clause permitting Congress to negate a
state's dissent to branching. That stipulation had been de-
bated off and on but could be the most important feature of all
for nationalists. The House concurred on August 6.16
Tyler took the allowed ten days to consider his decision
on signature. Meanwhile Webster, Ewing, Crittenden, and
other cabinet members urged him to approve Clay's bill. More
influential were several states-rights supporters, notably
Representative Henry Wise ofVirginia, who had an ugly argu-
ment with the Whig leader about a bank at the beginning of
the session. Another intimate adviser was Professor Nathaniel
Beverley Tucker of William and Mary College, once on quite
friendly terms with Clay. These persons helped convince the
president that the bank plan was altogether dangerous and
that the Kentuckian wanted nothing better than to evict Tyler
from power. While the chief executive delayed, his disapproval
of Clay's position intensified.17
Tyler returned the bill with his objections on August 16.
Contrary to what Botts had reported to Clay, yet predictable,
his view of the branching provision was negative. He thought
the decision whether to admit a branch by a state legislature
at its first meeting after the law's passage might not correctly
register popular opinion because of the timing of state elec-
tions, the bicameral character of the body, and other compli-
cating factors. Though the president's reasoning was rather
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finespun, the procedure that Clay had offered would probably
have been clumsy and ineffective. A more straightforward
question that Tyler answered negatively was whether Con-
gress should establish a branch it found to be "necessary· and
proper," in spite of a state's rejection. This clause would have
been a strong centralizing feature. Still another presidential
objection pointed to the proposed function of making loans and
discounting debtors' notes. Here Clay could reasonably com-
plain that Tyler had not previously made his views clear. While
he had focused on branching, he had not addressed the matter
of discounting, basic to operations of a bank. He had not asked
Secretary Ewing to eliminate his reference to discounting in
the original report to Congress, and it had not been seriously
challenged afterward but now became a principal issue, more
so than branching. Tyler attributed many abuses of the old
BUS to the process ofdiscounting in credit operations.18
When the clerk read the veto message aloud to the
Senate, there was commotion by spectators in the gallery,
some of it hissing and groans. As he had done before in such
situations, Benton immediately rose and demanded the "ruf-
fians" be evicted. His colleagues thought he was exaggerating
the problem and pacified the Missourian without punitive
action against the protesters. Would that the broader, long-
range political impact might also have been smoothed over.19
Reaction of Whigs to the veto was mixed. Many of them
complained that after Tyler's unforeseen accession to the presi-
dency he had thwarted the voters' will on a basic party posi-
tion. To have been honest, he should have declined the vice
presidential nomination if he disagreed with the restoration of
a national bank.20 Still, there were exceptions within the party
to this opinion. In the cabinet, despite great disappointment,
no member decided to resign. Webster wanted a bank as much
as anybody, but he had sought accommodation by Congress
and the White House and continued to do so. As a major figure,
Ewing favored another attempt. Crittenden urged Clay to
scale down his model of a bank. Make no provision for dis-
counting, he advised, and limit the institution to exchange op-
erations, which Tyler would accept. Furthermore, this change
might encourage him to approve a liberal basis of branching.
Maintain harmony now and revise the system later.21 Sur-
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prisingly, William Seward and Thurlow Weed, leaders of the
powerful organization in New York, wanted a compromise. So
did the young editor of the Tribune, Horace Greeley.22
First, the Senate discussed the veto and voted whether to
override it. On August 19 these animated speeches ran for
several hours with an aroused Clay the center of attention.
Having had time to organize his thoughts, he made a carefully
prepared, vigorous argument against the chief executive's rea-
soning. The tone was severe.23
He recalled recent events and circumstances: Tyler's suc-
cession to office, his early commitment to approve any consti-
tutional measure on banking, his intention to follow
instruction of the "fathers of the republican school," the con-
gressional concessions to him on location of a bank's head-
quarters in Washington and especially on state authority over
admission of branches, then his wholly unjustified veto and
professed adherence to conscience and duty.
As for the constitutional question, Clay saw no truth in
the president's assertion that there had been nearly as many
negative as positive precedents. Every president from Wash-
ington onward had recognized the validity of a national bank,
the senator said. Though Jefferson as secretary of state dis-
puted the power to create the first BUS, during his own ad-
ministration he signed legislation supporting its operation.
Madison, too, opposed chartering the institution in 1791 but
later recommended chartering the second BUS. Even Jackson
thought some kind of bank, if not Biddle's model, was consti-
tutional. Congress and the Supreme Court had repeatedly af-
firmed it as well.
Commenting on Tyler's objection to the provision on state
disapproval of branches, Clay emphasized his effort to accom-
modate the president's wishes instead of leaving full discre-
tion to the bank or to Congress. All to no effect, for after Tyler
had assented to the compromise, he vetoed his own bill. Just
as deplorable, he now disliked the section authorizing dis-
counting, despite the fact that his secretary of treasury in-
cluded that function in his report to the Senate. In short, the
Kentuckian contended that the president was not only wrong
but also guilty of duplicity.
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It is true that he cited past friendly relations with Tyler
and expressed great respect for the high office he occupied.
Nevertheless, he dismissed the chief executive's pleas of
constitutional duty and of self-respect concerning his judg-
ments. There were better courses of action, Clay declared. He
could have permitted the bill to become a law by returning it
without his signature. It would have been desirable deference
to a coordinate, popular branch of government. Or he could
have resigned-no doubt, the senator preferred that option. A
few years ago, Clay recalled, when Tyler was a senator, he
had resigned after refusing to obey his state legislature's in-
struction to vote for expunging from the senate journal a cen-
sure of Jackson's removal of bank deposits. That had been a
genuine act of conscience, the Kentuckian felt.
When he sat down, Rives spoke in rebuttal, defending
Tyler against unfair criticism of the veto as well as regrettable
personal attack. The two opponents indulged in exchanges at a
lower level than courtesy prescribed. Clay suspected the presi-
dent of having a devious purpose, of moving toward a new
party. Already, he remarked, a band of counselors composed a
"cabal," a latter-day Jacksonian kitchen cabinet. Though deny-
ing doing so, he was hinting Rives might be one of them. But
the movement had few recruits, amounting only to a "corpo-
ral's guard," he exclaimed sarcastically. Rives, alluding to
Clay, retorted he had heard of an attempted "dictatorship" to
dominate the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment. Mter this skirmish the Senate voted on overriding the
veto with a count nowhere near the necessary two-thirds.24
What should be the next step? Rives had urged setting
the matter aside this session, but Clay scelded him for taking
an irresponsible position. Aware of a new attempt, possibly for
a bank limited to dealing in exchange and not discounts, he
supposed that might be the best that could be done. So he
promised not to put up any obstacle, though such an institu-
tion could only be a temporary expedient.25
He knew whereof he spoke, for at that very time, there
were movements for something of the sort. On the day of the
veto, August 16, the first of a series of conferences to draft a
plan acceptable to both Congress and Tyler occurred in an
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effort marked by too much vagueness and misunderstanding.
Alexander Stuart, a friendly Virginia congressman, began the
process by visiting the president and running through the
text of the rejected bill with him for revisions. Tyler now in-
sisted upon limiting the bank to handling bills of exchange,
not to discounting debtors' notes; but his opinion about state
admission of branches was fuzzy. He inserted the proviso that
branches could not be established "contrary to state law" but
did not specify time or procedure, such as Clay's bill had done.
Over the next two days, John Sergeant of the House and John
Berrien of the Senate also met with Tyler, who seemed ever
more negative. Even Ewing, Webster, and other cabinet mem-
bers, anxious to arrive at a compromise, had trouble fixing
terms. Two events clouded prospects: Clay's hard-hitting
speech of August 19, attacking the veto, and then the surfac-
ing of a paper written by Botts, accusing Tyler of attempting
to form a coalition with the Democrats. Quite upset, the chief
executive appeared unlikely to sign any bank bill, regardless
of preceding negotiations. Webster sought to get congressional
leaders to postpone further effort that session.26
They refused to do that. They introduced a bill to create a
"fiscal corporation" (the president disliked the name bank) for
financial services to the government and for interstate ex-
change operations in the private sector, using branches oper-
ating "not contrary to law," presumably state law. Mer quick
House passage, the Senate set up a select committee to report
on the measure. Clay declined serving on this panel but
claimed he had an open mind. Convinced that it would be well
to accept this substitute as better than nothing, he certainly
had a decisive influence on congressional action, more than he
pretended. While the Senate discussed a committee report
that made no significant changes in the Sergeant-Berrien
draft, Clay had nothing important to say. His participation
consisted largely of a satirical attack upon leading Democratic
solons, who had made a congratulatory visit at the White
House after the recent veto, perhaps hoping for a coalition
with Tyler. He did not believe, however, that the president
and the Jacksonian party were compatible. They disagreed on
most issues other than banking, he declared. In fact, he pre-
dicted that Tyler would not dare veto the pending plan.27 If he
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had been more realistic, he would have thought otherwise.
Always a barometer of presidential thinking, Rives spoke
against it with reasoning that foreshadowed what would come
from the chief executive.28 The Senate passed it,·twenty-seven
to twenty-two.
Tyler held the second bank bill, too, several days and
then fired off his disapproval near the close of the session. He
objected to the provision that authorized dealing in exchange.
As a number of persons, Clay included, had pointed out, he
realized that bills of exchange could be used much as dis-
counted notes as credit instruments in the course of business.
In the president's opinion, this bill therefore would still allow
the bank to manipulate the economy. No matter that he was
the one who had insisted upon this part of the measure. Also
objectionable, he wrote, was the absence of a specific require-
ment of state consent for branching. Here, too, his own
clause, "not contrary to state law," now seemed to him inade-
quate. Contemporaries and historians, whether favorable or
unfavorable to Tyler, concluded that it was not so much these
details of legislation that induced the rejection as it was
Tyler's rising suspicion of what his political adversaries were
doing, stimulated by what he was hearing from his inner
states-rights circle.29
A breakup of the administration and the rupture of the
Whig party followed. In the evening after the veto, the cabinet
met to discuss its response. Clay was also present and must
have had some influence, though after a while he went into
another room. Four of the five officers who attended the
gathering decided upon simultaneous resignation. Secretary
of State Webster left early and would not concur in this action,
believing as he did that uhity of the party and establishment
of a bank were still possible. Five of the six cabinet members
did resign-all except Webster-and soon published their ver-
sions of the negotiations between Tyler and Congress. The
main reason they gave for their action was the president's re-
neging on the kind of bank plan he preferred.30
This failure to restore a banking system to serve the
nation occurred because of a collision of personalities, perhaps
as much as differences about economic policy. Buoyed by an
exhilirating Whig victory in the election of 1840, Clay was im-
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patient with opposition and delay, which his long experience
should have told him to expect. His opponents then, as well as
scholars later, charged him with being a dictator.31 He laid out
a very full agenda, which required persistence to be put into
effect, and he became irritable when events did not go his
way. But Tyler's sensitivity and defensiveness also interfered
with progress. He constantly suspected his opponents'motives
and interpreted their behavior as dangerously flggressive.
As far as broad policy was concerned, there was little in
the protracted congressional speeches having to do with that
dimension, but much about details of charter terms. Clay did
not effectively expound, as he usually did, the economic ratio-
nale for another national bank to help the country to extricate
itself from the depression and to regain a desirable rate of eco-
nomic growth. Still, he made substantial concessions in both
bank bills, retreating somewhat from sound constitutional
and economic ideas on the subject. It was Tyler who was out
of touch with reality in these areas.
As predominant as the issue of banking was, Clay confronted
others at the same time. He continued to give priority to dis-
tributing land proceeds to states for internal improvements,
both for the future and for retiring their large debts on ex-
isting projects. Though failing to join distribution to a preemp-
tion bill in the preceding session, he believed this approach to
be most promising. In addition to the necessity of accepting
preemption as the vehicle, however, he found he had to con-
nect distribution to bankruptcy and tariff legislation. So he
had to follow several intricate paths of senate business to
arrive at a package before adjournment in September 1841.
The name of the technique is logrolling. He did have some
help from Tyler, who recommended distribution in his opening
message, but only, he warned, if it did not push tariff rates
above the level prescribed by the compromise of 1833. In any
case, the depression had caused a shortage offunds.32
The senator fashioned a bill and had a Whig member of
the House introduce it there in June. Its familiar provisions
would give present and future occupants of public land the
right of purchasing 160 acres of it at minimum price before
auction. Clay's supplement would distribute land revenue, ap-
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portioned by population, to all states. Each of eight so-called
"new" states (all except Maine, admitted after Ohio in 1803)
would further receive five hundred thousand acres and 10
percent from sales of land within their borders for internal
improvements.
It was early August before the Senate took up the bill,
long since passed by the lower chamber. Like earlier dis-
cussions of land policy, this one was lengthy and lively. Cal-
houn fought the measure on constitutional and moral
grounds, predicting it would violate republican principles and
undermine civic virtue. Besides, he argued, much as many
others did, that the sad fiscal condition of the nation did not
permit distributing furids. A good point. Yet Clay prevailed
against repeated efforts to prohibit distribution whenever the
existing budget showed a deficit. Benton, as expected, fiercely
attacked the proposal, hoping as he did that downward gradu-
ation of land prices would ultimately win out.33 One amend-
ment after another to qualify or defeat the bill failed, with
Clay firmly resisting them. At last, he won approval of his
plan, uniting policies for administering public lands and for
supporting internal improvements.34
One factor materially helping passage was adoption of a
bankruptcy bill, which recruited some necessary votes for
distribution. Presently, there was no national legislation on
bankruptcy, and there had not been since the repeal of a
short-lived measure almost forty years before. Individual
states had acted on the subject, yet the Supreme Court had
limited what they could do constitutionally if their statutes
impaired contractual obligations retrospectively or involved
interstate applications. For years Webster, with advice from
Justice Joseph Story, had unsuccessfully sought enactment of
a federal law, as recently as the last session of 1840. Clay had
not taken the lead but fully supported these attempts.
Strangely, although he had much legal experience with bank-
ruptcy extending to a key case in the high court, he misstated
the meaning of the decision that he had won. Webster, who
had also participated in that case on the losing side, remem-
bered the precedent better, especially the part holding that
states could not interfere with interstate debtor-creditor re-
lations, important in a developing economy:35
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Now there were better prospects for legislation. The de-
pression had deepened the despair of bankrupt debtors,
heightening pressure for congressional relief. Even Tyler saw
the need for it. The Senate passed a bill permitting indi-
viduals, but not corporations, to petition for discharge of their
debts. Antibank Democrats, such as Benton, opposed the ex-
ception because they wished to use bankruptcy proceedings to
stop abuses by banks. Clay helped to defeat their amendment
to do SO.36 But the greatest barrier to the bankruptcy bill was
posed in the House. In an agreement with Democratic leaders
interested in the measure, Clay persuaded a number of hesi-
tant Whig representatives in the lower chamber to vote for it.
This brought around holdouts on distribution in the Senate,
who now got a bankruptcy law in exchange. "It was all bar-
gain and sale," Benton later wrote. Many other opponents also
complained of logrolling, but the Kentuckian predicted large
benefits to a modern economy.37
An even more important prerequisite for distribution had
been its reconciliation with the tariff. Primarily to raise reve-
nue for a hard-pressed Treasury, Clay's bill to raise some rates
then below 20 percent toward that future ceiling was pending
at the same time that the Senate discussed distribution. The
connection between the two bills was not lost on many mem-
bers, especially Democratic opponents who strongly suspected
that Clay wanted to siphon off revenue from the land offices as
an excuse for replacing it with ever higher protective duties at
the custom houses. Though denying the truth of these asser-
tions, the senator concluded that he would have to compro-
mise or else run into presidential vetoes on both subjects. So
near the end of debate on distribution, his friend Berrien, with
his approval, moved an amendment that would suspend dis-
tribution whenever any tariff rate exceeded 20 percent after
June 1842, the date when the compromise of 1833 would
reduce high rates to that level. This, along with arrival of a
message that the bankruptcy bill had made it through the
House, opened the way for success on distribution.38 Mterward
the revised tariff within the restriction of the Berrien amend-
ment passed too. They received a solid Whig vote, including
southerners and some persons of Tyler's persuasion.39 The
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president signed all three parts of Clay's logrolled package, as
Benton contemptuously viewed it, shortly before adjournment.
The Kentuckian felt pleased with these successes on
distribution, bankruptcy, and tariff, all of which had been
items on his agenda back in June. No doubt, Clay had sought
to accomplish more than ordinarily possible in a short session.
Though failing to get a national bank, he probably could not
have succeeded if he had had unlimited time, for a decisive
factor was the president's idea of an admissible policy, much
different than that of the senator.
On September 13, 1841, this tumultuous session ended.
From the perspective of the present day, one can see the out-
come as a turning point in political history. It turned out to be
the Whigs' last and best opportunity to set in motion the full
range of the American System. There would be many at-
tempts in the next decade to do so, all falling short of the opti-
mistic targets Clay and his cohorts had set after a heartening
electoral victory in 1840.
They expressed their frustration by an address to the
public, laying out Tyler's errors and inconsistencies, essen-
tially causing them to read him out of the party. To this a re-
sponse appeared in the press from Representative Caleb
Cushing of Massachusetts, defending the president in every
respect.40 It was arresting to read Cushing's paper in light of
his close relation to Webster, the only cabinet member who
had not resigned and one of the two most. powerful Whigs in
the land. Although Cushing called for party unity, the trend
was moving in the opposite direction.41 Notwithstanding
Clay's call for Whigs to stay the course toward economic na-
tionalism, prospects of fully developing his program as well as
fulfilling his own presidential aspirations had dimmed.
12
Limited
Success
A fter returning to Lexington in fall 1841, Clay spent manyan hour reviewing the disturbing course politics had
taken. What had caused a reversal when at last his party
had gained an opportunity to launch its economic program?
And even though an unforeseen change in the presidency had
occurred, why could the Whigs not have prevailed in the de-
plorable confrontation of two branches of government? He
concluded that the principal problem was Tyler's faulty and
stubborn position on the fundamental power to relieve the
nation from its desperate condition by esse:ptial legislation.
Always the senator came back to the belief that the policies
he had advocated were constitutional and desirable and that
another attempt to implement them must be made, just as
the congressional Whig address had urged at the close of the
special session.
For a few weeks he seemed truly uncertain whether he I
would return to Washington to lead a second effort toward
that goal. His dissatisfaction with the present "mortifying"
state of affairs was so great he was tempted to resign. He had
no hope of converting the president, who had betrayed the
trust confided in him. No hope of Tyler coming up with a
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reasonable substitute for the old national bank or the pet
banks or the ill-conceived Independent Treasury. Though he
did not say so, Clay must have believed only he could ef-
fectively head the party forces in December when they must
address this difficult situation. Whether he could actually suc-
ceed or not, it is understandable that he thought this was the
best strategy.1
If his assessment was correct, he would have to try some-
thing besides passing bills destined for veto. In good Whig
fashion, executive tyranny must be stopped. Only a consti-
tutional amendment revoking the two-thirds rule for over-
riding vetoes could remove the existing obstacle and restore
the popular will. His many years at the Capitol, however,
should have taught him how resistant the complicated
amending process had proven to be. Perhaps the mere pro-
posal would at least have psychological effect, both to rally his
own ranks and to push Tyler farther back on the defensive.
Not long after the Senate settled into its routine that
winter, at his usual place in the chamber the Kentuckian intro-
duced three amendments: empowering only a majority of all
members of each house to override a veto; abolishing the so-
called pocket veto after the close of a session, whereby the leg-
islators had no way to override; and transferring appointment
of the secretary of treasury from the president to Congress.
When that body got around to discussing these amendments, it
was clear nothing would come of the foray. Clay spoke emphat-
ically but mainly for the record.2 Calhoun, the best-known ad-
vocate of limited government, opposed the resolutions on the
ground that fortunately the chief executive, by the veto, had
prevented enactment ofunwise measures on internal improve-
ments and the tariff. Inconsistency with his earlier indictment
ofAndrew Jackson's tyranny during nullification days did not
bother him.3
Tyler clung to the possibility of getting a bank bill he
would not have to veto. In his annual message he regretted
that he had had the painful duty of disapproving previous
measures; nevertheless, he believed his objections had been
sound. He welcomed another attempt and had a plan that he
briefly described and would be happy to submit upon request.4
In the short period when Congress was not sitting, he had
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asked Webster to draft a bill for that purpose. The secretary of
state had complied, of course with the president's opinions as
guidelines.5 Caleb Cushing, Tyler's active supporter and Web-
ster's loyal friend in the House, then requested that the recom-
mendation be forwarded to his committee.6
At the capital an exchequer, with a board of control com-
posed of three presidential appointees as well as the secretary
of treasury and the treasurer, would perform functions of de-
posit and disbursement for the government. So far, it would
be similar to the abortive fiscal corporation. It could also re-
ceive deposits of individuals in specie and on that basis issue
up to $15 million in treasury notes, which could circulate as
currency. It would have agencies in states where their laws
did not prohibit, and they could handle short-term exchange
in areas not exceeding one hundred miles. But they could not
discount notes. To avoid the perennially feared union of the
purse and the sword in the executive, Congress would have a
substantial regulatory power over the whole operation.
The proposal was dead on arrival. It did not get to the
floor in either house, for members of every persuasion found
serious flaws. The president's plan had not generated much
interest even among Democrats. Numerous Jacksonians dis-
liked the provision for treasury notes, amounting to nothing
more than old-style paper currency, they contended. Old Bul-
lion Benton compared them to worthless continentals of the
Confederation era and waved some old samples as he orated.7
Clay did not speak on the subject, though he and fellow Whigs
sawall kinds of defects in the plan. They were remarkably
quiet, wishing not to stir up Tyler on the exchequer question
because he might then be less cooperative on other business,
ch~efly the tariff soon to be considered.8
Despite the fact that Webster drew upon his expertise in
banking and skillfully wound his way between two hostile
sides of the political issue, the plan had dubious value. Un-
doubtedly, the $15 million limit on circuJation oftreasury notes
as currency would have been insufficient for ordinary business
and for economic growth. On the other hand, it was question-
able that even that little amount ofspecie would have been vol-
untarily deposited with the exchequer in exchange for this
paper. Still more inadequate were the time and space limits
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placed for bills and drafts of exchange to be handled by the in-
stitution and its agencies. The provision would not have served
a vast country extending across a continent. If Congress had
created the exchequer, state-chartered banks would still have
carried on most of the financial activity in public and private
sectors.9
Another economic issue had higher priority than bank-
ing. It was the bankruptcy law previously passed but not to go
into effect until the first of February 1842, a· date rapidly ap-
proaching. It had been and continued to be a highly contro-
versial measure, both because it offered relief to distressed
debtors and because it had been a linchpin in the parlia-
mentary vehicle carrying Clay's package of distribution and
tariff to adoption. The act had stimulated widespread com-
plaint by creditors and conservatives, notwithstanding its
merciful policy toward the thousands who would benefit from
it. Opponents in Congress introduced bills to repeal the law or
at least postpone the date when it would become effective. In
Kentucky, feeling against it ran so high that the legislature in-
structed Clay to vote for a delay. The state's representatives in
the House led the move·to do so, and it passed there handily.
In the Senate Clay did not obey his instructions.
Furthermore, he spiritedly denied the accusation that he had
resorted to the devious tactic of supporting the statute while
secretly encouraging his fellow Kentuckians to kill it. He in-
sisted not only that the charges were baseless, as they seem to
have been, but that, at any rate, he could not control "the
judgment of my State & its whole delegation."lo In speaking
against repeal, he punctuated his plea with an emotional de-
scription of imprisoned debtors liberated by national legis-
lation. Just as the jail door is swinging open, he declared, "the
Senate is called upon to drive them back to their gloomy and
loathsome cells, and to fling back the door upon its grating
hinges." He was called upon to unite in this cruelty, he said,
but "I have not the heart to do it!"ll
Whether or not governed by such a humane impulse, the
senator pointed to a practical reason for leaving the bank-
ruptcy law alone. As he explained in a personal letter, "The
truth is that the Bankrupt law was a part of a system of
measures of relief. The Distribution bill could not have been
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carried without the Bankrupt bill; and if the latter be re-
pealed, there is much reason to fear that the Distribution bill
may also be repealed. And if we thus retrace our steps, amidst
our other difficulties, how will it be possible for the Whigs to
maintain their ascendancy?"12
He barely managed to fend off the heavy assault, chiefly
from Benton. The Senate decided against repeal, twenty-three
to twenty-two, and also refused to postpone the activating
date of the first of February. That was only a modest victory,
for Congress did repeal the statute during its next session.
For much of the nineteenth century there was no effective fed-
eral bankruptcy system, so that the subject reverted to a cir-
cumscribed state jurisdiction. Nevertheless, during the year
this law was in force, thirty-four thousand debtors invoked its
protection.13 •
Clay was quite right when he warned that his opponents
were aiming at distribution as well as bankruptcy. Mter en-
actment in the preceding session of the provision transferring
land revenue to the states, Alabama sought to stop it by a
method that other states might adopt. It would refuse to re-
ceive its share of the money, supposedly making the law unen-
forceable on the ground that state benefits would then be
skewed. Resort to the process could be a new-model attempt
at nullification, if the resistant state's portion was retained in
the general fund at the Treasury or if it was distributed to
others. Seeing how flimsy this reasoning was, Clay proposed
apportioning the refused funds to all the other states, and his
resolution to do so passed. Other efforts to sidetrack the pro-
gram of using land revenue for state internal improvements
came forward too. One would use the money for national de-
fense, and another would devote it to retiring the presently
unredeemable treasury notes. To all these diversions the Ken-
tuckian responded with a restatement of his rationale for fed-
eral distribution linked to state internal improvements. It
was, by now, familiar to all his auditors. Measures to improve
the lines of transportation, whether for shipping along the
coast or for roads and canals in the interior, were legitimate
regulations of commerce constitutionally, he still believed. Not
only that, they would also greatly stimulate American eco-
nomic development.14
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The connection between distribution and the tariff was
obviously close, since both significantly involved fiscal policy;
over the years politics had amply demonstrated that fact. In
the recent special session, the two had been joined in the Ber-
rien amendment, authorizing distribution of land revenue to
the states but requiring cessation when any tariff rate ex-
ceeded 20 percent. Clay had to pay that price, reluctantly, in
order to get approval of distribution. Now, if he could, he
wished to eliminate this proviso. The moment was favorable.
One reason was that the tariff compromise of 1833 would
probably be amended anyway-its ten-year course toward that
20 percent maximum would be reached in July.
It was all the more likely that a new tariff would have to
be framed inasmuch as the depression had severely strained
the Treasury, cutting revenue and causing a projected deficit
of $12 million in a budget of $26 million. In his annual mes-
sage of December 1841 Tyler urged some steps to reduce ex-
tensive borrowing and to escape the necessity of issuing ever
more treasury notes. Though it hurt to say so, he conceded
that tariff rates would have to go up; yet true to his principles,
he insisted that the 20 percent lid in the compromise remain
in place. If that became impossible, he declared, then he
wanted to adhere to the Berrien amendment and shut off
distribution.15
Argument about tariffs in general resumed, both in and
out of the Capitol. Amos Kendall, the prominent Jacksonian,
charged that protectionism allowed capitalists to draw trib-
ute, like a feudal nobility, from honest farmers and laborers. 16
Niles'Register had returned to the dialog after a long period of
silence to warn against the perils of moving toward free trade
while Britain talked about it but pursued the opposite policy.17
In the Senate Calhoun and others described the menace of
higher rates if extravagant expenditures continued. Though
reluctant to enter into such debate this early in the session,
Clay had to reply. He sought to calm worries by again endors-
ing the compromise of 1833 as a statement of the revenue
standard of duties. And he promised to propose measures for
economy in governmental operations.1s
Within a month, on February 15, 1842, the senator was
more explicit about adhering to the compromise. That com-
178 Henry Clay and the American System
mitment did not demand staying under the 20 percent ceiling,
he explained, but only to impose rates necessary for the "eco-
nomical administration of government," to use its language.
As a matter of fact, he now conceded that higher rates were
needed and could be laid without violating the provision of
1833. He took this risky step in presenting the resolutions he
had promised. Furthermore, distribution ought not be sus-
pended if rates went beyond 20 percent. Then he called for re-
ductions in expenditures, seemingly to a greater extent than
Calhoun had demanded.19
As in times past, Clay's resolutions provided an agenda
for legislative discussion. In general, he emphasized the ele-
ments of the budget, with details on revenue, elimination of a
deficit, and the practicability of a higher tariff-much on
governmental fiscal reform and a little on the policy of pro-
tection.
He discussed the tariff in this fashion in order to prove
that maximum rates of 20 percent could not produce the neces-
sary revenue and might have to be raised to 30 percent or
more. And since land sales were very depressed, they would
not add the necessary amount, even if they were not dis-
tributed to the states and went into the general fund. In put-
ting .the case this way, he did deemphasize protectionism
almost to the level of a side effect of rate revision. Neverthe-
less, he reiterated his well-known rationale for the American
System to combat the extremely high British imposts, even
prohibitive ones such as the corn laws, and to achieve a bal-
anced, developing economy in the United States.20
His opponents saw higher rates as an inexcusable breach
of faith, as breaking the 20 percent promise he had made
during a national c:fisis. Calhoun led the criticism on this
point, for he had long claimed that the compromise of 1833
had demolished the American System, not susceptible to this
effort to revive it. Silas Wright and Levi Woodbury attacked
Clay's fiscal assumptions as well, which drew him, they main-
tained, to the erroneous conclusion that it was necessary to
break a sacred pledge. They relied here on some optimistic fig-
ures of savings by retrenchment in governmental operations.21
Inevitably, the discussion turned to the policy of distri-
bution. As for Clay's plea for repeal of the Berrien amendment,
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his opponents were on solid ground in emphasizing how fool-
ish it would be to donate money to the states at a time when
the Treasury was so hard pressed. In addition, the strict-
constructionist argument reappeared, denying constitutional
authority for the national government to do such things as to
pay the current state debts on internal improvements indi-
rectly. Rives was the foremost critic of Clay's resolution on
these grounds. Instead, the Virginian urged depositing land
proceeds in the Treasury for general use until fiscal recovery.
In return, he would agree .to a tariff maximum of 25 percent.
Rives and Clay had another one of their heated exchanges.22
No one knew better than the Kentuckian that Rives continued
to reflect Tyler's views, which made it likely that raising the
tariff while retaining distribution would encounter more
vetoes.
By the end of March the senator delivered the last of a
series of long speeches on the tariff. He had decided to resign
his seat, so that conclusion of debate on his resolutions coin-
cided with his widely noticed farewell and shared its drama.
Not that he would never return to Washington, even at the
other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. In any event,he obtained
a roll calIon his tariff resolutions. Interestingly, by only a one-
vote margin the Senate rejected Rives's amendment to sus-
pend distribution until retirement of the government's debt.
Yet it did not repeal the Berrien amendment. Distribution, it
appeared, would end, since a new presidential. message con-
cluded that rates would have to go above 20 percent and that
the proviso must stand, as Rives had argued. Clearly, it would
stay in effect unless a two-thirds vote overrode a veto of legis-
lation to the contrary. As for disposition of Clay's resolutions,
the Senate skirted around all those having specific application
by referring them to committees. It did approve two general
statements calling for economy in governmental operations
and avoidance of debt. 23
The next day, March 31, Clay escorted his good friend,
John Crittenden, into the Senate chamber to introduce him as
his successor and to announce his own resignation. A large
audience squeezed into the room for the senator's moving val-
edictory with highlights of his public career. Besides elegant
expressions of gratitude for past favors and apologies for un-
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intended wounded feelings, he defended his conduct against
the charge of having been a dictator in congressional pro-
ceedings.
Insisting he had no such powers as a dictator possessed,
neither military nor financial nor political, he believed he had
only sought to redeem Whig pledges to restore the nation's
prosperity. "That my nature is warm, my temper ardent, my
disposition, especially in relation to the public service, en-
thusiastic, I am ready to own; and those who suppose that I
have been assuming the dictatorship, have only mistaken for
arrogance or assumption that ardor and devotion which are
natural to my constitution, and which I may have displayed
with too little regard to cold, calculating, and cautious pru-
dence, in sustaining and zealously supporting important na-
tional measures of policy which I have presented and
espoused."24
Later that spring he had a better opportunity to review
past politics and raise the banner for future reform. At a bar-
becue in Lexington on June 9, a huge crowd listened as he
ranged across major issues in rigorously partisan terms, de-
spite urging Democrats to put aside predilections of party. For
himself, he denied an excessive ambition for the presidency,
but everyone knew that already there were movements, many
in his behalf, looking forward to the election two years in the
future. In a little more self-vindication he also claimed a high
degree of consistency throughout his long career.
His dominant theme, however, emphasized the nation's
economic distress caused by Democratic mistakes. Falling
prices, unsound money, loss of confidence, failing business,
and suffering of farmers and workers had not occurred inevi-
tably due to impersonal forces. Blame must rest upon faulty
public policies, which he proceeded to describe. The heart of
the problem, he asserted, lay in Jacksonian errors: the veto of
a national-bank recharter, the removal of governmental de-
posits from the bank (followed by failed experiments with pet
state-bank depositories and with an impractical independent
treasury), and repeated resistance to distribution of land pro-
ceeds to the states. Clay recalled the principal conditions re-
sulting from each of these missteps, all to the great detriment
of the country.
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He thought the desirable remedies were obvious. Return
to a national bank for financial recovery. Enact a protective
tariff to nourish industry and raise a revenue for the govern-
ment. Approve distribution to assist the states. Sad to say, the
president had obstinately prevented adoption of these meas-
ures. Clay exhorted all good Whigs to shake off their lethargy.
Do not despair, he exclaimed, "even though you have been
"shamefully deceived and betrayed." All that Americans
needed was a new pilot to replace Captain Tyler on the help-
less ship. Would the popular Kentuckian be the new pilot?25
During these June days at Ashland, Clay was carrying on
an active correspondence with friends and supporters to
strengthen his advantage for the presidential nomination. But
much of it also kept him informed about proceedings in Con-
gress. Though having withdrawn as a senator, he maintained
his position as leader of Whig policy and strategy. And his
strongest link to legislative politics was his successor in the
Senate, John Crittenden, who reliably shared his opinions.26
The principal issue in Washington through the summer
was the tariff, which was pending when Clay resigned.27 Tyler
had sent up a message recommending increased rates even
beyond the maximum of 20 percent prescribed by the compro-
mise of 1833 because of an acute shortage of revenue. At any
rate, there was a widespread belief, then shared by the presi-
dent until later advised by the attorney general otherwise,
that further legislation would be required because the ex-
isting law of 1833 might lapse at the end of June. Tyler in-
sisted upon retaining the present prohibition of distribution if
rates in a new act rose above the ceiling to be imposed on
July 1.28
Congress had been slow to adopt any measure, and it
seemed unlikely it could complete work on a bill before that
perceived deadline. So it passed a temporary statute for col-
lecting customs under the old schedule for another month. Dis-
cussion had centered on the question of distribution. Clay's
friends had conceded in an amendment to "postpone" distri-
bution until August 1; yet they explained that the process could
then resume if rates did not go above 20 percent, thus· reacti-
vating the Berrien amendment. Democrats and Tyler's sup-
porters disagreed. The effect, they thought, would be to abolish
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that proviso, not for just a month, but to allow an unrestricted,
permanent policy ofdistribution.29
As he watched congressional proceedings, Tyler was
persuaded by that argument, incorrect though it was. Accord-
ingly, he vetoed this temporary tariff, deepening the serious
disagreement of two branches of government. The resulting
debate in the House laid out large differences on the relation
between tariff and distribution. A present-day reading of the
speeches confirms the version of those denying that the meas-
ure could or was intended to slip in an unlimited policy of
distribution. Besides, if Tyler had interpreted it accurately, he
would still have had an undiminished power to decide later
upon necessary legislation. The House failed to muster the
two-thirds to override the veto, but now the president had ac-
cepted advice that the old law would not lapse, eliminating
the need for temporary action.3o
As Congress continued to grapple with the problem
during July, Clay received frequent reports from the Capitol
by Crittenden and other prominent Whigs. It seemed probable
that Tyler would veto almost anything they passed. As defen-
sive strategy, they were inclined to propose rates at 20 per-
cent, preserving distribution of land revenue and home
valuation of imports. It was surprising that they would re-
treat from protectionism that far and more surprising that
Clay agreed it could be done to save distribution as more im-
portant. His position no doubt stiffened theirs on maintaining
distribution in the ensuing debate, and Crittenden then de-
cided to try also for higher rates on the slender chance of suc-
cess. Whatever the outcome of this second effort, Clay opposed
complete submission, in his view, to this miserable chief ex-
ecutive.31 In fact, he looked with interest at suggestions of im-
peaching Tyler, a justifiable step, he thought, though not to be
taken immediately.32
The bill that Crittenden managed through the Senate not
only raised rates above 20 percent but went beyond the Ber-
rien amendment. It would repeal outright this proviso, which
had made distribution conditional on tariff rates staying at
that level. Perhaps it was because he thought Tyler would
veto the bill in any case that he went for unrestricted distri-
bution and higher rates. A number of senators warned that a
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veto was certain. Furthermore, there was opposition to an in-
crease of the impost on cotton bagging to five cents per square
yard (welcome to Clay and the hemp interest), as well as
upward adjustments on iron, salt, coffee, and tea. And Benton,
Calhoun, Buchanan, and Wright attacked the general protec-
tionist character of the measure with familiar arguments. In
almost every instance Crittenden killed amendments if only
by the thinnest margin, usually two or three votes. Mter pas-
sage on August 6, the president hurled back his predicted
veto, primarily because of the section on distribution.33
Learning that the veto was on the way, Clay sent off his
advice about the next phase" of struggle. Though a protective
tariff was important, he said, Whigs "ought at all hazards to
insist upon the distribution of the Land fund." If Congress
could not pass such a bill this session, it ought to pass the
same bill the next one and let Tyler's Democratic friends take
the criticism.34 Meanwhile, Clay's lieutenant was also less
hopeful of getting a protective measure and suggested approv-
ing one at the level of 20 percent, thus denying the president
his badly needed revenue. Though both men were wavering
almost daily between a hard line and some unpalatable con-
cession, it was Crittenden, at the center of·the tangle, who
had to make the final decision after frequent meetings of the
party caucus. And ultimately, Clay would have to bend more
than he would have liked. "So much depends upon local
circumstances, upon the temper of the two houses &c.," he
wrote, "That no person at a distance can judge of what is best
to propose." A sensible outlook, although he had already done
all he could to influence the course of policy.35
In late August the Senate took up a new tariff bill passed
by the House, generally for decidedly protective rates but with
no provision for distribution. Debate consisted largely of argu-
ments about particular rates as viewed by local·interests ar-
rayed against substantial antiprotectionist opposition. Iron,
cottons, woolens, hemp, coal, and glass were items receiving
much higher rates. Clay's prized provision for home valuation
of imports at customs houses was not carried over from the
compromise of 1833. The average for all goods amounted to
about 35 percent, though individual categories rose to '65 per-
cent or more.36 Somewhat surprisingly Buchanan, spokesman
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for Pennsylvania iron masters despite his Democratic opin-
ions, supported the bill not only for that specific interest but
also for raising revenue sought by the administration. Simi-
larly, another Jacksonian leader, Wright of New York, voted
for it not only for wool and woolen interests but for the hard-
hit Treasury. The average level of imposts therefore nearly
equaled that of the law of 1832, the target of nullification of
that day. Calhoun reacted against the present legislation with
a great deal of fire, as one might imagine. The absence of a
provision for distribution caused a number of southern sena-
tors to vote nay-Berrien for one. On the other hand, Rufus
Choate, Webster's cohort, thought the legislative strategy of
separating distribution from the tariff bill was necessary for
passage and spoke persuasively in behalf of the industrialists
who would benefit from it. In the end this tariff passed as nar-
rowly as possible, by one vote. The margin in the House had
been that thin tOO.37
Although Tyler gave Congress no trouble on protection
and quickly signed this version, he would not do the same for
a separate provision for distribution, which went to him im-
mediately afterward. By a pocket veto he again rejected a
policy of sending money to the states when the national gov-
ernment sorely needed it.38 In this position he made a credible
,case, despite Clay's sustained commitment to stimulate eco-
nomic development and to assist states to pay their large
debts. For his part, the Kentuckian would not quit his advo-
cacy of distribution, notwithstanding the dwindling possibility
of success.39
One might expect him to be unhappy about the outcome
of this duel with "Captain" Tyler, yet that was not true. His
correspondence assumed a philosophical tone: ''We are all per-
fectly satisfied in this quarter with the passage of the Tariff,"
he remarked, and "there is no disposition felt to censure those
of our friends who voted against it upon high motives by
which they were actuated. It was a case of extreme em-
barrassment; and acquiescence, if not praise, is due to the
course of both sections of our friends." As for the suspension of
distribution, it would "only be temporary, if the Whigs retain
power, and if they lose it, the other party will repeal the law."
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All things considered, "I must say that I am not sure how I
should have voted, if I had been in Congress."40
His generous and calm reaction can be accepted at face
value, especially since he did get just the kind of protective
tariff he wanted. Still, one·· can suspect his reaction assumed
this cast, in part, to heal partisan wounds, to unify the Whig
campaign two years ahead, and, not least, to solidify his own
prospects for the presidency. Indeed he was already taking
active steps toward that goal.
13
Disappointments
Soon after Congress ended its long, acrimonious session inlate August 1842, attention shifted to the coming fall elec-
tions, which would be influenced by the disrupted relations
between legislative and executive branches of government in
Washington. As the acknowleged front runner for the Whig
presidential nomination, Clay was unusually active in a day
when there was a lingering belief that a candidate for the
high office ought to avoid open electioneering. In addition to
an extensive correspondence and statements appearing in the
press, his widely reported speeches through the next several
months addressed leading issues, most of them economic.'
A highlight was his appearance on September 29 in
Dayton, Ohio. Before a huge crowd, questionably estimated as
more than a hundred thousand, he expressed. gratitude for
resolutions supporting his candidacy together with that of
others in his party. In response to opponents' charges that the
Whig party had no basic principles, he restated those that he
himself had long embraced under the rubric of the American
System. His two-hour discussion was comprehensive and ex-
plicit. Despite the recent tangle about banking, the nation
must have a national institution to supply a sound currency,
he declared, not the visionary hard-money medium favored by
Locofoco radicals. Nor would the country approve Tyler's ver-
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sion, which the president first agreed to and then abandoned
by his treacherous vetoes. Indeed, underlying all measures
must be a severe limitation of the kind of executive power the
president had claimed. And of course he endorsed a protective
tariff, similar to the law just enacted but joined again to
distribution of land revenue.! During the following week Clay
also spoke to gatherings at Cincinnati and Indianapolis,
where he advanced similar arguments.2
Notwithstanding his optimistic forecast that the Whig
cause would prevail, the fall elections were disappointing.3 The
Democrats regained control of the House with a new majority
of 142 to 79 and left the Whigs with a narrow margin in the
Senate. No doubt the setback reflected dissatisfaction with
deadlock at the capital and persistent ills of the depression.
Were there fatal flaws in the party system? Probably not, for
both parties had held together in Congress quite well except
for the small band of Tyler's apostates. Party-line voting on all
substantive questions was ~teady. As the Kentuckian saw it,
the problem lay mostly with the undemocratic use of an arbi-
trary veto power, which he still hoped to eliminate by consti-
tutional amendment. 4
For the present, he continued speechmaking and other
efforts to strengthen his position in the critical election two
years ahead. Spending the winter of 1842-43 in New Orleans,
he combined politics and personal business there while visit-
ing relatives and friends. On the way down and during his
return home he stopped frequently to confer with party
leaders. Invariably he met warm receptions and addressed
admiring crowds. Back in Lexington at an enthusiastic meet-
ing in April he repeated his well-settled prescription for what
must be done to put the nation on a correct course.5
Heartened by the response he had been receiving, he de-
cided upon a broader tour of the South, which would begin at
New Orleans in February 1844, proceed through the Gulf
states into the Carolinas, and end at Washington in April. It
would cover a section where his economic nationalism had often
encountered much resistance but where he felt it was becoming
more attractive, as apparent during his recent travel there.6
Clay emphasized the tariff more than any other subject
at each stop along the way, just as he did in his ongoing cor-
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respondence. His main goal was to reconcile extremes, to pro-
mote harmony rather than inflame opposition. Reviewing his
record on the tariff from 1816 and 1824 on to 1832 and 1833,
he contended that he had consistently balanced the need for
reasonable protection of domestic industry with the interests
of agriculture and labor. His particular focus was on the com-
promise of 1833, quieting the crisis of nullification. As he had
done earlier in the Senate, he defended the present higher
rates as necessary to provide for the economical adminis-
tration of the government. According to his interpretation of
that compromise, duties did not have to be lower than 20 per-
cent. The determinant was the requirement of revenue in the
federal treasury; and in these difficult days, rates had to be so
adjusted. A desirable policy must be to supply "incidental"
protection within the limits of that requirement. The adjective
and its hazy concept were becoming fashionable among politi-
cos of every stripe.7
Although he held out an olive branch to southern advo-
cates of low rates, he would not· abandon essentials of the
American System. He deplored the notions of free-traders, es-
pecially when Britain clung to duties that, as in the case of the
com laws, were prohibitive toward American imports. Farmers
and planters, in addition to manufacturers, were hurt badly.
So far as possible, national self-sufficiency was the true object
for the United States. The old doctrine of a home market, of
mutual interest of all parts of the economy, was valid yet com-
patible with only incidental protection.8
To be specific, he endorsed the tariff of 1842, adopted
after the duel of congressional Whigs and Tyler. Its schedule,
he thought, fit the terms of a revenue standard while discrimi-
nating in favor of industrial development in this country.
Though saying this, he well knew that Democrats were
already striving to repeal the measure with a different appli-
cation of incidental protection. One fault he did see in the stat-
ute was its abandonment of home valuation of imports by
officers at custom houses, thereby reviving unreliable declara-
tion ofvalue by foreign exporters. This key element of the com-
promise of 1833, upon which he had then insisted, had
regrettably been dropped, he said.9
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Another fault in the present tariff, he admitted, was that
it lacked a provision for distribution of land revenue to states,
one more casualty of Tyler's stubbornness. During speeches in
Georgia and Virginia especially, pointing out their loss of pro-
ceeds from lands they had ceded to the national government,
he urged the justice of compensating them with distribution.
In other states too, distribution would be helpful in retire-
ment of debts incurred by their internal improvement expen-
ditures. Clay had lost none of his strong commitment to
distribution as a central economic policy. The commitment
was so firm that he renewed his willingness to accept preemp-
tion in land sales to squatters, objectionable though it was, if
connected with distribution. 10
He dealt with the banking issue cautiously, despite its
recent prominence on the political battlefield. On every occa-
sion he called for the restoration of an old-style national bank,
but only ifa popular mandate clearly favored it. This is what he
had been saying ever since Jackson killed the BUS. Probably
he would have been less reserved if a popular mandate had
brought him into the presidency. Another guarded aspect of
handling the issue was his total concentration on the value of a
national bank in supplying a uniform currency, as if there were
not many other important functions of such an institution in
the economy. As a further defensive tactic he explained at
length his own shift from opposing a national bank in 1811 to
approving one in 1816, a recognition of changed circumstances
after the War of 1812, he said. To be sure, since then he had as-
serted the constitutionality of such a corporation created by
Congress. Furthermore, he did not hesitate to attack Tyler for
his inconsistency and states-rights rigidity on the question. ll
From the beginning ofhis southern tour in February 1844
until its finish in April, Clay felt he enjoyed strong support in
that section. His initial confidence showed in a letter, exulting
that "There is scarcely a speck in the whole horizon."12 Aside
from whatever number of Democrats might come over to him,
Whigs in the South were decidedly favorable, as became obvi-
ous in place after place he visited along his route. This was so
partly because they had nowhere else to go. He was the certain
party nominee, Whigs would not readily join the Democrats,
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and voting for Tyler was out of the question. Nevertheless, he
believed they were attracted to his positions on tariff and
banking as the basis ofa desirable economic program.13
Other developments encouraged him.·Webster, one of the
Whig founders and a leading economic nationalist, had left
Tyler's cabinet and thereby detached himself from that aber-
rant wing, though for a while he kept his distance from Clay.
But he had reaffirmed his orthodoxy and eventually cam-
paigned for the party effectively in the Northeast.14 And there
was the welcome rapprochement of William Rives with the
Kentuckian. He spoke in the Senate for a protective policy and
could strengthen prospects in Virginia.15 Of course, Whig
pamphlets went out to voters in quantity. One that Clay highly
praised was John ~ Kennedy's Defense ofthe Whigs, describing
the evolution of their nationalist principles from Madison's
program of 1815, while old Federalists gravitated to the Jack-
sonian states-rights camp.16
Alas, a very dark cloud was forming. Tyler had grown
interested in annexing the former Mexican state of Texas in
response to territorial expansionists and southern slavehold-
ers, often the same people. By late 1843, about the time Clay
had decided upon his southern tour, negotiations to annex
were under way, and from the first he thought the idea unde-
sirable and impractica1.17 A spur to the project soon appeared
when Calhoun became secretary of state, rounded out a draft
treaty, and prepared to submit it to the Senate for ratification
as Clay was finishing his trip in April 1844.
On the thirteenth at Raleigh, North Carolina, he gave
one of his best speeches. Widely reported and well received, it
ranged over his familiar economic topics but did not mention
Texas, just as he had done ever since he had set out. Though
believing that he was on the right track and that southern
opinion paid little attention to the question of annexation, he
now concluded he must issue a statement. He felt confident
he could reconcile various viewpoints in a way different from
anything he had yet seen.18 So a few days later, he completed
a letter and sent it on to his friends in Washington for pub-
lication. He opposed bringing in Texas, he wrote, because it
would precipitate a war with Mexico and might break up the
Union.19
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Clinging to the belief that the matter had not attracted
"a general expression of public opinion," he resolved to say
nothing more about it. At his next stop in Petersburg, Vir-
ginia, he followed that strategy, recurring to tariff, banking,
and the coming election.20 His Raleigh letter appeared in
newspapers everywhere, but the platform adopted by the na-
tional Whig convention on May 1 contained not a word about
Texas.21 Nevertheless, the issue did not go away and in fact
crowded out those on economic policy, contrary to the new
presidential nominee's assessment. Reluctantly, he later re-
leased two letters addressed to supporters in Alabama, ex-
plaining and then softening his opposition to annexation. The
effect was failure to calm an excitement that had broken
through old boundaries of political argument.22
Even on a staple of the contest; the tariff, Clay suffered a
blow during the summer. His Democratic opponent, James K.
Polk, an all-out expansionist nominated instead of Van Buren,
gained in the race by an ambiguous letter to John Kane of
Pennsylvania about his views on protection versus revenue.
Polk, a faithful Jacksonian, freely admitted he had always fa-
vored low rates; but in communicating with this person in a
manufacturing state, he straddled with language Clay was
also using. "I am in favor of a tariff for revenue," he wrote,
"such a one as will yield a sufficient amount to the Treasury to
defray the expenses of the government economically adminis-
tered. In adjusting the details of a revenue tariff I have hereto-
fore sanctioned such moderate duties as would produce the
amount ofrevenue needed, and at the same time afford reason-
able incidental protection to our home industry." He closed by
emphasizing government's duty to protect all economic inter-
ests. It is true that Polk opposed publishing the letter, but its
eventual appearance damaged Clay's weakening campaign.23
The Kentuckian recognized that if the Kane letter attracted
even a modest number of popular votes in this large state, it
might deliver enough electoral votes for Polk's victory.24
There was slippage in New York, too. Silas Wright, the
stalwart Democrat, had abandoned altogether his moderate
approval of protective rates, particularly on wool and woolens.
It meant more trouble in this pivotal state on the tariff issue,
for Wright would unsparingly attack the American System.25
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And a further worry for Clay people here was the presence of
the new Liberty party, nominating James G. Birney for the
antislavery cause, directed against extension of the institu-
tion into Texas. It was thought Birney would draw away more
Whig than Democratic votes.26
Mter return from the southern tour and nomination by
the Whig convention in early May, Clay spent most of his time
at Ashland without much electioneering. He made no im-
portant speeches and answered less incoming correspondence.
He did send off the two Alabama letters in July, attempting to
clarify his position on Texas, but otherwise left that issue
alone. More than other topics, the revived charge ofhis corrupt
bargain involving Adams's election in 1824 caused him to com-
ment on it often.27
Election results in November were bad news. He had lost,
though by an incredibly narrow margin. Polk got 170 electoral
votes to his 105, seemingly a decisive outcome. But the popu-
lar count was 1,337,000 to 1,299,000. Particularly irritating
were the 62,000 votes received by the antiannexationist
Birney, perhaps the larger part of it at Clay's expense. The two
populous industrial states of Pennsylvania and New York and
the lower South, both areas about which he had strong hopes,
went to Polk.
To explain why an election turned out the way it did is
always problematic, and this is especially true for the
historian's explanation many years after the event,· when some
kinds of helpful evidence one has on present-day electoral be-
havior are lacking.28 Besides, then as now, contemporaries
themselves viewed the event through various filters, personal
and external. Such was the case with Clay's interpretation of
what happened in the election of 1844. His early reaction was
that the foreign vote went against him, owing to lax franchise
requirements permitting, in some cases, noncitizens to vote. A
rising nativist movement complained about this; and though
Clay was not an extremist on the subject, he did believe
stricter rules were needed. So he felt his false image as a nati-
vist hurt him among the foreign-born electorate. Another
reason he offered was prevalence of fraud at election places-
by Democrats, of course. During these years, this was a
common complaint by losers.29
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Clearly, he thought the opposition had misled the people
on economic issues, mainly on the principal issue of the tariff.
He could cite Polk's Kane letter, deceptive as he saw it, as
having a pivotal impact in Pennsylvania and other industrial
quarters. The Kentuckian had focused on the tariff in his ar-
duous southern circuit and felt the results were excellent,
only to see a regrettable diversion of attention away from it.
This had occurred despite his concession of only incidental
protection by moderate rates. Anyway, he never forgot the
perceived setback to desirable policy the victorious Democrats
had ~nflicted.30 The only remarkable thing about his view of
what happened was that in the immediate aftermath of the
election, he did not emphasize its contribution to his defeat.
The same was true of Texas annexation. Beyond the Ra-
leigh and Alabama letters, he had avoided paying attention to
that question throughout the campaign. Mter the election he
either ignored it or referred to it cryptically. One reason for
the outcome, he once observed, originated with the "abolition-
ists." Undoubtedly, he had in mind damage from the Liberty
party or from a wider array of opinions on adding a new state
of Texas, for and against it. His own cautious disapproval and
even his subsequent deference to public sentiment in his
second Alabama letter did not suit many people who had defi-
nite views on either side of the issue. Had he been so occupied
with the well-known subjects of tariff. and banking, so arro-
gant and inflexible that he did not respond to a new situation
adequately? Difficult to say. Polk had preempted expansion-
ism, and Clay could not have endorsed it with much benefit to
his own candidacy even if he had been willing. Yet perhaps in
1844 only an expansionist could have been elected. Then
there is the virtue of being faithful to one's convictions; and
Clay's worries about the dangers posed by stirring up the
question of extending slavery are understandable in light of
later events leading to the Civil War.31
Over the next five years, in retirement from the Senate
and, to some extent, from involvement in politics, he observed
events with more than a little discouragement. Tyler carried
annexation of Texas through an outgoing Congress by the du-
bious procedure of joint resolution. In a bellicose, lucky ap-
proach, his successor Polk gained a favorable treaty with
194 Henry Clay and the American System
Britain on the disputed Oregon boundary. But his bellicose
policy toward Mexico pushed the country into war. To fulfill
his pledges during the election of 1844 still further, he re-
stored an independent treasury after a hiatus during the
Tyler administration.
That left the tariff. Despite Polk's amorphous Kane
letter, as president he now wanted a sizeable reduction of
rates. His secretary of treasury, Robert Walker, built upon
prior work of Democratic congressmen to fashion a detailed
schedule of the lowest rates to produce the necessary revenue.
The average levy would be 26 percent, several points below
the existing tariff of 1842.32 Adopted by the thinnest margin in
the Senate, this measure was linked to a rapprochement with
Britain, an exporting country that itself was lowering rates,
indeed repealing the hated corn laws. The actions of the two
countries on commerce with one another were facilitated by a
British concession on the Oregon boundary, warding off pos-
sible conflict.
Clay's opinion of the Walker tariff of 1846 and of the Brit-
ish reform was predictably negative. He deplored "the vision-
ary promises of an alien policy of free trade, fostering the
industry of foreign people and the interests of foreign coun-
tries, which has brought in its train disaster and ruin to every
nation that has had the temerity to try it."33 In fact, neither
country had adopted free trade, whatever the claims or criti-
cisms. There was still a measure of protection in the American
law, not drastically different from the superseded measure of
1842, which the Kentuckian wanted restored. Besides, he was
thrown on the defensive when the statistics on trade for 1847
revealed a favorable balance for the United States. He ex-
plained it as the result of the current European famine's stim-
ulus to American export of foodstuffs, a temporary condition.34
Hope for long-range improvement, he believed, depended
upon a reversal of policy by a Whig victory in the next presi-
dential election. During the campaign of 1848, he advised, the
party must look to the old issues, the tariff and internal im-
provements especially.35 But he soon found that different fac-
tors diverted attention from these economic essentials: the
progress of the Mexican War and the gathering interest in a
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popular general, Zachary Taylor. As for the war itself, he con-
tended that it was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally pro-
voked by Polk. As for Old Rough and Ready, who had sought a
warm relationship with him, Clay had long since had enough
of military heroes as presidents. At any rate, he himself was
the most eligible candidate to handle political affairs. But
given the new situation, as well as a growing feeling across
the land that he and his positions were becoming rather out of
date, his chances for the nomination seemed poor. Even his
steadfast friend Crittenden was not steadfast about his
making another run for the prize. Indeed, Crittenden headed
a strong movement for the more attractive Taylor, even
though most people, including the general himself, were not
sure whether he was a Whig or a Democrat.36 Still, when the
national convention met in the summer, it selected him. That
fall, Taylor won election. Taking the outcome hard, Clay com-
plained that his party had rejected his American System, not
just its advocate, merely to gain power. In the early months of
the new administration, he found that the president neither
invited his advice nor shared his priorities.37
Circumstances pressed Taylor toward priorities related to
slavery, primarily to its status in the newly acquired Mexican
cession, a subject intensifying sectionalism. Clay himself
became a major actor in Congress, beginning in December
1849, when he returned to the Senate and took the lead in
fashioning a compromise between North and South.
Nevertheless, between then and adjournment in autumn
1850, he had a few opportunities to address economic ques-
tions. In debate during this crisis, he occasionally called atten-
tion to the tariff. If Democrats and Whigs could cooperate on
issues of slavery, he thought, they might find opportunities to
remove some problems of commercial regulation. Clay was at-
tempting to connect action on them to legislation within the
great compromise. Nothing came ofit.38 He also submitted pe-
titions from particular interests, such as iron manufacturers of
Pittsburgh, for adjustments of rates upward, with no effect.39
In the next congressional session, beginning in December
1850, now that the compromise had been adopted, he made an
unsuccessful effort to amend the tariff of 1846 by eliminating
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fraudulent declarations of value at custom houses. Low-tariff
Democrats had a majority in both houses and were not minded
to tamper with the status quo.40
One important advance in federal internal improvements
was a huge land grant for construction of the Illinois Central
Railroad. Stephen A. Douglas, the rising Democratic senator
from the state that would initially benefit most from the meas-
ure, introduced a bill to donate six square miles of the public
domain for each mile of the road's right-of-way. Though given
to states, the land would then go to private companies. Ap-
proved by only one house of Congress earlier, it passed both
easily in April 1850, though it generated a full discussion of its
terms and of the general policy. There were some predictable
constitutional objections; but they were markedly restrained,
compared to the fiery speeches of an earlier day. The principal
issue involved the relative advantages to be gained by indi-
vidual states, for the project was to link Chicago with Mobile.
It was therefore more than a little interesting to Mississippi
and Alabama, which managed to get lands along with Illinois.41
Clay strongly supported the bill on the grounds ofwestern
development and significant national benefits. He remarked
he was familiar with the prairie through which the line would
run, presently "utterly worthless" because wood and water
were scarce on its flat, treeless terrain.42 How surprised even
he would have been to see the rich agricultural region it
became, well beyond his progressive forecast! During dis-
cussion on the Senate floor he heard scattered advocacy of :Qis
favorite idea of distributing land proceeds to all states yet did
not actively help its proponents.43 By the Illinois Central law
Congress added a precedent to earlier measures subsidizing
internal improvements, a policy significant during the era of
railroad building over the next half century.44
A few months later, Clay took a negative position on a
modest proposal to appropriate $230,000 for a railroad in Mis-
souri intended to feed a transcontinental line toward the Pa-
cific. The sponsor was Clay's inveterate adversary Benton,
who claimed this was justifiable by the old program to assist
building the National Road with a percentage of revenue from
federal land sales in states from Ohio to Missouri. In a spirited
exchange with Old Bullion, Clay argued that the fund for that
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purpose had long since been overdrawn. It appears he was still
rankled by the fact that Kentucky had not shared in this bene-
fit as states north of the Ohio River had in the past fifty years.
It was hardly a good reason to take the stand he did. Further-
more, he seemed to oppose Benton's project because it was
Benton who advanced it. At any rate, his selectivity found
plenty of company, and the bill failed decisively.45
The shoe was on the other foot when the Kentuckian's
own interest was at stake. He supported a bill a few days later
to supply funds for work on interior rivers and harbors. One
section particularly important to him would provide for the re-
moval of snags from western waterways. Throughout his long
career, he had been a spokesman for this commercial network
in which his state had a fundamental interest. In the present
instance and in some others related to development of
transportation, he apparently had a local as much as a na-
tional objective, his denials to the contrary notwithstanding.
The bill stalled. So he had to leave such matters to his succes-
sors on the political scene.46
Increasingly, his opponents charged him with adhering to
stale views on time-worn topics, not keeping current with more
important questions of the present, therefore not being alive to
opportunities for human improvement. Rather· than dwelling
upon tariff, banking, and land policies, he ought to have con-
fronted more relevant challenges to America, they contended.
One line of historical interpretation concurs with this criti-
cism. During a brush in the Senate with Lewis Cass, who
called for a sympathetic stance toward the Hungarian revo-
lution against an old, oppressive Austrian empire, Clay cate-
gorically denied he was one of those alleged stationary
politicians, oblivious to progress. Mter all, he scolded, he was
not like Democrats who favored progress toward a war. In-
stead, he was committed to the nation's growth and prosperity,
to a government supportive of the economic welfare of all citi-
zens.This was his vision of progress, he declared.47 A fitting
statement on this day, March 3,1851, in the last congressional
speech ofhis long career.
Henry Clay, c. 1848. Engraving of a daguerreotype by Marcus Root.
Courtesy of the University ofKentucky Library, Special Collections.
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Retrospect
I n an overview of Clay's political career, a theme that standsout is his economic nationalism, his advocacy of govern-
mental encouragement of growth in all sectors of the economy.
He sought a balance of agriculture, commerce, and manufac-
turing so that the United States would have a home market,
not largely dependent upon imports from abroad. The country
must industrialize to supply manufactured goods, he believed,
while agriculture provided food and raw materials. Improved
transportation and financial institutions rounded out an eco-
nomic program, known as the American System.
An important influence upon his thinking was his own
experience as a young man in Kentucky, where individual en-
terprise and public policies joined to exploit the resources of a
new land. Soon, when he was sent to Congress, he enthusi-
astically supported laying out roads and canals through fed-
eral as well as state legislation. He also displayed a keen
interest in stimulating manufacturing as it was entering a
phase of modernization. Then his nationalism intensified in
urging a declaration of war in 1812 to uphold maritime rights
and afterward in striving to achieve American self-sufficiency.
In his day a new field of study was political economy, the
relationship of. government and economic matters. On the
Anglo-American scene the point of departure was Adam
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Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776), which had a decided effect
upon many of Clay's contemporaries. Smith had called for an
end to mercantilism, a system long employed by England and
other nations to control foreign and colonial commerce by nu-
merous regulations to assure a favorable balance of trade. In-
stead, Smith advised, depend upon individualism without
intervention by government. This was termed laissez-faire,
which translated into free trade with no commercial barriers.
Clay often battled those adhering to Smith's text, but he ap-
parently did not read much in the field ofpolitical economy. He
probably did have a significant influence upon the school of
writers who endorsed his own economic nationalism. Foremost
was Hezekiah Niles's friend Daniel Raymond, a lawyer and
professor of Baltimore, whose Thoughts on Political Economy
(1820) went through several editions, stating the case for the
American System with ability. There was also Friedrich List, a
German-American, who contributed his theoretical arguments
to protariff conventions, organized by Clay's friends. The Ken-
tuckian used political economists occasionally as auxiliaries,
but more often as target~.l
He began his service in government as a firm Jefferso-
nian Republican and always insisted he subscribed entirely to
the strict-constructionist principles Madison set forth in' op-
posing the Federalist Sedition Act of 1798. Yet, contrary to a
common opinion, these Republicans were not rigid on practi-
cal questions. They favored agriculture, it is true, but recog-
nized the importance of commerce in marketing products of
planters and farmers. They moved toward war with Britain
over the cutoff ofAmerican maritime rights in this trade. And
they came to accept tariffs, protecting new industry and pur-
suing national economic independence. Secretary of Treasury
Gallatin came out with broad recommendations for advancing
manufacturing and even broader ones for establishing a net-
work of roads and canals. Clay was this kind of Republican.2
Whatever the uses of ideology, he depended chiefly upon
the vehicle of a political party to achieve his purposes. With
the demise of the Federalist organization in the twenties,
there was a unique interlude of one-party or no-party govern-
ment, to be swept away by the rise of Andrew Jackson, who
headed the Democratic party. Clay and Webster led the Na-
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tional Republican opposition to Jackson's adminstration. As
the Bank War intensified because of the recharter veto and
the executive order to remove the government's deposits from
the institution, the coalition of Old Hickory's adversaries as-
sumed the name of Whigs. Although it was often said that the
only common ground of the party's elements was disapproval
of President Jackson's authority, its core was National Re-
publican, and its leader was Henry Clay. Internal differences
of opinion notwithstanding, the articles of faith became the
American System.
Democrats held to the objectives of equal rights, no spe-
cial privileges to corporations or individuals, and a relatively
passive government checked by narrow constitutional in-
terpretation. Most Whigs preferred active programs of pro-
tective tariffs, a national bank, and federal aid to internal
improvements. They had little difficulty in finding appropriate
authority to implement them. Intellectual historians have
characterized Whigs as modernizers and Democrats as tradi-
tionalists. In legislative voting, studies have found a high
degree of party solidarity. But in a general sense, counting
state as well as national situations, there were similarities
between the parties concerning the ends, if not the means, of
policy.3
A clear difference between parties persisted on the tariff
issue. As a protectionist spokesman, Clay emphasized the ne-
cessity of attaining national self-sufficiency within a well-bal-
anced economy. There were benefits for all interests and all
sections. The plantation South would find a market for its sta-
ples in the North, the West for its foodstuffs in the East, and
the North for its industrial products throughout the nation.
Labor would greatly benefit by employment at higher wage$.
Harmony, mutual advantages, and prosperity would follow
adoption of a truly protective system, he reasoned. Do not be
diverted by the siren song of free trade, he warned, for no
other country had, in fact, adopted it. Do not be diverted by
the false assertion that such a tariff would hurt consumers by
higher prices. On the contrary, the stimulus to business would
lead to more competition and lower prices, once growth was
achieved. And do not believe the charge that Congress lacked
the power to establish protective rates, because it did have
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unqualified authority to lay imposts on imports and to regu-
late commerce.
Mter a very modest start toward this sort of policy in the
first tariff of 1789, in which the object of protection was men-
tioned but not achieved beyond a low revenue level, legis-
lation moved slowly upward-by a moderate amount in 1816,
further by the tariff of 1824, which the Kentuckian sponsored
as the beginning of true protection, and then by the so-called
abominations of 1828, the highest until the Civil War. Reac-
tion set in and brought reduced rates in 1832 and 1833 as con-
cessions to a ruffled South. A higher tariff of 1842 finally
survived vetoes by Tyler but was lowered four years later.
Antiprotectionists maintained a strong attack upon the
American System. It began with the agrarian branch of Jef-
fersonianism, arguing that it was quite undesirable to nurse
industrialization, which would unfairly subsidize some capi-
talists while bringing to this country all the social ills then
besetting English cities. They liked to quote Adam Smith, who
had advised nations to buy goods at home or abroad, depend-
ing upon where they were more efficiently and cheaply pro-
duced. In the United States, they also insisted that the tariff
raised consumer prices and amounted to an oppressive tax. It
was Calhoun who made the most of this point, since, he said,
the South suffered northern exploitation as a result. For a
remedy, he assembled his dubious theory of state nullification
against the tariff of 1832. Clay responded by a ten-year grad-
ual reduction, which he felt forestalled secession and war. Be
that as it may, he hesitated to repeat his well-known consti-
tutional view of a popularly based, inseparable Union to coun-
ter nullification.
In assessing the tariff controversy, one can begin by
looking at British-American commerce. England was the larg-
est supplier and customer of the United States, with about 40
percent ofAmerican trade both ways involving that country. In
nine of the years 1821 to 1833, imports from Britain exceeded
exports there. Fine cottons and woolens as well as iron led the
list of imports, while cotton fiber was the largest export by a
great margin.4
Aside from the imbalance of this trade, there were other
problems. One was evasion of American customs regulations.
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Invoices on British imports often declared lower than actual
values. Until the thirties, officers at ports in the United States
did not have authority to value this merchandise; and even
when so-called home valuation went into effect, there were
mistakes and frauds and differences from one place to another.
Furthermore, there were notorious practices in consigning
goods to agents for sale at auction, often a strategy of selling at
cutthroat prices to unload surpluses, even consciously to take
a loss or to deceive customs. Eventually rules and taxes re-
duced the use of auctions, yet the whole system was full of de-
fects. 5 Statistics, which are not very reliable, show no
substantial impact by new tariffs upon price levels, but they
may reflect dumping with low profits or the widespread laxity
of customs administration.6 Clay frequently tried to get con-
gressional reforms to check fraud and improve efficiency, but
never successfully.
On the other hand, British commercial policy controlled
imports strictly. On many products its rates were higher than
those of the United States, and some goods were prohibited al-
together. Cotton came in with only a nominal levy, of course,
for it was a vital industrial raw material. Overall, the balance
of trade was very favorable to that country.7 The greatest
American complaint involved the corn laws, which laid an es-
calating scale of duties on imported wheat and flour as the
British products' prices declined; indeed, importation was pro-
hibited ifprices fell to a certain minimum.8 This sore grievance
lasted until repeal in 1846. Moreover, the navigation acts of
American pre-Revolution memory still preserved a large share
of the carrying trade to British or colonial vessels and crews.9
So it seemed to Clay that British political economists and
politicians warmly commended free trade but clung to the re-
verse, the old mercantilism. True enough, a reform movement
was trying to discontinue it by the twenties, with leaders such
as William Huskisson making quite an effort; and to a limited
extent he obtained revisions. Yet he had to deny that he aimed
at complete abandonment of the system, and in fact, he left
much in place. How different was Huskisson's position from
his own, Clay asked?
Historians have found it difficult to evaluate the impact
of protective tariffs from that day to this. Since it has been one
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of the most partisan questions in politics, an impartial in-
terpretation is rare. Recovery and accuracy of sufficient infor-
mation about the effects of that policy have posed serious
problems, even for the best equipped investigator. Besides,
many factors determined these effects, so that weighting them
has been nearly impossible. It is uncertain whether the effects
were actually slight or substantial.
On the wide range of interpretations, Edward Stan-
wood's thoroughly researched, two-volume work presented the
most convincing protectionist view years ago (1903). Mter in-
vestigating political aspects especially, he believed tariffs were
quite effective in stimulating the economy and that they had
the opposite effect when rates were reduced. About the same
time, on the other end of the interpretive spectrum, the classic
volume of Frank Taussig conceded a possible impact, particu-
larly in an early stage of an industry's development, but very
little in the long run. Victor Clark's full History of Manu-
factures (three volumes, 1916) resembled Taussig's position. It
recognized that tariffs might have offered some economic
help, yet much less than contemporaries supposed. Between
these opposing views are a number of good studies of indi-
vidual industries-hemp, iron, textiles, for example. All find
some impact, but how much in comparison with other factors,
it turns out, is not clear. 1O
Unsatisfying though this may be, there seems to be no
definite answer. There ¥lere numerous elements affecting
changes, as all these authors point out: freight and insurance
in shipping, cyclical movements of depression and prosperity,
many features of supply and demand, financial and labor con-
ditions, and so forth. Econometricians have recently ad-
dressed the problem and cannot move their mathematical
models very far toward clarification.ll An inspection of statis-
tics on imports and exports, on volume and value of many
goods, does not reveal a close congruity of movement with par-
ticular tariff laws.12 As a number of experienced observers say,
the chief effect may have been psychological, either to encour-
age entrepreneurial expansion or to cause retrenchment, de-
pending on various circumstances.13 Even after a sober study
of hard figures, it is clear that politics also supplied a signifi-
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cant force. Clay's speeches, though laced with numbers and a
good deal of information, were no exception.
Another pillar of the American System was a national
bank to provide adequate credit and currency for the growing
economy. Hamilton's first Bank of the United States (1791-
1811), performed these functions well, on the whole, despite
continuing criticism by some Republicans. 14 Many Jefferso-
nians did become reconciled to it, and Secretary of Treasury
Gallatin recommended renewing the bank's charter. Slower to
move away from his constitutional scruples was Clay, but he
became an adherent by 1816, when the second BUS was char-
tered. He now had much business with the institution's
branches in Kentucky and Ohio as lawyer and entrepreneur.
He was on intimate terms with its presidents at the central
office. As standing counsel his cases in federal circuit and su-
preme courts were mutually rewarding.
The period when he was most involved with the BUS
was, of course, that of the Bank War, 1832-37, when Jac~son
vetoed the recharter bill and removed the government's de-
posits. Clay's adversaries thought he was merely forwarding
his presidential bid and protecting his personal financial con-
nections instead of taking a dispassionate stand on policy.
Actually, his motives were mixed. He accepted proposed revi-
sions of the charter in the bill, but the president vetoed it.
When, in the congressional session of 1833-34, he attacked
Jackson's order to remove deposits and pressed for censuring
him by the Senate, his emotions got the better of him. He
would have taken better ground if he had sought a practical
compromise, possibly Webster's proposals for short-term ex-
tension, and thereby had been true to his reputation as a
peacemaker. In general, he could have more effectively ad-
dressed the tilt of the BUS toward particular interests and in-
dividuals, its broad powers over terms of credit and volume of
currency, and the inflated authority of its president.
Opposing opinions on finance hardened during the de-
pression beginningin 1837, when the unlucky new president,
Van Buren, relentlessly pushed his independent-treasury pre-
scription. It was not a useful idea as far as an acceptable
banking system was concerned because it was essentially a
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retreat, a divorce as Clay and other opponents dubbed it, from
constructive action by government in order to guard its own
funds. It turned out that when the Independent Treasury was
permanently established (1846-1913), it did not deliver on
Democratic promises.15 Clay had the better argument here.
An unfortunate episode concerning banking occurred
during the Harrison-Tyler administration in 1841-42. Clay
now had a Whig majority in both houses and insisted upon
another national bank. He made concessions to meet Tyler's
states-rights sensitivity, but both the senator and the chief
executive failed to communicate well and took rigid stands,
again notwithstanding Webster's plea for more attempts to
reconcile differences. Regardless of whether Clay's demands
were better than Tyler's objections, his last opportunity to put
this and the rest of his American System into operation
slipped away.
In addition to a protective tariff and.a national bank, im-
provement of transportation was a prime component of Clay's
program. During this early phase of developing a modern
economy, new forms and a better quality of transportation
contributed so much to growth that historians have called the
process a revolution.16 As a westerner, the Kentuckian under-
stood the importance of linking his section to East and South.
It required a National Road, on which he traveled to and from
Washington. It also depended upon improved waterways, the
cleared channels of the Ohio-Mississippi river system as well
as projects such as the Louisville and Portland Canal at the
falls where hundreds of the newly developed steamboats
passed. They accommodated him for frequent trips eastward
or down to' New Orleans and carried his hemp to market.
Soon an extensive railroad network handled freight and pas-
sengers faster, farther, and more cheaply than ever thought
possible. This dramatic transition involved not only vigorous
efforts by private enterprise but huge governmental support
at several levels. Throughout his career he played a major
role in this internal improvement policy making.
When he arrived at the capital as a young senator in
1806, the Jefferson administration had already set a plan in
motion for the National Road, to be financed by federal re-
ceipts of land sales in Ohio and to c~nnect that new state and
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the territory as far as the Mississippi Valley with Maryland.
He strongly approved the commitment as one of Gallatin's am-
bitious· proposals for a national grid of improvements. During
the decade of 1815-25 he fought many a battle to advance
work on the National Road and to broaden policy for other
undertakings. He sometimes encountered stiff resistance. On
constitutional grounds, President Madison vetoed a bill to use
the bonus received for chartering the bank as a fund for in-
ternal improvements. Over the next several years Clay re-
sponded to Madisonian objections and those of other strict
constructionists, even President Monroe. His cogent argument
was that the postal, military, and commerce powers of Con-
gress justified federal action. He fared well enough on the Na-
tional Road, which ultimately reached western Illinois in the
1830s, but less so on other proposals for monetary grants.
Indeed, he himself opposed some bills with the complaint,
widely heard in other quarters, that his state was not getting
a just share.
A low point of his efforts appeared in 1830 when Jackson
vetoed the Maysville Road bill, an improvement from
Kentucky's northern boundary on the Ohio River to Lexing-
ton, hopefully to link the National Road with New Orleans in
the future. Jackson, with Van Buren's urging, selected the
measure as a test case to stop what he felt was undue ex-
pansion of federal authority, no doubt also to deliver a blow to
his foremost political adversary. Clay had a good argument in
rejecting the president's reason that this was a local not an
interstate project and therefore beyond constitutional limits.
Segments of major routes had been previously approved.
Furthermore, contrary to Jackson's position, there were many
precedents for the government to mix its funds with private
capital by subscription to this turnpike company's stock, as
the bill provided.17 Though large appropriations were made for
internal improvements throughout Old Hickory's adminis-
tration, the veto was a signal to Clay that he had better look
for some other strategy in order to bypass Jackson's consti-
tutional inconsistencies.
The option he found was distribution of the federal reve-
nue from sale of public lands to states for internal improve-
ments. The idea was not new when he proposed it in 1832.
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The congressional law for the admission of Ohio as a state in
1802 had provided for granting 5 percent of this revenue to
construct the National Road to and through the state. And
later the same provision was attached to admission of others.
In the twenties senators presented bills for distributing such
funds to all states, old or new. A competing proposal would
have ceded the public lands themselves to the states in which
they lay. Clay assembled his own formula as part of a commit-
tee report in 1833, which would distribute not only for in-
ternal improvements but also education and colonization of
emancipated slaves to Mrica. It passed Congress, but Jackson
vetoed. Clay was furious, contending that the distribution
measure was considered part of the tariff compromise relating
to nullification.
Time and again, he strenuously attempted to obtain
adoption of distribution, just as strenuously as for a national
bank or a protective tariff. During the Whig confrontation
with Tyler in 1841-42, he managed to get legislation, only to
have to stipulate that it would not operate if tariff rates ex-
ceeded 20 percent. His opponents always charged that distri-
bution was his effort to draw off funds from the Treasury to
make it necessary to keep tariff rates high. Not true. He
sought this policy mainly to facilitate internal improvements,
as he declared he did. Mter he left the Senate in 1842, his suc-
cessor Crittenden tried his best to get an unrestricted provi-
sion in the new tariff but had to yield to the president's
unshakable opposition. During the Jacksonian era, there were
only two brief periods of distribution before repeal. It was one
of Clay's greatest disappointments.
Toward the end of his life, he witnessed the spectacular
rise of the railroad as an immensely important form of trans-
portation. Many of the arguments of previous years in behalf
of governmental aid now applied to it. And that aid was
forthcoming in huge amounts for decades. Land grants and
loans were often voted, though monetary distribution was
not. The Senate extended a very generous donation of land to
the Illinois Central, sponsored by the Jacksonian Democrat
Stephen Douglas and heartily approved by the venerable
Whig Henry Clay.
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In the winter of 1852 as the desperately ill, seventy-five-
year-old senator sat in his Washington hotel room, he had
much to remember from his long political experience. Al-
though he had enjoyed most of the honors and popularity a
public man could hope to gain, he had not reached the one
prize he thought was his due, the presidency. But he had exer-
cised strong leadership in the cause of economic nationalism,
of his American System. At a time when the economy had an
encouraging rate of growth and had already crossed the
threshold of an industrial revolution, he had some success in
defining a positive governmental role. In the thirties his party
followers made a good run against the prevailing Democratic
opinion, which called for a limited national government, equal
rights, and individualism. But after the stalemate of 1841, the
Whigs had a long period ahead as a minority party. Further-
more, the crucial question of slavery obscured objectives Clay
might have implemented.
During the Civil War, a decade after the Kentuckian's
death, however, Lincoln and the Republican party imple-
mented much of the American System.18 From the beginning
of his political career, the president had been a confirmed
Whig and follower of Clay. When he had served in the Illinois
legislature in the thirties, he was a leader in promoting an
ambitious internal improvement program of roads and canals
for the state. He had also urged distribution of national land
proceeds. Despite little help from that direction, the state em-
barked on an extensive, if financially disastrous, effort on its
own.19 Nonetheless, Lincoln never abandoned the underlying
rationale. His party put important measures through Con-
gress for transcontinental railroads, subsidized generously by
federal land grants and loans directly to private companies,
such as the Union Pacific. To be sure, the formula was some-
what different than Clay's proposals to distribute funds from
land sales to states for developing transportation, but the
basic idea was the same: a modern economy in peace or war
required a good infrastructure, whose development govern-
ment ought to assist.20
Another wartime policy persisting in the years ahead
was a much higher tariff than those of the preceding fifteen
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years or earlier. The thrust came from the boundless need for
ever larger revenue, .still primarily derived from customs re-
ceipts. But the president and his party in Congress also justi-
fied this trend as desirable protection for industry, as Clay
and other Whigs had previously.
Equally noteworthy is the impact of the war and Whig-
gish ideology upon banking. The disarray of hundreds of state-
chartered banks and the consequent confusion of their note
issues as well as other operations posed a serious problem in
financing the Union cause. So a remedy was establishment of
national banks with fiscal and monetary functions that Clay
and Nicholas Biddle would have approved.
It is incorrect to attribute these changes entirely to a sup-
posed presidential dominance of Congress or to a neo-Whig-
Republican majority there. They came about when they did, in
large part, because of conditions during the conflict. But that
is not to say that they would have assumed the same shape if a
Jacksonian Democratic administration had been in power. In
the White House Lincoln would recall his long attachment to
Clay's American System. He still remembered the Kentuckian
as "the beau ideal of a statesman."21
Appendix
Tariff and Prices at New York
Year
1824R
1825
1828R
1829
1832L
1833L
1841
1842R
1843
1846L
1847
Textiles
191
198
190
182
161
162
140
132
114
122
117
Metals
242
279
234
229
212
205
204
183
172
191
186
Prices are based upon an index of 100 for the years 1910-14.
R =raised tariff rates. L =lowered rates. Source: Historical Sta-
tistics, part 1 (Washington, D.C., 1975), 201.
Tariff and Volume of Imports
In a comprehensive study ofannual tariffrates and the volume
of imported textiles and metal products, 1823-43, Victor S.
Clark, History ofManufactures in the United States, 1607-1860
(Washington, D.C., 1929), 1: 604-10, concludes, "Any analysis
that we may make of these figures brings us at least to the
negative conclusion that rates of duty had little effect upon the
fluctuation ofquantity of imports from year to year, and there-
fore upon the evenness offoreign competition."
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